

Title: Appendix C: Regression models, appendix for “The impact of conspiracy belief on democratic culture: Evidence from Europe”

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
Note: The material contained herein is supplementary to the article named in the title and published in the Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) Misinformation Review.

## Appendix C: Regression models


**Table C1.** Relationship between attitudes towards democracy and conspiracy belief (robust linear regression models).

	Conspiracy belief: immigration	Conspiracy belief: Covid-19
Consider democracy to be important	-0.10 *** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.10 ** (0.03)	-0.16 *** (0.03)
Political trust	-0.20 *** (0.03)	-0.33 *** (0.04)
Populism	0.32 *** (0.04)	0.30 *** (0.03)
Political interest	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.02 *** (0.00)
Left-right self-positioning	0.04 *** (0.00)	0.02 ** (0.00)
Gender (1 = female)	0.01 (0.01)	0.04 ** (0.01)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 *** (0.00)
Education level (1 = medium)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 ** (0.01)
Education level (1 = high)	-0.08 *** (0.01)	-0.08 *** (0.01)
Income (1 = medium)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Income (1 = high)	-0.03 ** (0.01)	-0.05 *** (0.01)
Place of residence (1 = rural)	0.02 * (0.01)	0.02 * (0.01)
Place of residence (1 = town)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Place of residence (1 = suburb)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Country fixed-effects	X	X
Constant	0.36 *** (0.05)	0.53 *** (0.06)
n observations	16199	16199
adjusted r <sup>2</sup>	0.22	0.24

Note: Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the country level  
 \*\*\* p < .001; \*\* p < .01; \* p < .05.



**Figure C1. The relationship between attitudes towards democracy and the propensity to believe in an immigration-related conspiracy.** Predicted effects based on the robust linear regression models in Table C1 with other variables held constant at their means and country held constant at Germany,  $n = 16,199$  for both models.



**Figure C2. The relationship between attitudes towards democracy and the propensity to believe in a COVID-19-related conspiracy.** Predicted effects based on the robust linear regression models in Table C1 with other variables held constant at their means and country held constant at Germany,  $n = 16,199$  for both models.

**Table C2. The relationship between conspiracy belief and political efficacy (robust linear regression models).**

	External political efficacy	Internal political efficacy
Conspiracy belief: immigration	-0.10 *** (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)
Conspiracy belief: Covid-19	-0.12 *** (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)
Political interest	0.01 * (0.00)	0.11 *** (0.00)
Left-right self-positioning	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Consider democracy to be important	-0.08 * (0.03)	0.08 ** (0.02)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.17 *** (0.02)	-0.03 * (0.01)
Political trust	0.10 ** (0.02)	0.06 ** (0.02)
Populism	-0.18 *** (0.03)	0.12 *** (0.02)
Gender (1 = female)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.05 ** (0.01)
Age	-0.00 ** (0.00)	0.00 ** (0.00)
Education level (1 = medium)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Education level (1 = high)	0.04 ** (0.01)	0.03 * (0.01)
Income (1 = medium)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Income (1 = high)	0.02 * (0.01)	0.01 * (0.00)
Place of residence (1 = rural)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 * (0.01)
Place of residence (1 = town)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 * (0.01)
Place of residence (1 = suburb)	-0.02 * (0.01)	-0.02 * (0.01)
Country fixed-effects	X	X
Constant	0.52 *** (0.05)	-0.03 (0.03)
n observations	16199	16199
adjusted r <sup>2</sup>	0.19	0.23

Note: Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the country level  
 \*\*\* p < .001; \*\* p < .01; \* p < .05.

**Table C3. Relationship between the tendency to believe in conspiracies and voting intention (robust logistic regression models).**

	Left/far-left	Green	Socialdemocratic	Liberal	Conservative	Right/far-right
Conspiracy belief: immigration	-0.82 *** (0.22)	-1.07 *** (0.20)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.31)	-0.21 (0.19)	1.79 *** (0.19)
Conspiracy belief: Covid-19	0.40 * (0.18)	-0.19 (0.26)	-0.26 (0.14)	-0.60 * (0.25)	-0.25 (0.20)	0.52 *** (0.15)
Political interest	0.16 ** (0.06)	0.13 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.07)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.12 *** (0.03)
Left-right self-positioning	-0.50 *** (0.04)	-0.31 *** (0.05)	-0.36 *** (0.03)	-0.06 (0.06)	0.30 ** (0.09)	0.40 *** (0.05)
Consider democracy to be important	-0.31 * (0.12)	0.77 *** (0.17)	-0.15 (0.29)	0.12 (0.69)	0.80 * (0.32)	-0.77 *** (0.11)
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.35 (0.33)	0.33 (0.33)	1.28 ** (0.45)	-0.11 (1.04)	-0.11 (0.64)	0.33 (0.73)
Political trust	0.02 (0.53)	1.56 *** (0.31)	1.87 *** (0.26)	1.59 * (0.67)	2.06 *** (0.35)	-1.48 *** (0.43)
Populism	1.34 *** (0.20)	-0.24 (0.35)	-0.78 *** (0.23)	0.43 (0.54)	-0.67 (0.48)	-0.20 (0.38)
Gender (1 = female)	-0.09 (0.06)	0.21 (0.15)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.11)	0.02 (0.09)	0.02 (0.09)
Age	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.06 *** (0.02)	0.06 *** (0.02)
Education level (1 = medium)	-0.06 (0.08)	0.12 *** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.08)	0.02 (0.09)	0.19 (0.11)	-0.15 (0.09)
Education level (1 = high)	-0.09 (0.18)	0.27 (0.16)	-0.22 ** (0.08)	0.26 (0.16)	0.32 ** (0.12)	-0.47 *** (0.07)
Income (1 = medium)	-0.13 ** (0.04)	0.09 (0.13)	0.13 (0.09)	0.02 (0.04)	0.18 (0.11)	0.09 (0.08)
Income (1 = high)	-0.41 *** (0.10)	-0.06 (0.12)	0.15 (0.10)	0.29 (0.17)	0.43 *** (0.09)	-0.16 (0.13)
Place of residence (1 = rural)	0.11 (0.12)	-0.30 *** (0.07)	-0.26 *** (0.07)	0.05 (0.17)	-0.04 (0.11)	0.33 *** (0.07)
Place of residence (1 = town)	0.12 (0.08)	-0.35 *** (0.11)	-0.08 (0.07)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.07)	0.24 *** (0.06)
Place of residence (1 = suburb)	0.22 *** (0.05)	-0.10 (0.17)	0.01 (0.09)	0.13 (0.10)	-0.20 * (0.09)	0.15 (0.08)
Country fixed-effects	X	X	X	X	X	X
Constant	-18.61 *** (1.25)	-20.05 *** (1.20)	-18.76 *** (1.21)	-1.32 * (0.59)	-3.45 *** (0.91)	-5.89 *** (0.50)
n observations	13732	13732	13732	13732	13732	13732
Log-likelihood	-2316.90	-1442.95	-3397.53	-4050.26	-4414.44	-5362.05
AIC	4689.79	2941.91	6851.06	8156.52	8884.87	10780.09
BIC	4900.56	3152.68	7061.83	8367.29	9095.64	10990.86
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup> (McFadden's)	0.37	0.35	0.30	0.22	0.18	0.30

Note: Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the country level  
\*\*\* p < .001; \*\* p < .01; \* p < .05.

**Table C4.** Relationship between conspiracy belief and different forms of place-based identity (robust linear regression models).

<i>Feel connected with</i>	town or city	region	country	Europe
Conspiracy belief: immigration	0.02 (0.01)	0.03 * (0.01)	0.04 ** (0.01)	-0.07 *** (0.01)
Conspiracy belief: Covid-19	0.05 *** (0.01)	0.07 *** (0.01)	0.04 *** (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)
Political interest	0.02 *** (0.00)	0.01 *** (0.00)	0.02 ** (0.00)	0.01 *** (0.00)
Left-right self-positioning	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 ** (0.00)	0.01 * (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)
Consider democracy to be important	0.13 *** (0.02)	0.09 ** (0.02)	0.13 *** (0.02)	0.10 * (0.04)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.05 *** (0.01)	0.05 *** (0.01)	0.16 *** (0.02)	0.06 (0.05)
Political trust	0.26 *** (0.02)	0.30 *** (0.02)	0.32 *** (0.03)	0.55 *** (0.02)
Populism	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.05 ** (0.01)	0.03 (0.03)
Gender (1 = female)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 * (0.01)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 * (0.00)
Education level (1 = medium)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 *** (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)
Education level (1 = high)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03 ** (0.01)	-0.02 ** (0.00)	0.02 (0.01)
Income (1 = medium)	0.03 *** (0.01)	0.02 ** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)
Income (1 = high)	0.03 ** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Place of residence (1 = rural)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.04 ** (0.01)
Place of residence (1 = town)	-0.02 * (0.01)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.03 *** (0.01)
Place of residence (1 = suburb)	-0.04 ** (0.01)	-0.02 ** (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Country fixed-effects	X	X	X	X
Constant	0.22 *** (0.03)	0.23 *** (0.03)	0.15 *** (0.02)	0.31 *** (0.04)
n observations	16199	16199	16199	16199
adjusted r <sup>2</sup>	0.10	0.10	0.20	0.26

Note: Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the country level  
 \*\*\* p < .001; \*\* p < .01; \* p < .05.

**Table C5. Relationship between the tendency to believe in conspiracies and different forms of political participation (robust logistic regression models), Part 1.**

	Private setting	Public disc.	Social network	Polit. party	wear a badge
Conspiracy belief: immigration	-0.38 *** (0.09)	-0.03 (0.12)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.12)	-0.24 (0.14)
Conspiracy belief: Covid-19	-0.17 * (0.09)	0.27 * (0.13)	0.08 (0.08)	0.22 * (0.10)	-0.03 (0.18)
Political interest	0.51 *** (0.05)	0.73 *** (0.04)	0.69 *** (0.03)	0.84 *** (0.05)	0.69 *** (0.07)
Left-right self-positioning	-0.03 ** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03 * (0.01)	-0.07 ** (0.02)
Consider democracy to be important	1.35 *** (0.15)	-0.06 (0.19)	0.37 ** (0.12)	-0.56 * (0.22)	-0.25 (0.26)
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.39 *** (0.09)	-0.25 (0.14)	-0.46 *** (0.09)	-0.25 (0.18)	-0.19 * (0.08)
Political trust	-0.27 (0.21)	0.31 (0.23)	-0.25 (0.19)	0.86 *** (0.22)	0.90 *** (0.17)
Populism	0.24 (0.14)	0.33 (0.23)	1.20 *** (0.11)	0.20 (0.39)	0.80 ** (0.24)
Gender (1 = female)	0.12 ** (0.04)	-0.29 *** (0.06)	-0.11 (0.06)	-0.28 * (0.11)	-0.08 (0.05)
Age	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Education level (1 = medium)	0.20 ** (0.07)	0.15 * (0.07)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.10)	0.09 (0.11)
Education level (1 = high)	0.39 *** (0.10)	0.48 *** (0.09)	0.02 (0.08)	0.42 ** (0.14)	0.28 * (0.11)
Income (1 = medium)	0.18 ** (0.06)	-0.13 * (0.06)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.18 ** (0.06)
Income (1 = high)	0.35 *** (0.10)	0.03 (0.08)	-0.12 ** (0.04)	-0.02 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.10)
Place of residence (1 = rural)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.07)	0.13 * (0.06)	-0.08 (0.16)
Place of residence (1 = town)	0.02 (0.06)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.17 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.08)
Place of residence (1 = suburb)	-0.03 (0.08)	0.17 * (0.09)	0.07 (0.08)	0.08 (0.10)	0.04 (0.07)
Country fixed-effects	X	X	X	X	X
Constant	-2.10 *** (0.25)	-3.49 *** (0.38)	-2.85 *** (0.26)	-4.92 *** (0.45)	-3.98 *** (0.60)
n observations	16199	16199	16199	16199	16199
Log-likelihood	-9729.64	-5750.06	-8257.74	-3742.60	-3795.21
AIC	19515.29	11556.13	16571.48	7541.20	7646.42
BIC	19730.68	11771.52	16786.88	7756.60	7861.82
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup> (McFadden's)	0.10	0.11	0.10	0.13	0.11

Note: Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the country level  
 \*\*\* p < .001; \*\* p < .01; \* p < .05.

**Table C5. Relationship between the tendency to believe in conspiracies and different forms of political participation (robust logistic regression models), Part 2.**

	Contact politician	Demonstration	Petition	Election	Boycott	None
Conspiracy belief: immigration	0.05 (0.09)	-0.57 *** (0.11)	-0.42 *** (0.08)	-0.26 ** (0.09)	-0.69 *** (0.14)	0.18 (0.11)
Conspiracy belief: Covid-19	0.08 (0.09)	0.17 (0.13)	0.00 (0.10)	-0.35 *** (0.07)	-0.24 * (0.12)	-0.02 (0.13)
Political interest	0.62 *** (0.05)	0.53 *** (0.03)	0.40 *** (0.02)	0.47 *** (0.03)	0.47 *** (0.03)	-0.87 *** (0.04)
Left-right self-positioning	0.01 (0.01)	-0.15 *** (0.03)	-0.08 *** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.05 ** (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)
Consider democracy to be important	-0.02 (0.26)	0.51 *** (0.15)	1.34 *** (0.16)	1.38 *** (0.13)	1.08 *** (0.21)	-0.96 *** (0.12)
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.08 (0.16)	-0.56 *** (0.13)	-0.41 ** (0.13)	-0.53 *** (0.15)	-0.05 (0.12)	0.46 ** (0.14)
Political trust	0.20 (0.23)	-0.53 *** (0.13)	-0.43 * (0.17)	0.64 *** (0.10)	-0.56 *** (0.17)	-0.53 ** (0.18)
Populism	0.34 * (0.17)	0.60 *** (0.14)	0.59 *** (0.15)	0.32 *** (0.08)	0.85 *** (0.13)	-0.60 ** (0.19)
Gender (1 = female)	-0.23 *** (0.04)	-0.05 (0.08)	0.21 * (0.10)	0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.07)
Age	0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.04 *** (0.01)	0.02 * (0.01)
Education level (1 = medium)	0.15 * (0.07)	-0.00 (0.09)	0.23 *** (0.04)	0.24 *** (0.06)	0.20 *** (0.05)	-0.34 *** (0.04)
Education level (1 = high)	0.38 *** (0.05)	0.24 *** (0.06)	0.33 *** (0.08)	0.29 *** (0.08)	0.50 *** (0.06)	-0.47 *** (0.07)
Income (1 = medium)	-0.08 (0.06)	0.10 (0.06)	0.12 (0.07)	0.29 *** (0.04)	0.05 (0.08)	-0.24 *** (0.07)
Income (1 = high)	0.04 (0.09)	0.16 * (0.08)	0.14 (0.08)	0.45 *** (0.04)	0.21 * (0.09)	-0.42 *** (0.12)
Place of residence (1 = rural)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.42 *** (0.08)	0.06 (0.06)	0.16 ** (0.05)	-0.16 * (0.07)	0.00 (0.07)
Place of residence (1 = town)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.27 *** (0.08)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.09 ** (0.03)	-0.20 *** (0.06)	-0.14 ** (0.05)
Place of residence (1 = suburb)	0.10 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.05 (0.07)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.20 * (0.08)
Country fixed-effects	X	X	X	X	X	X
Constant	-4.61 *** (0.40)	-1.57 *** (0.27)	-1.85 *** (0.30)	-2.43 *** (0.29)	-3.83 *** (0.24)	0.57 (0.34)
n observations	16199	16199	16199	16199	16199	16199
Log-likelihood	-4728.68	-7182.66	-10252.97	-8852.65	-8113.00	-4619.08
AIC	9513.37	14421.32	20561.94	17761.29	16282.00	9294.16
BIC	9728.76	14636.72	20777.33	17976.69	16497.40	9509.55
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup> (McFadden's)	0.08	0.12	0.08	0.15	0.11	0.17

Note: Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered at the country level  
\*\*\* p < .001; \*\* p < .01; \* p < .05.