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In the October 2024 flash floods in Spain, social media posts falsely claimed authorities were concealing the number of casualties. The narrative centered on a flooded parking structure in Valencia, where hundreds of bodies were falsely claimed to be trapped. This narrative gained traction even after videos showing the premises had been evacuated.

Fact-checking has become a key response to disinformation during crises and conflicts, but its role is increasingly contested due to concerns about its effectiveness and its co-optation by different political actors. In polarized, high-choice environments, fact-checking is often embedded within partisan and state-aligned infrastructures, shaping validation and rejection of knowledge claims.

Major platforms constantly claim to fight disinformation and support the fact checking community, but their transparency reports and the empirical evidence from a survey of expert fact checkers across 21 EU countries show a different reality. This study finds that despite commitments made under EU regulations, expert fact checkers remain largely peripheral actors within the existing platform governance framework, with limited insight into how their work influences platform decisions.

We conducted an expert survey of almost a hundred academics, fact checkers, and journalists who actively work towards mitigating disinformation and providing policy advice in the European context to examine whether they share views on generative artificial intelligence’s (AI) role in disinformation.

Misinformation and conspiracy theories are often grouped together, but do people believe in them for the same reasons? This study examines how these conceptually distinct forms of deceptive content are processed and believed using the COVID-19 pandemic as context. Surprisingly, despite their theoretical differences, belief in both is predicted by similar psychological factors—particularly conspiracy mentality and the perception that truth is politically constructed—suggesting that underlying distrust in institutions may outweigh differences in types of deceptive content in shaping susceptibility.

Some of today’s most popular large language model (LLM)-powered chatbots occasionally reference Kremlin-linked disinformation websites, but it might not be for the reasons many fear. While some recent studies have claimed that Russian actors are “grooming” LLMs by flooding the web with disinformation, our small-scale analysis finds little evidence for this.

Outside China, WeChat is a conduit for translating and circulating English-language information among the Chinese diaspora. Australian domestic political campaigns exploit the gaps between platform governance and national media policy, using Chinese-language digital media outlets that publish through WeChat’s “Official Accounts” feature, to reproduce disinformation from English-language sources.

The potential for harm entrenched in mis- and disinformation content, regardless of intentionality, opens space for a new analytical agenda to investigate the weaponization of identity-based features like gender, race, and ethnicity through the lens of violence. Therefore, we lay out the triangle of violence to support new studies aiming to investigate multimedia content, victims, and audiences of false claims.

We used a modified Delphi method to elicit and synthesize experts’ views on disinformation, misinformation, and malign influence (DMMI). In a three-part process, experts first independently generated a range of effective strategies for combatting DMMI, identified the most impactful barriers to combatting DMMI, and proposed areas for future research.