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Research Article

White consciousness helps explain conspiracy thinking

While conspiracy theories have long been tied to race, ethnicity, and religion, understanding this relationship is increasingly important in countries where White identity has become politically charged. This study finds that those high in White consciousness are more likely to 1) engage in generalized conspiracy thinking, 2) endorse the racist "great replacement" conspiracy theory, and 3) move from generalized conspiracy thinking to endorsing specific, non-racial conspiracy theories. The link between White consciousness and conspiracy thinking has implications for those interested in mitigating its antipluralist outcomes.

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Research questions

- Does White consciousness help explain "great replacement" conspiracy beliefs?
- Are those high in White consciousness more likely to engage in generalized conspiracy thinking?
- Do White consciousness and conspiracy thinking interact when explaining non-racial conspiracy theory beliefs?

Essay summary

- White consciousness is "a psychological, internalized sense of attachment" (Jardina, 2019, p. 4) to a White in-group (White identity) combined with "a political awareness or ideology regarding the group's relative position in society along with a commitment to collective action aimed at realizing the group's interests" (Miller et al., 1981, p. 474)
- I conducted a survey of White Canadians which measured their 1) levels of White consciousness, 2) levels of generalized conspiracy thinking, 3) beliefs about the so-called "great replacement" conspiracy theory, and 4) beliefs about several other, non-racial conspiracy theories.
- Those high in White consciousness were much more likely to endorse the "great replacement" conspiracy theory, which alleges that governments and corporations are purposely allowing foreigners into the country to replace White workers and culture. Only 57% of White respondents

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- rejected this view outright, and those strongest in White consciousness were much more likely to espouse "great replacement" views than those weakest in it.
- Respondents' levels of White consciousness strongly predicted levels of generalized conspiracy thinking, or the broad tendency to see the world as being controlled through secret plots by malevolent actors.
- White consciousness makes the effect of generalized conspiracy thinking stronger when
 predicting specific conspiracy theory endorsement, even for conspiracy theories that are not
 directly related to race, ethnicity, or religion. The impact of conspiracy thinking on non-racial
 conspiracy endorsement is almost 60% greater for those highest in White consciousness than
 those who are lowest.
- While conspiracy theories have long been tied to race, ethnicity and religion, researchers and
 practitioners interested in mitigating the harmful effects of White identity on conspiracy belief
 must first better understand the mechanisms linking them.

Implications

Conspiracy theories have long been closely tied to race, religion, and ethnicity. From antisemitic conspiracy theories in the high medieval period to the more recent "birther" conspiracy in the United States (Enders et al., 2020; Simonsen, 2020), the delineation of "us" and "them" along ethno-racial and religious lines promotes the belief that these groups are locked in a primordial, zero-sum contest, where better outcomes for one group leads to worse outcomes for another. In turn, this can lead members of more powerful groups to believe historically disadvantaged groups are conspiring to usurp power or otherwise subvert the established order. If we can better understand how and why ethnic and racial identities lead people to conspiracy beliefs, we can develop strategies to counteract their negative consequences.

I found that White identity is related to conspiracy thinking in at least three ways. First, the strength of White consciousness helps explain specific beliefs about the "great replacement" conspiracy theory: The explicitly racist view that governments and corporations are purposely promoting immigration to "replace" the White population with people of color for political and economic gain. Second, those high in White consciousness are more likely to engage in generalized conspiracy thinking. Here, conspiracy thinking refers to "an individual's underlying propensity to view the world in conspiratorial terms" (Uscinski et al., 2016, p. 58), and corresponds to a set of stable attitudes in an ideological belief system (Imhoff & Bruder, 2014). Finally, I show that White consciousness and conspiracy thinking interact with each other, producing effects that are greater than the sum of their parts. Specifically, White consciousness makes conspiracy thinking stronger when it comes to non-racial conspiracy theory endorsement—that is, conspiracy theories that have no explicit link to relations between ethnic, racial or religious groups. Here again, conspiracy endorsement refers to belief in *specific* conspiracy theories (e.g., "climate change is a hoax") versus conspiracy thinking, which refers to a *generalized* propensity to see the world in conspiratorial terms.

The longstanding relationship between White consciousness and conspiracy belief is important in a context where White identity has become increasingly consequential in advanced democracies. As a psychological attachment to a White in-group, White identity can become politicized into White consciousness if identifiers believe their future life prospects are tied to the outcomes of their group overall—in this case, of White people writ large (McClain et al., 2009). White identity is often activated by status threat, represented by any perceived challenge to the power or privilege that White people have historically enjoyed in racialized, White-majority societies. Jardina (2019) found that the election of President Barack Obama and the changing racial makeup of the United States signaled a challenge to

Whites' dominant position in society, thus triggering a perception that Whiteness is under attack. When confronted with their relative numerical decline in society, White people become more positively disposed towards other White people, more negatively disposed towards ethnic minorities, and more supportive of policies which promote the interest of their group at the expense of other groups (Beauvais & Stolle, 2022; Danbold & Huo, 2015; Outten et al., 2012). Indeed, conspiracy thinking often emerges in a context where a group feels threatened by outside forces seemingly beyond their control, led by a perception that malevolent forces are "out to get" them.

On one hand, these results should not be surprising; White people have created systems which favor themselves over other racial groups in White-majority countries, and since White identifiers (those who have a psychological attachment to a White in-group) tend to see inter-group relations in zero-sum terms (Snagovsky, 2020), they may be suspicious that the pursuit of racial equality will come at the expense of their privileged position in society. This explains why a stronger attachment to a White in-group is associated with the belief that powerful, secret, and malevolent forces control major events and thus pose a threat to the established order. This also suggests that stronger attachment to a historically privileged racial identity is tied to beliefs that this identity is under threat, which explains why White identifiers are more likely to believe themselves the victims of a secret plot to "replace" them.

On the other hand, the finding that White consciousness and conspiracy thinking interact to explain non-racial conspiracy theories is unexpected. Here, the impact of conspiracy thinking on the endorsement of non-racial conspiracy theories is almost 60% greater for those White respondents who were most firmly attached to their Whiteness, when compared to those White people most weakly attached to it. This suggests that while the impact of White identity may have started as a fear of other groups displacing pro-White power structures, it may have bled over into seeing conspiracies in all manner of places, from climate change to the COVID-19 pandemic. Here, it is worth noting that as a correlational study, this analysis cannot make any claims about causality, and alternative explanations for this relationship may be possible. In particular, more research is needed to understand how factors like left-right ideology affect these variables (beyond what is captured in the control variables).

How might researchers and practitioners develop strategies to weaken the pathway from White consciousness to conspiracy belief? Future research should examine which specific elements of White consciousness make conspiracy thinking stronger; is mere attachment to a powerful group enough to make group members think that other groups are out to get them, or is there something particular about White consciousness that triggers this relationship? Indeed, political elites, especially on the ideological right, have long sought to mobilize White grievance for political gain, in part by seeking to convince White people that they belong to a group which is under siege from globalist forces outside of their control. If it turns out there is something special about White consciousness, practitioners should turn their attention to discrediting the narratives promoted by these elites in the eyes of White identifiers specifically; untargeted, broad-based condemnation of these views is unlikely to be enough. On the other hand, if being attached to any privileged identity is enough to stimulate conspiracy thinking, practitioners should examine ways to convince White identifiers that inter-group relations need not lead to zero-sum outcomes, where gains for one group represent losses for another.

Finally, this study was conducted in Canada, a diverse settler society where racial and ethnic relations are much less polarized than in a country like the United States. In this respect, Canada is much more comparable to other advanced democracies, such as Australia, the United Kingdom, and others in Western Europe. The fact that White consciousness has such powerful consequences for conspiracy belief in this context should serve as a wake-up call for those who are inclined to think that this relationship is only relevant in a country like the United States. Indeed, the impacts of White consciousness transcend the "usual suspects," and it is imperative to better understand its impacts in a global context.

Findings

Finding 1: Those high in White consciousness are more likely to believe in the "great replacement" conspiracy theory.

I created indices which measured respondents' attachment and political commitment to a White racial identity (White consciousness) as well as their tendency to engage in conspiracy thinking. The strength of White consciousness predicted specific beliefs about the so-called "great replacement" conspiracy theory, as measured by the view that "governments and corporations are purposely allowing foreigners into the country to replace White workers and culture." Only 57% of White respondents rejected this view outright, with 13% believing it was more likely to be true than a non-conspiratorial alternative, and an additional 18% thought the two were equally likely (12% were not sure). However, as Figure 1 shows, for every standard deviation unit increase in the strength of White consciousness, there is a 2-times increase in the odds ratio of moving up one point in endorsing this conspiracy theory (i.e., moving from rejecting the view to thinking it was plausible, or from thinking it was plausible to endorsing this view).




Figure 1. Predictors of the "great replacement" conspiracy theory. Points represent odds ratios from an ordinal logistic regression with 95% confidence intervals. Index variables (conspiracy thinking and White consciousness) have been standardized to have a mean of 0 and variance of 1. The dependent variable is attitudes towards the "great replacement" conspiracy theories (3-point scale), where more positive coefficients represent a greater likelihood of endorsing the conspiracy. Respondents who selected "don't know" were excluded from the analysis. N = 1,362.

These effects were present even after controlling for generalized conspiracy thinking, where an increase of one standard deviation unit was associated with a 2.6-unit increase in the odds ratio of endorsing this specific conspiracy. This represents a greater increase than the strength of White consciousness, though the two effects are not statistically different from each other. Many of the same predictors of conspiracy

thinking also explained attitudes towards the great replacement conspiracy theory: Those who were more politically interested, less satisfied with democracy, and more right-wing were more likely to endorse this view. Wealthier respondents were less likely to endorse the White replacement conspiracy theory, an effect which was not present for conspiracy thinking in general.

Finding 2: Those high in White consciousness are more likely to engage in conspiracy thinking.

As Figure 2 shows, there is a strong relationship between White consciousness and conspiracy thinking: As the strength of White consciousness increases, so too does the likelihood that a respondent engages in conspiracy thinking. This relationship is present even when accounting for several alternative explanations of conspiracy thinking, including age, gender, education, income, political interest, political knowledge, right-wing ideology, satisfaction with democracy, and whether the respondent lives in the Canadian province of Québec. For every standard deviation unit increase in the strength of a respondent's White consciousness, the respondents' level of conspiracy thinking is likely to be 0.28 standard deviation units greater. This is a strong relationship. Women, those who were more satisfied with democracy, those with higher levels of political interest, and those with greater political knowledge were also less likely to engage in conspiracy thinking. By contrast, respondents who self-identified as being on the right of the political spectrum were more likely to engage in conspiracy thinking. As Appendix G shows, part of this relationship is driven by ethno-racial consciousness more broadly, as ethnic minority respondents higher in ethnic consciousness also have higher levels of conspiracy thinking. However, the effect is stronger for White respondents, and the difference between the groups is statistically significant (p < .05).




Figure 2. Predictors of conspiracy thinking. Points represent ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. Index variables (conspiracy thinking and White consciousness) have been standardized to have a mean of 0 and variance of 1. The dependent variable is conspiracy thinking, where more positive coefficients represent greater levels of conspiracy thinking. N = 1,539.

Finding 3: White consciousness makes the effect of conspiracy thinking stronger, even for non-racial conspiracy theories.

While White consciousness predicts conspiracy thinking, and both help predict "great replacement" beliefs, White consciousness also makes conspiracy thinking stronger when it comes to non-racial conspiracy theories. Figures 3 and 4 show the results of an interaction between White consciousness and conspiracy thinking. Here, the dependent variable is an index where higher values correspond to greater belief in a range of non-racial conspiracy theories, including those about COVID-19 and vaccines, climate change, the World Economic Forum (WEF), the "deep state," "15-minute cities," and election interference.




Figure 3. Predictors of non-racial conspiracy endorsement. Points represent ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. Index variables (conspiracy endorsement, conspiracy thinking, and White consciousness) have been standardized to have a mean of 0 and variance of 1. The dependent variable is conspiracy endorsement, where more positive coefficients represent a greater likelihood of endorsing a range of conspiracy theories (see Appendix B for question wordings). N = 1,529.




Figure 4. Predicted effects of conspiracy thinking on conspiracy endorsement at various levels of White consciousness. All three variables have been standardized to have a mean of 0 and variance of 1. Shaded area represents 95% confidence intervals. Control variables from the model in Figure 3 are held constant at their means. N = 1,529.

As Figures 3 and 4 show, White consciousness interacts with conspiracy thinking when explaining non-racial conspiracy beliefs, even when controlling for a range of other explanatory factors. While conspiracy thinking is the strongest determinant of non-racial conspiracy endorsement, the strength of its impact depends on respondents' level of White consciousness: At the lowest level of White consciousness, a one standard deviation rise in conspiracy thinking increases beliefs about non-racial conspiracies by approximately 0.32 standard deviations. By contrast, at the highest level of White consciousness, the effect of conspiracy thinking rises to 0.51 standard deviation units (representing a 58% increase). University education, living in Québec, and greater satisfaction with democracy are all associated with a lower level of conspiracy endorsement, while right-wing self-placement continues to be associated with a greater level of conspiracy endorsement in this model.

Methods

I conducted a survey of Canadian adults, which was administered through Qualtrics and fielded through Cint/Lucid Marketplace from April 21–May 01, 2023. The sample was stratified according to age, gender, and province, and was deployed in both English and French. After White respondents were isolated from the broader sample, I was left with 1,556 valid responses. The characteristics of White respondents according to sampling criteria (age, gender, province) closely matched those of non-visible minority Canadians according to the 2021 census (see Appendix A).

I followed Uscinski et al. (2016) in measuring conspiracy thinking using a four-item, 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree):

- 1. Much of our lives is being controlled by plots hatched in secret places.
- 2. Even though we live in a democracy, a few people will always run things anyway.
- 3. The people who really 'run' the country, are not known to the voters.
- 4. Big events like wars, the current recession, and the outcomes of elections are controlled by small groups of people who are working in secret against the rest of us.

A Cronbach's alpha value of 0.83 indicates the scale had excellent internal consistency.

I adapted the approach advanced by Clifford et al. (2019) to measure conspiracy endorsement in which they argue offering respondents a binary choice of two statements (one corresponding to a conspiracy theory and the other to a "conventional" explanation for a phenomenon) produces more accurate estimates than Likert-type questions. I modified this approach to include a third option indicating "both of these are equally likely." White replacement was measured by asking which of the following statements was most likely to be true (with additional options for "both of these are equally likely" and "not sure"): "Governments and corporations are purposely allowing into the country to White workers and culture" or "Immigration decisions in Canada are made on economic and humanitarian grounds." The responses were recoded into a 3-point scale corresponding to an ordinal variable ranging from least to most conspiratorial (1 = non-conspiracy theory statement, 2 = both of these are equally likely, and 3 = conspiracy theory statement).

Respondents answered in the same format for nine non-racial conspiracy theories, choosing between two sets of statements. While the exact question wording is available in Appendix B, these conspiracy theories touched on the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, the World Economic Forum (WEF), the "deep state," "15-minute cities," and election interference. Responses were re-coded into a three-point scale as per above. A Cronbach's alpha of 0.85 indicated the scale had excellent internal consistency.

I expanded Jardina's (2019) White identity battery into an eight-item measure of White consciousness:

- 1. How important is being White to your identity?
- 2. How strongly do you identify with other White people?
- 3. What happens to White people in this country will have something to do with what happens in my life.
- 4. When people criticize White people, it feels like a personal insult.
- 5. When I meet someone who is White, I feel connected with this person.
- 6. When I speak about White people, I feel like I am talking about "my" people
- 7. When people praise White people, it makes me feel good.
- 8. I have a strong attachment to other White people.

Items 1 and 2 were asked as stand-alone questions, while respondents were asked to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed with the statements in items 3–8. A Cronbach's alpha of 0.9 indicates excellent internal scale consistency. All three scales (conspiracy thinking, conspiracy endorsement, and White identity) were standardized to have a mean of 0 and a variance of 1.

The estimates in Figures 1, 3, and 4 come from ordinal least squares (OLS) regression since the dependent variables (conspiracy thinking and conspiracy endorsement) are continuous. The estimates in Figure 2 are odds ratios from an ordinal logistic regression since the dependent variable (White replacement beliefs) corresponds to a three-point scale. All models control for age (both as years and as years-squared to account for curvilinear effects), gender, university education, income, political interest, political knowledge, left-right ideological self-placement, satisfaction with democracy, and whether the respondent lives in Québec (see Appendix B for exact question wording).

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Competing interests

The author declares no competing interests.

Ethics

The research protocol for this study was approved by the University of Alberta Human Research Ethics Board (Pro00113410). Survey participants provided informed consent prior to participating in the survey. Gender categories used in the study were defined by the researcher and were necessary to examine whether different gender groups had different levels of conspiracy endorsement.

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Data availability

All materials needed to replicate this study are available via the Harvard Dataverse: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/BS9OAZ

Appendix A: Quality control measures for survey

While the survey was being fielded, several quality control measures were implemented. Respondents were excluded from the survey if they did not meet the inclusion criteria (under 18, living outside of Canada), straight-lined through the survey, failed three attention check questions, or sped through the survey. "Don't know" responses were considered missing data. The characteristics of White respondents according to sampling criteria (age, gender, province) closely matched those of non-visible minority Canadians according to the 2021 census.

Table A1. Sample composition.

Characteristic	% Sample	% Population	Difference
Alberta	10.03	11.00	0.97%
British Columbia	13.62	12.30	-1.32%
Manitoba	3.53	3.70	0.17%
New Brunswick	2.83	2.70	-0.13%
Newfoundland and Labrador	1.74	1.90	0.16%
Northwest Territories	0.00	0.10	0.10%
Nova Scotia	3.15	3.30	0.15%
Ontario	36.18	34.80	-1.38%
Prince Edward Island	0.45	0.50	0.05%
Quebec	25.45	26.00	0.55%
Saskatchewan	2.96	3.40	0.44%
Yukon	0.06	0.10	0.04%
18 to 24 years	8.35	12.00	3.65%
25 to 34 years	13.69	15.00	1.31%
35 to 44 years	15.36	15.00	-0.36%
45 to 54 years	15.87	15.00	-0.87%
55 to 64 years	20.12	19.00	-1.12%
65 years and over	26.61	25.00	-1.61%
Woman	49.87	49.22%	-0.65%
Man	49.10	50.78%	1.68%
Another gender	1.03		-1.03%

Note: Data for 18–24-year-olds in the population are taken from the proportion of White people who are 15–24.

Appendix B: Survey question wording

Age

First, how old are you?

Gender

Do you self-identify as:

- A woman
- A man
- Transgender
- Two-spirited
- Gender-fluid and/or non-binary
- Another (please specify)
- I prefer not to answer

Education

What is the highest level of education that you have completed?

Income

What was your total household income, before taxes, for the year 2022?

Political interest

How interested are you in each of the following levels of politics? Set the slider to a number from 0 to 10, where 0 means no interest at all, and 10 means a great deal of interest: national politics

Political knowledge

We would like to see how widely known some political figures are. Please answer off the top of your head without checking online.

- Do you happen to recall the name of the Premier of your Province? [multiple choice]
- What is the name of the federal Minister of Finance? [multiple choice]
- What is the name of the current Governor-General of Canada? [multiple choice]

Left-right ideology

In politics, people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means very left-wing, and 10 means very right-wing?

Satisfaction with democracy

On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not satisfied at all with the way democracy works in Canada?

Conspiracy endorsement

Nine conspiracy theories were examined by offering respondents a binary choice (as per Clifford et al. 2019) between a conspiracy view and a non-conspiracy view. All options were expanded to include an option to say that "both of these are equally likely" and "don't know."

- 1. "COVID-19 was manufactured in a lab and purposely created to control people." vs. "COVID-19 originated in animals, and jumped between species until infecting humans."
- 2. "Climate change is a hoax put on by world governments." vs. "Climate change is real and caused by human activity."
- 3. "The World Economic Forum (WEF) works in secret against ordinary people." vs. "The World Economic Forum (WEF) works mostly in the open to benefit member countries."
- 4. "The true dangers of vaccines are being hidden by the medical establishment." vs. "Vaccines are safe and highly effective against disease."
- 5. "There is a 'deep state' embedded in the government that operates in secret and without government oversight." vs. "Most government decisions are made by duly elected officials and the civil service."
- 6. "There is a good chance microchips could be implanted through the COVID-19 vaccine." vs. "The COVID-19 vaccine only contains what it says on the vaccine label."
- 7. "Justin Trudeau and the Liberal Party actively worked with the Chinese Communist Party to steal the 2021 federal election." vs. "Chinese interference had a minor impact on the outcome of the 2021 federal election, and the Liberal Party did not seek Chinese support."
- 8. "The government wants to create a system of '15-minute cities' to control where people can and cannot go." vs. "'15-minute cities' are an idea to bring people's basic needs (work, housing, food) closer to them, in order to improve their quality of life."
- 9. "Extreme climate activists, such as those who vandalize famous paintings, are funded and encouraged by the fossil fuel industry in order to discredit the environmental movement." vs. "Extreme climate activists, such as those who vandalize famous paintings, are part of a grassroots movement of citizens who are frustrated with government inaction on climate change."

Item 7 about election interference is very tangentially related to race and ethnicity. Removing it from this index does not have any substantive impact on the scale's internal consistency or on the results in Figures 3 and 4.

Appendix C: Descriptive statistics

Table C1. Descriptive statistics for key variables.

Variable	Obs.	M	SD	Min.	Max.
Conspiracy thinking	1,542	07	.83	-1.58	1.77
Conspiracy endorsement	1,544	04	.70	79	2.24
White replacement	1,367	1.51	.75	1	3
White identity	1,555	14	.75	-1.76	1.52
Age	1,556	50.85	17.27	18	92
Age (squared)	1,556	2883.40	1743.38	324	8,464
Woman	1,554	.50	.50	0	1
University education	1,556	.30	.46	0	1
Income	1,556	4.35	2.75	1	16
Political interest	1,556	6.25	2.84	0	10
Political knowledge	1,556	1.85	.99	0	3
Ideology (right)	1,556	5.07	2.13	0	10
Satisfaction with democracy	1,556	2.66	.83	1	4
Quebec	1,556	.26	.44	0	1

Appendix D: Tables for figures used in the article

The following tables correspond to the estimates used in the figures of the main paper. For completeness, both bivariate and multivariate estimates are presented.

Table D1. Predictors of the "great replacement" conspiracy theory.

Table D1. Predictors of the g		<u>, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , </u>
	(1)	(2)
	White replacement	White replacement
White identity	2.618***	2.095***
	(0.215)	(0.203)
Conspiracy thinking		2.703***
		(0.255)
Age		1.023
		(0.025)
Age (squared)		1.000
		(0.000)
Woman		0.932
		(0.123)
University education		0.772
		(0.120)
Income		0.930**
		(0.023)
Political interest		0.934**
		(0.022)
Political knowledge		0.953
		(0.072)
Ideology (right)		1.218***
		(0.040)
Satisfaction with democracy		0.621***
		(0.052)
Québec		1.070
		(0.155)
Observations	1,367	1,362

Note: Corresponds to Figure 1 in main paper; coefficients are odds-ratios; standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table D2. Predictors of conspiracy thinking.

	(1)	(2)
	Conspiracy thinking	Conspiracy thinking
White identity	0.303***	0.279***
	(0.027)	(0.026)
Age		-0.002
		(0.006)
Age (squared)		-0.000
		(0.000)
Woman		-0.093 [*]
		(0.037)
University education		-0.024
		(0.041)
Income		-0.010
		(0.007)
Political interest		-0.029***
		(0.007)
Political knowledge		-0.067**
		(0.022)
Ideology (right)		0.036***
		(0.009)
Satisfaction with democracy		-0.344***
		(0.023)
Québec		-0.048
		(0.042)
Constant	-0.030	1.303***
	(0.021)	(0.177)
Observations	1,541	1,539

Table D3. Predictors of non-racial conspiracy endorsement.

Tuble D3. Fredictors of non-re		
	(1)	(2)
	Conspiracy	Conspiracy
	endorsement	endorsement
White identity	0.069***	0.064***
	(0.019)	(0.018)
Conspiracy thinking	0.538***	0.420***
	(0.017)	(0.018)
White identity x Conspiracy thinking	0.058**	0.057**
	(0.020)	(0.019)
Age		-0.006
		(0.004)
Age (squared)		0.000
		(0.000)
Woman		-0.011
		(0.026)
University education		-0.091**
		(0.028)
Income		-0.009
		(0.005)
Political interest		-0.004
		(0.005)
Political knowledge		-0.009
		(0.015)
Ideology (right)		0.063***
		(0.006)
Satisfaction with democracy		-0.152***
		(0.017)
Québec		-0.086**
		(0.029)
Constant	0.004	0.476***
	(0.014)	(0.123)
Observations	1,531	1,529

Note: Corresponds to Figure 3 in main paper; standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Table D4. Predicted effects of conspiracy thinking on conspiracy endorsement at various levels of White identity (WI).

паении	y (vvi).
	Mean
WI = -1.75	0.320***
	(0.035)
WI = -1.5	0.334***
	(0.031)
WI = -1.25	0.349***
	(0.027)
WI = -1.0	0.363***
	(0.024)
WI = -0.75	0.377***
	(0.021)
WI = -0.5	0.391***
	(0.019)
WI = -0.25	0.406***
	(0.018)
WI = 0	0.420***
	(0.018)
WI = 0.25	0.434***
	(0.019)
WI = 0.5	0.449***
	(0.021)
WI = 0.75	0.463***
	(0.024)
WI = 1.0	0.477***
	(0.027)
WI = 1.25	0.491***
	(0.031)
WI = 1.5	0.506***
	(0.035)
Observations	1529

Note: Corresponds to $\overline{Figure\ 4}$ in main paper; marginal effects; standard errors in parentheses; (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Appendix E: Null treatment effects for separate experiment

A separate experiment was conducted within the same survey on the effects of perceived demographic change on White identity. Respondents read either one of three fictional vignettes about changing demographics or a control article where respondents read about hikers discovering a large icicle.

To verify that this experiment had no impact on the present study about conspiracy endorsement, the analyses in Tables D1–D4 (and correspondingly Figures 1–4 of the main paper) were repeated for only those respondents in the control group. The results were substantively identical but with a corresponding loss of power given the smaller sample size. Tables E1–E4 present these results. For completeness, both bivariate and multivariate estimates are presented.

Table E1. Predictors of the "great replacement" conspiracy theory (control group only).

	(1)	(2)
	White replacement	White replacement
White identity	2.400***	1.565 [*]
	(0.415)	(0.323)
Conspiracy thinking		2.685***
		(0.490)
Age		1.021
		(0.051)
Age (squared)		1.000
		(0.001)
Woman		0.713
		(0.199)
University education		0.560
		(0.183)
Income		0.980
		(0.050)
Political interest		0.918
		(0.045)
Political knowledge		1.191
		(0.179)
Ideology (right)		1.219**
		(0.078)
Satisfaction with democracy		0.673 [*]
		(0.114)
Québec		0.792
		(0.253)
Observations	337	337

Note: Corresponds to Figure 1 in main paper but using only the subset of the sample which did not receive the demographic change treatment; coefficients are odds-ratios; standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table E2. Predictors of conspiracy thinking (control group only).

	(1)	(2)
	Conspiracy thinking	Conspiracy thinking
White identity	0.357***	0.369***
	(0.060)	(0.058)
Age		0.012
		(0.014)
Age (squared)		-0.000
		(0.000)
Woman		-0.094
		(0.079)
University education		-0.063
		(0.088)
Income		-0.004
		(0.015)
Political interest		-0.012
		(0.015)
Political knowledge		-0.077
		(0.044)
Ideology (right)		0.013
		(0.018)
Satisfaction with democracy		-0.394***
		(0.046)
Québec		0.015
		(0.094)
Constant	0.020	1.188**
	(0.044)	(0.366)
Observations	386	386

Note: $\overline{\text{Corresponds to Figure 2 in main paper but using only the subset of the sample which did not receive the demographic change treatment; standard errors in parentheses; * <math>p < .05$, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table E3. Predictors of non-racial conspiracy endorsement (control group only).

Tuble ES. Fredictors of non-rucial consp	(1)	(2)
	Conspiracy	Conspiracy
	endorsement	endorsement
White identity	0.097*	0.064
write identity	(0.041)	(0.041)
Conspiracy thinking	0.530***	0.428***
conspiracy trimining	(0.035)	(0.037)
White identity x Conspiracy thinking	0.103*	0.092*
armed account of a compared of a minimage	(0.044)	(0.042)
Age	(6.6)	0.006
		(0.009)
Age (squared)		-0.000
		(0.000)
Woman		-0.046
		(0.055)
University education		-0.113
		(0.061)
Income		0.003
		(0.010)
Political interest		0.004
		(0.010)
Political knowledge		-0.037
		(0.030)
Ideology (Right)		0.072***
		(0.013)
Satisfaction with democracy		-0.139***
		(0.034)
Québec		-0.072
		(0.064)
Constant	0.049	0.100
	(0.030)	(0.255)
Observations	382	382

Note: $\overline{\text{Corresponds to Figure 3 in main paper but using only the subset of the sample which did not receive the demographic change treatment; standard errors in parentheses; * <math>p < .05$, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table E4. Predicted effects of conspiracy thinking on conspiracy endorsement at various levels of White identity (WI) (control group only).

identity (WI) (control group only).
	Mean
WI = -1.75	0.267***
	(0.073)
WI = -1.5	0.290***
	(0.064)
WI = -1.25	0.313***
	(0.056)
WI = -1.0	0.336***
	(0.048)
WI = -0.75	0.359***
	(0.042)
WI = -0.5	0.382***
	(0.037)
WI = -0.25	0.405***
	(0.035)
WI = 0	0.428***
	(0.037)
WI = 0.25	0.451***
	(0.041)
WI = 0.5	0.474***
	(0.047)
WI = 0.75	0.497***
	(0.054)
WI = 1.0	0.520***
	(0.062)
WI = 1.25	0.543***
	(0.071)
WI = 1.5	0.566***
-	(0.081)
Observations	382

Note: Corresponds to Figure 4 in main paper but using only the subset of the sample which did not receive the demographic change treatment; marginal effects; standard errors in parentheses; (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

Appendix F: Additional variables

During peer review, four additional variables were identified as potential confounders to the effect of White consciousness. Tables F1–F3 re-run the paper's main models including these four. The question wording and alpha values for the scales are below. * indicates items are reverse coded in the index.

Racial resentment ($\alpha = 0.71$)

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, strongly agree)

- The Irish, Italians, Jews and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Visible minorities in Canada should do the same without any special favors.
- Generations of discrimination and unfair treatment have created conditions that make it difficult for visible minorities to work their way out of the lower class.*
- Over the past few years, visible minorities have gotten less than they deserve.*
- It is really a matter of not trying hard enough; if visible minorities would only try harder they could be just as well off as Whites.

Outgroup thermometer (α = 0.9)

There are many kinds of groups in the world: gender, ethnic and religious groups, nationalities, political factions. Set the slider to any number from 0 to 100, where 0 means you really dislike the group and 100 means you really like the group.

- Aboriginal people
- Ethnic minorities
- Muslims
- Jews

White privilege

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, somewhat agree, strongly agree)

White people in Canada enjoy more privilege than people from other ethnic backgrounds.

Perceptions of victimhood (α = 0.73)

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, strongly agree)

- I usually get what I deserve in life.*
- The system works against people like me.
- Sometimes it feels like the world is out to get me.
- People like me are falling behind in society.

White thermometer

There are many kinds of groups in the world: gender, ethnic and religious groups, nationalities, political factions. Set the slider to any number from 0 to 100, where 0 means you really dislike the group and 100 means you really like the group: White people.

Table F1. Predictors of conspiracy thinking (with additional control variables).

	(1)
	Conspiracy thinking
White consciousness	0.219***
	(0.028)
Age	-0.014 [*]
	(0.006)
Age (squared)	0.000
	(0.000)
Woman	-0.070 [*]
	(0.036)
University education	0.038
	(0.039)
Income	0.006
	(0.006)
Political interest	-0.022**
	(0.007)
Political knowledge	-0.052 [*]
	(0.020)
Ideology (right)	0.031***
	(0.009)
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.242***
	(0.023)
Quebec	0.030
	(0.040)
Racial resentment	0.149***
	(0.029)
Outgroup thermometer	0.051 [*]
	(0.026)
White privilege	0.011
	(0.016)
Victimhood	0.349***
	(0.025)
White thermometer	-0.003**
	(0.001)
Constant	1.283***
	(0.192)
Observations	1,520

Note: Standard errors in parentheses: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table F2. Predictors of the "great replacement" conspiracy theory (with additional control variables).

(1) White replacement White consciousness 1.371** (0.153)2.432*** Conspiracy thinking (0.246)0.989 Age (0.025)Age (squared) 1.000 (0.000)Woman 1.078 (0.149)University education 0.791 (0.127)Income 0.948^{*} (0.024)Political interest 0.955 (0.025)Political knowledge 0.956 (0.075)Ideology (right) 1.178*** (0.041)0.756** Satisfaction with democracy (0.067)Quebec 1.006 (0.155)1.664*** Racial resentment (0.186)0.599*** Outgroup thermometer (0.059)White privilege 0.888 (0.055)1.549*** Victimhood (0.160)White thermometer 1.015 (0.004)Observations 1,351

Note: Coefficients are odds ratios; standard errors in parentheses: p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table F3. Predictors of non-racial conspiracy endorsement (with additional control variables).

	(1)
	Conspiracy
	endorsement
White consciousness	0.030
	(0.021)
Conspiracy thinking	0.403***
	(0.019)
White consciousness x Conspiracy thinking	0.054**
	(0.019)
Age	-0.012**
	(0.005)
Age (squared)	0.000
	(0.000)
Woman	-0.000
	(0.026)
University education	-0.078**
	(0.028)
Income	-0.007
	(0.005)
Political interest	-0.004
	(0.005)
Political knowledge	-0.011
	(0.015)
Ideology (right)	0.056***
	(0.006)
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.138***
	(0.017)
Quebec	-0.094**
Build would would	(0.029)
Racial resentment	0.039
Outer and the area are at a s	(0.021)
Outgroup thermometer	-0.003
M/hita minilaga	(0.019)
White privilege	-0.042***
Victimhood	(0.012)
victiiiiiioou	0.032 (0.020)
White thermometer	0.002*
winte thermometer	(0.001)
Constant	0.616***
Constant	(0.142)
Observations	` '
Observations	1510

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Appendix G: Weighted analyses

The analyses in Tables G1–G3 are weighted for age, gender, and province of residence, according to 2016 Census data.

Table G1. Predictors of conspiracy thinking (with survey weights).

Tuble G1. Fredictors of conspiracy trilliking	g (with survey weights).
	(1)
	Conspiracy thinking
White consciousness	0.275***
	(0.026)
Age	-0.004
	(0.007)
Age (squared)	-0.000
	(0.000)
Woman	-0.099**
	(0.038)
University education	-0.033
	(0.041)
Income	-0.009
	(0.007)
Political interest	-0.029***
	(0.007)
Political knowledge	-0.067**
	(0.022)
Ideology (right)	0.037***
	(0.009)
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.352***
	(0.023)
Quebec	-0.049
	(0.042)
Constant	1.390***
	(0.183)
Observations	1,538

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table G2. Predictors of the "great replacement" conspiracy theory (with survey weights).

(1) White replacement White consciousness 2.090*** (0.204)2.721*** Conspiracy thinking (0.258)1.024 Age (0.026)Age (squared) 1.000 (0.000)Woman 0.939 (0.125)University education 0.769 (0.120)0.929**Income (0.024)Political interest 0.937** (0.023)Political knowledge 0.962 (0.073)Ideology (right) 1.214*** (0.040)0.616*** Satisfaction with democracy (0.052)Quebec 1.072 (0.154)Observations 1,361

Note: Coefficients are odds ratios; standard errors in parentheses; p < .05, p < .01, p < .001.

Table G3. Predictors of non-racial conspiracy endorsement (with survey weights).

	(1)
	Conspiracy
	endorsement
White consciousness	0.059**
	(0.018)
Conspiracy thinking	0.416***
	(0.018)
White consciousness x Conspiracy	0.058**
thinking	
	(0.019)
Age	-0.006
	(0.005)
Age (squared)	0.000
	(0.000)
Woman	-0.011
	(0.026)
University education	-0.086**
	(0.028)
Income	-0.010 [*]
	(0.005)
Political interest	-0.003
	(0.005)
Political knowledge	-0.008
	(0.015)
Ideology (right)	0.063***
	(0.006)
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.157***
	(0.017)
Quebec	-0.086**
	(0.028)
Constant	0.492***
	(0.127)
Observations	1,528

Appendix H: Ethnic minority respondents

The analyses in Tables H1—H3 examine ethnic minority respondents. Ethnic consciousness is related to conspiracy thinking for these respondents, but there is no effect for great replacement beliefs and no interaction effect between ethnic consciousness and conspiracy thinking for non-racial conspiracy endorsement.

Table H1. Predictors of conspiracy thinking for ethnic minority respondents.

	(1)
	Conspiracy thinking
Ethnic consciousness	0.166***
	(0.043)
Age	0.022*
	(0.011)
Age (squared)	-0.000*
	(0.000)
Woman	-0.093
	(0.058)
University education	0.046
	(0.061)
Income	-0.024 [*]
	(0.010)
Political interest	-0.024*
	(0.012)
Political knowledge	-0.066 [*]
	(0.030)
Ideology (right)	0.086***
	(0.014)
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.152***
	(0.040)
Quebec	0.001
	(0.082)
Constant	0.112
	(0.247)
Observations	549

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table H2. Predictors of the "great replacement" conspiracy theory for ethnic minority respondents.

	(1)
	White replacement
Ethnic consciousness	0.910
	(0.141)
Conspiracy thinking	2.211***
	(0.355)
Age	1.037
	(0.042)
Age (squared)	1.000
	(0.000)
Woman	1.089
	(0.226)
University education	0.604*
	(0.130)
Income	1.103**
	(0.041)
Political interest	0.995
	(0.040)
Political knowledge	0.819
	(0.086)
Ideology (right)	1.183**
	(0.061)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.768
	(0.107)
Quebec	1.214
	(0.338)
Observations	478

Note: Coefficients are odds ratios; standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table H3. Predictors of non-racial conspiracy endorsement for ethnic minority respondents.

	(1)
	Conspiracy
	endorsement
Ethnic consciousness	-0.038
	(0.036)
Conspiracy thinking	0.388***
	(0.039)
Ethnic consciousness x Conspiracy thinking	-0.024
	(0.045)
Age	0.011
	(0.009)
Age (squared)	-0.000
	(0.000)
Woman	-0.012
	(0.047)
University education	-0.157**
	(0.049)
Income	0.003
	(0.008)
Political interest	0.008
	(0.010)
Political knowledge	-0.080***
	(0.024)
Ideology (right)	0.047***
	(0.011)
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.140***
	(0.033)
Quebec	-0.033
	(0.066)
Constant	0.110
	(0.202)
Observations	544

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Appendix I: Partisanship

The analyses in Tables I1–I3 use partisanship instead of left-right self-placement.

Table 11. Predictors of conspiracy thinking (with Party ID).

Table 11. Predictors of conspiracy think	ang (with Party ID).
	(1)
	Conspiracy thinking
White consciousness	0.240***
	(0.030)
Age	-0.011
	(0.007)
Age (squared)	0.000
	(0.000)
Woman	-0.079*
	(0.038)
University education	0.048
	(0.041)
Income	0.004
B. Dr. Live	(0.007)
Political interest	-0.020**
Deltained horousined as	(0.008)
Political knowledge	-0.063**
Liboral Doub.	(0.022)
Liberal Party	0.000
Consorvative Porty	(.) 0.175***
Conservative Party	
Now Domogratic Party (NDD)	(0.049) 0.003
New Democratic Party (NDP)	
Bloc Québécois	(0.054) -0.063
BIOC Quebecois	(0.084)
Green Party	0.144
Green Farty	(0.087)
People's Party	0.596***
reopie's raity	(0.117)
Other:	-0.084
other.	(0.155)
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.223***
Satisfaction with acmodiacy	(0.026)
Quebec	0.082
Quesco	(0.048)
Racial resentment	0.146***
	(0.031)
Outgroup thermometer	0.056*
	(0.028)
White privilege	0.020
, ,	(0.017)
	/

Victimhood	0.338***
	(0.027)
White thermometer	-0.003**
	(0.001)
Constant	1.264***
	(0.211)
Observations	1,323

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table 12. Predictors of the "great replacement" conspiracy theory (with Party ID).

(1) White replacement 1.538* White consciousness (0.192)2.474*** Conspiracy thinking (0.274)Age 0.996 (0.027)Age (squared) 1.000 (0.000)Woman 1.140 (0.172)University education 0.778 (0.133) 0.943^{*} Income (0.026)Political interest 0.955 (0.029)Political knowledge 0.931 (0.080)**Liberal Party** 1.000 (.) 1.694** **Conservative Party** (0.323)New Democratic Party (NDP) 1.043 (0.248)Bloc Québécois 1.456 (0.442)**Green Party** 1.705 (0.582)People's Party 4.572*** (1.979)Other: 0.665 (0.395)Satisfaction with democracy 0.817^{*} (0.084)Quebec 1.055 (0.202)1.806*** Racial resentment (0.221)0.619*** Outgroup thermometer (0.066)White privilege 0.910 (0.061)Victimhood 1.463*** (0.164)

White thermometer	1.017***
	(0.004)
Observations	1,195

Note: Coefficients are odds ratios; Standard errors in parentheses; ${}^*p < .05$, ${}^{**}p < .01$, ${}^{***}p < .001$.

 Table 13. Predictors of non-racial conspiracy endorsement (with Party ID).

	(1)
	Conspiracy
	endorsement
White consciousness	0.054^{*}
	(0.022)
Conspiracy thinking	0.383***
	(0.020)
White consciousness x Conspiracy thinking	0.074***
	(0.020)
Age	-0.012 [*]
	(0.005)
Age (squared)	0.000
	(0.000)
Woman	0.012
	(0.027)
University education	-0.079 ^{**}
,	(0.029)
Income	-0.008
	(0.005)
Political interest	0.001
	(0.006)
Political knowledge	-0.019
ŭ	(0.016)
Liberal Party	0.000
,	(.)
Conservative Party	0.243***
•	(0.035)
New Democratic Party (NDP)	-0.077 [*]
	(0.039)
Bloc Québécois	-0.064
	(0.060)
Green Party	0.036
·	(0.063)
People's Party	0.577***
	(0.085)
Other:	0.074
	(0.111)
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.095***
	(0.019)
Quebec	-0.031
	(0.035)
Racial resentment	0.050*
	(0.023)
Outgroup thermometer	-0.004
	(0.020)
White privilege	-0.037**
	(0.013)
	•

Victimhood	0.024
	(0.020)
White thermometer	0.001
	(0.001)
Constant	0.671***
	(0.154)
Observations	1,317

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

Appendix J: Factor analysis

In order to identify White consciousness as a common factor, I conducted exploratory factor analysis. I use common factor analysis instead of principal components analysis because the purpose here is to identify latent structures (Widaman, 2018). The determinant of the correlation matrix (0.017), Bartlett's test of sphericity (p < .001), and the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy (0.914) all indicate the data are an excellent fit for factor analysis (Watkins, 2021). If there were multiple factors present in these measures, theory suggests they should be correlated, and so an oblique rotation (Promax) was used. However, the Minimum Average Partial (MAP) Correlation method, Parallel Analysis, and Scree plot all support the presence of a single factor (Velicer et al., 2000).

Table J1. Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances.

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
Q1	0.7043	0.504
Q2	0.7243	0.4753
Q3	0.5968	0.6438
Q4	0.646	0.5827
Q5	0.7474	0.4414
Q6	0.772	0.404
Q7	0.7758	0.3981
Q8	0.7987	0.3621

Note: Oblique promax rotation; N = 1,362.

- Q1. How important is being White to your identity?
- Q2. How strongly do you identify with other White people?
- Q3. What happens to White people in this country will have something to do with what happens in my life.
- Q4. When people criticize White people, it feels like a personal insult.
- Q5. When I meet someone who is White, I feel connected with this person.
- Q6. When I speak about White people, I feel like I am talking about "my" people
- Q7. When people praise White people, it makes me feel good.
- Q8. I have a strong attachment to other White people.

Appendix K: Conspiracy theory ideology

The analyses in Table K1 show the results for conspiracy endorsement of left-right neutral and left-wing conspiracy theories. These are:

- "COVID-19 was manufactured in a lab and purposely created to control people."
- "The World Economic Forum (WEF) works in secret against ordinary people."
- "The true dangers of vaccines are being hidden by the medical establishment."
- "There is a good chance microchips could be implanted through the COVID-19 vaccine."
- "Extreme climate activists, such as those who vandalize famous paintings, are funded and encouraged by the fossil fuel industry in order to discredit the environmental movement."

The resulting scale had a Cronbach's alpha of 0.76, indicating good internal consistency. Note as well, the controls for both left-right ideology and party ID.

Describing conspiracy theories as "left-right neutral" is a theoretical argument rather than an empirical one. Indeed, the first four of these conspiracy theories are *still* more likely to be endorsed by people on the political right, and the last one which is explicitly targeted towards the political left has mixed results when examined on the left-right spectrum. This is in large part because right-leaning individuals are more likely to engage in conspiracy thinking in the first place (see Figure 2).

My argument here is that from a theoretical perspective, health care and the WEF should be equally tempting targets of conspiracy thinking for the political left as for the political right: indeed, the political left has been skeptical of the WEF for decades, and skepticism of COVID-19 and vaccines tie into a well-documented left-wing distrust of "Big Pharma" (Sorell & Butler, 2022). In other words, to the extent that right-leaning individuals are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories of any sort in the first place, it is very difficult to empirically validate which conspiracy theories are left-wing and right-wing without engaging in circular logic: "this conspiracy theory is right-wing because right-wing people are more likely to believe it, but being right-wing (which involves anti-statism and a distrust of big institutions) means you are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories." As a result, we can look to theory to help guide our tests.

Table K1. Predictors of non-racial conspiracy endorsement for theoretically neutral and left-wing conspiracy theories.

(1)
Conspiracy
endorsement
0.048
(0.026)
0.362***
(0.023)
0.053^{*}
(0.024)
-0.008
(0.006)
0.000
(0.000)
0.038
(0.032)

University education	-0.046
	(0.034)
Income	-0.013*
	(0.006)
Political interest	0.001
Publication Later	(0.007)
Political knowledge	-0.029
Libourd Doub.	(0.018)
Liberal Party	0.000
Conservative Party	(.) 0.115**
Conservative Party	(0.043)
New Democratic Party (NDP)	-0.099*
New Democratic Party (NDP)	(0.046)
Bloc Québécois	-0.087
bloc Quebecols	(0.070)
Green Party	0.052
Green arty	(0.074)
People's Party	0.497***
respices runcy	(0.101)
Other:	-0.045
	(0.130)
Ideology (right)	0.041***
<i>5</i> , (<i>5</i> ,	(800.0)
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.093***
·	(0.022)
Quebec	-0.038
	(0.040)
Racial resentment	-0.000
	(0.027)
Outgroup thermometer	0.013
	(0.024)
White privilege	-0.036 [*]
	(0.015)
Victimhood	0.023
	(0.024)
White thermometer	0.001
	(0.001)
Constant	0.484**
	(0.184)
Observations	1,309

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.