

Appendix F: Item-level descriptive statistics

This appendix reports item-level means and standard deviations (SDs) on the original response scales, alongside the aggregated percentages used in the main text and figures, so that the distributions behind the top-category summaries are fully transparent. Aggregation follows the convention of the figures: the two highest categories for 5-point scales, the three highest for the 7-point threat block (Q10, “high” or higher), and the two highest for the 4-point research-obstacles block (Q23, “moderate” or “major” obstacle). For Q8, the percentage shown is the share answering “about as important,” with “I don’t know” responses included in the denominator; Q8 means and SDs are computed on the 1–3 scale excluding “I don’t know.” Denominators vary by block under pairwise deletion (see Appendix A).

Q8. Relative importance of disinformation vs. other societal problems (1 = Less important; 2 = About as important; 3 = More important; 4 = I don’t know [excluded from mean/SD])

Table F1. *Relative importance of disinformation compared with other societal problems: item means, standard deviations, and share answering “about as important.”*

Item	N	M	SD	% high
Climate change	98 (102)	1.89	0.59	62
Racism	99 (102)	2.07	0.66	55
Sexism	99 (102)	2.12	0.69	50
Armed conflicts	99 (102)	1.77	0.60	57
Precarity	97 (101)	1.93	0.73	46
Democratic decline	98 (102)	2.10	0.53	69
Infectious diseases	97 (102)	1.90	0.77	38

Q9. Perceived impact of disinformation (1 = Strongly disagree ... 5 = Strongly agree)

Table F2. *Perceived impact of disinformation: item means, standard deviations, and percentage agreeing.*

Item	N	M	SD	% high
A disinformation campaign can decisively change an election result	101	4.05	1.06	83
Foreign disinformation campaigns are a major threat to democracy	102	4.36	0.87	90
Disinformation played an important role in Trump’s 2016 election	102	3.98	0.98	71
Disinformation plays an important role in Russian support for the war in Ukraine	102	4.24	0.85	87
Disinformation played an important role in the rise of populist parties in Europe	102	4.05	1.03	80

Item	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	% high
Disinformation played an important role in Covid-19 vaccine hesitancy	102	4.15	1.03	81
Social networks make it easy to influence voters' choices	102	4.17	0.91	80
Disinformation plays an important role in distrust toward the State	102	4.09	1.02	78

Q10. Perceived threats to the information environment (1 = Not a threat at all; 2 = Very low; 3 = Low; 4 = Moderate; 5 = High; 6 = Very high; 7 = The greatest threat)

Table F3. *Perceived threats to the information environment by actor type: item means, standard deviations, and percentage rating "high" or higher.*

Item	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	% high
Private media	101	4.82	1.08	63
Owners or leaders of social media platforms	101	5.79	1.04	91
Government, politicians, or parties of my country	101	4.67	1.13	57
Activists or militants	101	4.41	1.24	47
Ordinary citizens	101	3.49	1.22	18
Foreign governments, politicians or parties	101	5.14	1.17	69
State-supported or state-controlled media	101	4.17	1.57	41
Journalists or press organizations	101	3.67	1.36	22

Q12. Reasons why people believe disinformation (1 = Not at all; 2 = A little; 3 = Moderately; 4 = A lot; 5 = Enormously)

Table F4. *Reasons why people believe disinformation: item means, standard deviations, and percentage answering "a lot" or "enormously."*

Item	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	% high
Ignorance	99	3.54	1.12	57
Political or identity-based motivations	99	4.04	0.77	79
Confirmation bias and selective exposure	99	4.36	0.69	90
Limited reflection, intuition rather than analysis	99	3.80	0.93	68
Strong emotional reactions	99	4.15	0.75	83
Repetition that makes information familiar and 'true'	99	4.03	0.71	81
Lack of time or information overload	99	3.68	0.97	57
Promotion of certain content by algorithms	99	4.24	0.74	84
Lack of trust in institutions or experts	99	3.81	0.84	65
Low skills for verifying information	99	3.68	1.00	65

Q13. Beliefs about how disinformation spreads (1 = Strongly disagree ... 5 = Strongly agree)

Table F5. *Beliefs about how disinformation spreads: item means, standard deviations, and percentage agreeing.*

Item	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	% high
People encounter opposing opinions more often offline than online	96	3.20	1.12	45
Fact-checking reduces false beliefs on average	96	3.29	1.06	53
Problem comes mainly from demand (public actively seeks content)	96	2.94	1.15	39
Problem comes mainly from supply (massive dissemination)	96	3.86	1.00	76
Offline channels play a role as important as social networks	96	3.25	1.12	48
Recommendation algorithms strongly influence political opinions	96	4.11	0.84	85

Q15. Expected developments (next 3–5 years) (1 = Very unlikely ... 5 = Very likely)

Table F6. *Expected developments over the next 3–5 years: item means, standard deviations, and percentage rating “somewhat likely” or “very likely.”*

Item	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	% high
States’ capacity to deal with disinformation will increase	99	3.42	1.03	60
Increased capacity will be sufficient to contain disinformation	99	2.28	0.89	13
Foreign interference will increase, with greater sophistication	99	4.51	0.86	96
Proportion of false or manipulated content will increase	99	4.43	0.92	93
Public trust in media, science, and institutions will decrease	99	4.10	0.91	83

Q16. Obstacles to combating disinformation (1 = Not at all problematic ... 5 = Extremely problematic)

Table F7. *Obstacles to combating disinformation: item means, standard deviations, and percentage rating “very” or “extremely problematic.”*

Item	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	% high
Insufficient resources (budgets and staff)	93	3.74	0.88	65
Unclear roles and coordination, no lead actor	93	3.58	0.91	54
Legal framework protects false but lawful content	93	3.31	0.90	43
Administrative slowness	93	3.71	0.87	63
Political commitment limited, concrete resources insufficient	93	3.94	0.88	76
Lobbying by large digital companies	93	3.99	0.83	70
Scarce skills, difficult to retain specialists	93	3.65	0.95	52
Fear of being accused of censorship	93	3.68	0.91	63
Lack of operational tools and shared indicators	93	3.60	0.89	55
Public policies react after the fact	93	3.96	0.79	71

Q19. Information sources on disinformation (1 = Never; 2 = Rarely; 3 = Sometimes; 4 = Often; 5 = Very often)

Table F8. *Information sources on disinformation: item means, standard deviations, and percentage answering “often” or “very often.”*

Item	N	M	SD	% high
Books	94	2.97	1.17	31
Scientific articles (peer-reviewed)	94	2.98	1.32	41
Press articles	94	3.79	0.93	65
Gray literature or popularization	94	3.35	1.15	50
Posts on social networks	94	3.17	1.20	39

Q22. Engagement with scientific research (1 = Strongly disagree ... 5 = Strongly agree)

Table F9. *Engagement with scientific research: item means, standard deviations, and percentage agreeing.*

Item	N	M	SD	% high
I keep up to date with recent academic research	91	2.90	1.18	36
I know the main points of scientific consensus	91	3.43	1.06	57
I trust peer-reviewed results to guide decisions	91	3.91	0.75	71
Academic results sufficiently concrete for my institution	91	3.38	0.85	48
My institution’s practices regularly rely on scientific evidence	91	3.54	0.87	48
My institution regularly collaborates with researchers	91	3.35	1.23	49

Q23. Obstacles to using scientific research (1 = Not an obstacle; 2 = Minor obstacle; 3 = Moderate obstacle; 4 = Major obstacle)

Table F10. *Obstacles to using scientific research: item means, standard deviations, and percentage rating “moderate” or “major obstacle.”*

Item	N	M	SD	% high
Lack of time to read and digest articles	87	3.25	0.75	89
Language barrier (English, scientific jargon)	87	2.29	0.96	46
Limited access (paywalls, no reliable summaries)	87	2.93	0.93	66
Difficulties in methodological understanding	87	2.37	0.95	45
Applicability perceived as low	87	2.57	0.98	54
Lack of institutional incentives or resources	88	2.76	0.99	64

Note: For Q8, N is shown as “basis for mean/SD (n including “I don’t know”).” “% high” follows each block’s rule stated above.