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Research Note

Research note: Explicit voter fraud conspiracy cues increase belief among co-partisans but have broader spillover effects on confidence in elections

In this pre-registered experiment, we test the effects of conspiracy cue content in the context of the 2020 U.S. elections. Specifically, we varied whether respondents saw an explicitly stated conspiracy theory, one that was merely implied, or none at all. We found that explicit cues about rigged voting machines increase belief in such theories, especially when the cues target the opposing political party. Explicit cues also decrease confidence in elections regardless of the targeted party, but they have no effect on satisfaction with democracy or support for election security funding. Thus, conspiratorial cues can decrease confidence in institutions, even among the out-party and irrespective of a change in conspiracy beliefs. The results demonstrate that even in a landscape saturated in claims of fraud, voters still respond to novel explicit cues.

Authors: Benjamin A. Lyons (1), Kaitlyn S. Workman (1)
Affiliations: (1) Department of Communication, University of Utah, USA
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Research questions

- To what extent do implicit and explicit conspiracy cues increase conspiracy belief?
- Do the effects of conspiracy cues increase with partisan congeniality (i.e., when they come from a co-partisan)?
- Do conspiracy cues have spillover effects on confidence in elections, satisfaction with democracy, or willingness to donate to election security efforts?
- Do the effects of conspiracy cues increase with conspiracy predisposition, dislike of the media, or other respondent characteristics?

Research note summary

- In a preregistered online experiment, 2,111 respondents from Prolific (an online survey platform) read one of five simulated news articles. Four of these centered on decreased down-ballot roll-

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off, and a fifth was a placebo article. Among the four treatment articles, two contained quotes from a Democratic elected official in Kentucky and two contained quotes from a Republican elected official in New Jersey, all pointing out a decrease in roll-off. In each set of articles, one version contained an explicit theory about the opposition rigging voting machines to fill in down-ballot votes, while one version implied questionable activity by pointing out a sizeable drop in roll-off from prior years in favor of the opposition party but did not directly claim fraud had occurred.

- Only explicit conspiracy cues increased agreement that the opposition party manipulated vote totals or was otherwise responsible for the decrease in roll-off. Explicit cues from either party also decreased confidence in elections regardless of respondent partisanship. Implicit cues had no effect on attitudes.
- There were no clear effects on satisfaction with democracy in general, or on willingness to donate toward enhanced election security.
- We also tested for differential effects across respondents' predisposition to conspiracy thinking, feelings toward the media, feelings toward Blacks and Hispanics, affective polarization, political interest, and political knowledge. We find few consistent patterns across these.

Implications

Research on conspiracy beliefs has documented a number of worldviews and other psychological predispositions with which these beliefs are associated (e.g., Miller et al., 2016; Raab et al., 2013; Uscinski et al., 2016), as well as situational factors that may trigger them, such as crises and the uncertainty they bring, negative economic conditions, or electoral losses (Douglas et al., 2019). Some work has further documented correlations between social media exposure and these beliefs (Enders et al., 2021). Still, the actual content and style of conspiracy cues are likely important in the spread of conspiracy beliefs (Lyons et al., 2019; Nyhan et al., 2016; Uscinski et al., 2016), and at the same time, elites (e.g., elected officials) have become increasingly bold in both implicitly and explicitly endorsing conspiracy theories (Berlinksi et al., 2020; Enders & Smallpage, 2018; McCright & Dunlap, 2017), which may degrade trust in democratic institutions (Berlinski et al., 2020; Clayton et al., 2021; Einstein & Glick, 2015). In this context, the potential differential effect of conspiracy cues remains an important open question.

In this study, we specifically look at the effect of conspiracy cues regarding voter fraud. Perceptions of voter fraud have been studied extensively. Several studies have shown a "winner effect," in which voting for the winning candidate is associated with greater trust in elections, while those on the losing side are more likely to doubt the legitimacy of the process (e.g., Sinclair et al., 2018). Group-centric perceptions of electoral integrity are another consistent finding (Appleby & Federico, 2017; Edelson et al., 2017; Sances & Stewart, 2015; Wilson & Brewer, 2013). For example, anti-immigration attitudes (Udani & Kimball, 2018) and Republican identification (Bowler & Donovan, 2016) have been linked to perceptions of voter fraud and other beliefs about electoral integrity in the United States. Finally, recent work has further shown the negative consequences of elite rhetoric on the issue. Exposure to actual (though unsubstantiated) claims of fraud made by prominent elected Republicans and conservative media personalities (e.g., Donald Trump, Rick Scott, Marco Rubio, Lindsey Graham, etc.) in 2018 and 2020 appear to have had deleterious effects among co-partisans (Berlinski et al. 2020, Clayton et al., 2021). Still, we know less about the effects of similar claims that articulate or infer an actual *conspiracy* (with reference to the actors, motives, and methods that one entails). Further, these studies employ real-world messages from Republicans as stimuli. This improves external validity but has limited our ability to make inferences about how members of *both* parties respond to in- and out-party fraud claims. This is especially important if such cues operate in a similar fashion to more mundane cues from elites.

Top-down models of attitude formation are fundamental to political behavior and public opinion research (Campbell et al., 1960; Zaller, 1992). Campbell et al. (1960), for instance, argue that the political party is "an opinion-forming agency of great importance," and a party is "a supplier of cues by which the individual may evaluate the elements of politics" (p. 128). In this sense, elite partisan cues serve as an information shortcut (Popkin, 1991), particularly for issues about which an individual may have limited knowledge or familiarity (Li & Wagner, 2021). Thus, partisan cues can induce processing in which individuals evaluate information based on its concordance with their political identity (Chaiken, 1980; Kunda, 1990). Much of this work has traditionally focused on policy preferences (Goren, 2005; Lenz, 2012). As others have indicated though, these cuing effects likely carry over beyond policy attitudes to the reception of misinformation (Flynn et al., 2017; Veenstra et al., 2014) and democratic norm violations especially (Clayton et al., 2021). Some have posited that such norm violations may be treated as unacceptable and rejected or even punished (Carey et al., 2020). Other research has suggested that personal views do serve to constrain the influence of elites espousing unpopular opinions to some degree, as well (Mummolo et al., 2021; Peterson, 2018). In sum, partisan conspiracy cues may operate much like more mundane elite cues, but it is possible that explicitly distasteful messages may be rejected even by co-partisans (see Valentino et al., 2018).

Finally, it is important to consider that a great deal of conspiracy-centric communication is vague, subtle, or perhaps even unintentional, rather than fully articulated (Lyons et al., 2019; McCright & Dunlap, 2017; Starbird, 2016; Starbird, 2017), and the reception of such cues has not been fully explored in the elite cue model discussed above. Presenting suspicious coincidences may spread conspiracy beliefs in the place of a robust theory detailing the responsible parties, their incentives, and their methods (Lyons et al. 2019; Prooijen et al., 2017; Raab et al., 2013; Rich & Zaragoza 2016). Notably, too, the rhetorical strategy of "just asking questions" has been used by commentators to allow for conspiracy ideation while maintaining plausible deniability (Byford, 2014; Novak, 2017; Seay, 2017). We refer to this more subtle version as an *implicit cue*, while a fully articulated conspiracy theory is referred to as an *explicit cue*. One recent study compared the effect of explicit and implicit conspiracy cues on the adoption of novel public health conspiracy beliefs (Lyons et al., 2019) concerning Zika, GM mosquitoes, and vaccines, finding that both explicit and implicit conspiracy cues increased conspiracy beliefs. However, questions remain. In particular, what are the effects of implicit and explicit cues in a partisan domain?

As such, we tested the effects of both explicit and implicit cues about voter fraud in the 2020 U.S. election. We showed that in this context, explicitly stated partisan conspiracy theories increased conspiracy beliefs among co-partisans and decreased confidence in elections regardless of their agreement with the respondent's partisanship. Implicit cues, however, did not influence respondents' attitudes. The findings regarding explicit cues are cause for concern, especially if partisan fraud claims have spillover effects on out-partisans' perceptions of democratic legitimacy. Uptake of elite cues—even those which erode democratic norms—may be unfortunate in this circumstance, but ultimately are not surprising (Berlinski et al., 2020; Zaller, 1992). But broader spillover effects may present an especially wicked problem for democracies facing emboldened losing candidates (Hernández-Huerta, 2020). Our results demonstrate that even in a landscape saturated in claims of fraud, as the United States remains in the wake of the 2020 election and subsequent contestation of results, voters still respond to novel explicit cues.

On the other hand, there were no effects of implicit cues. It is worth mentioning that we presented respondents with a subtle treatment. The implicit cue merely quoted an elected official pointing out a large decrease in down-ballot roll-off between elections and questioning why this had occurred—with a potential implication that the opposing party may somehow be responsible. This is a minimalistic approach to an implicit cue, based on prior work examining whether journalists may unintentionally transmit conspiracy beliefs (Lyons et al., 2019), and partisans may need a more forceful use of "just asking questions" rhetoric to pick up on such cues. Indeed, our minimalistic approach may even be considered

an additional control condition as we have no evidence that respondents processed the treatment as intended, and we should be cautious in drawing any conclusion from the null. Future work in this area should test a fuller range of treatments across the implicit-explicit spectrum.

In general, though, this study's findings fit with prior work showing that partisans tend to accept in-group elite cues (Campbell et al., 1960; Zaller, 1992), even when those cues violate democratic norms (Berlisnki et al., 2020; Clayton et al., 2021) and provide experimental evidence that conspiracy endorsement, specifically, can be driven by partisan cues (see Miller et al., 2015; Uscinksi et al., 2016). More importantly, however, they also demonstrate broader spillover effects on out-partisans, and as such, suggest that these cues may be even more harmful than prior work indicated. These findings suggest that conspiracy belief per se need not serve as the mechanism to erosions of trust in democratic institutions, because those in the out-party, who tended not to express belief in the uncongenial conspiracy theory, nevertheless expressed decreased confidence in elections. It is possible that these broader spillover effects arise instead due to increased epistemic cynicism in general (Balmas, 2014; Guess & Lyons, 2020; Paul et al., 2016; Pingree et al., 2013).

Findings

Finding 1: Explicit (but not implicit) conspiracy cues influence directly related beliefs about the cause of voting patterns. These effects are concentrated among co-partisans.

We find significant effects of explicit cues among those for whom they are politically congenial. Democrats exposed to an explicit conspiracy cue targeting Republicans were more likely to agree that Republicans had rigged voting machines (M = 2.59, SD = 1.16) than those in the control (M = 1.90, SD = 1.01). Independents also expressed greater agreement in the explicit cue condition (M = 2.43, SD = 1.08) than in the control (M = 2.08, SD = 1.08). Republicans exposed to an explicit conspiracy cue targeting Democrats likewise increased agreement that Democrats were responsible for the decrease in down-ballot roll-off (M = 3.51, SD = 1.22, vs. M = 3.26, SD = 1.10 in the control). These cues were generally unable to influence out-partisans, and in some cases even backfired among them. Further, we generally found no effects of implicit cues regardless of congeniality. These outcomes are depicted in Figure 1 (see Table B2 in Appendix B for full regression results). We did not detect an increase in conspiratorial responses using an open-ended question prior to the above-mentioned closed-ended items (see Clifford et al., 2019 and Lyons et al., 2019 for discussions of conspiracy belief measurement approaches), with only 8–10% of respondents providing a conspiratorial response across conditions (see Table C2 in Appendix C).

Finding 2: Explicit conspiracy cues have spillover effects on confidence in elections for both co-partisans and those of the opposing party.

We also found that explicit conspiracy cues reduce confidence in elections. Our measure of confidence includes items concerning the ability of the public to cast votes as entitled, the fair count of ballots, security of ballots from tampering, the accuracy of voting machines, and broader trust in the electoral system. We found a negative main effect of both explicit cues relative to the control (see Table B3 in Appendix B). In other words, the decrease in confidence was not contingent on cue congeniality (Table B4, Appendix B). We present the results when collapsing by explicitness (i.e., regardless of target party) in Figure 2 (see also Table C3 in Appendix C). However, we did not detect spillover effects on satisfaction with democracy itself, and the treatments did not appear to increase support in willingness to donate toward improved election security.



Figure 1. Conspiracy beliefs by conspiracy cue and party. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.

Finding 3: Predispositions are strongly associated with fraud beliefs and related attitudes, but do not consistently moderate cue uptake.

We also tested whether a number of background characteristics made respondents more or less likely to be affected by conspiracy cues. Specifically, we looked at respondents' predisposition to conspiracy thinking; feelings toward the media; feelings toward Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics; affective polarization; political interest; and political knowledge as potential moderators. We found that these had strong relationships with our outcomes of interest: predisposition to conspiracy thinking and affective polarization were associated with less confidence in elections, for instance, while media trust, political knowledge, and political interest were associated with greater confidence (Table B5, Appendix B). However, these characteristics tended not to have consistent amplifying or dampening effects on conspiracy cue uptake (Tables B6–B12, Appendix B). Based on the large number of exploratory moderation tests (seven moderators for each of the four cues, applied to seven outcome variables, for a total of 196 significance tests) and potential for false positives, we applied the Benjamini-Hochberg Procedure (a statistical procedure that controls for the false discover rate) with an acceptable false discovery rate set at 20%. As a result, four interaction terms were found to be significant. However, three of these did not appear to increase the given cue's targeted belief and may still be spurious: 1) media affect X the explicit Republican fraud cue's effect on belief that *Democrats* manipulated voting machines; 2) affect toward Blacks X the explicit Republican fraud cue's effect on belief that *Democrats* manipulated voting machines; and 3) affect toward Hispanics X the explicit *Republican* fraud cue's effect on belief that Democrats manipulated voting machines. The fourth significant interaction was affect toward Hispanics X the explicit Democrat fraud cue's effect on belief that Democrats manipulated voting machines, $b = .01$, $p < .005$. Given that none of the moderators produced a consistent pattern of effects, these exploratory results should be viewed with caution.



Figure 2. Confidence in elections by party and conspiracy cue explicitness (pooled). Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.

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Methods

We preregistered our hypotheses, measurements, and analyses via OSF (registration: https://osf.io/aynqd/?view_only=886fe9dc77f642f6a16874a534950419; for data and materials see: https://osf.io/wp4az/?view_only=b67e8f7ba71a4e58b16c2d8b8a20d731). The 2,111 respondents in the United States were recruited via Prolific, with quotas set for equal proportions for sex and partisanship (Republican, Democrat, and independent). The final sample was 34.6% Democrat, 33.2% Republican, and 32.2% independent. Respondents ranged in age from 18 to 83 (*M* = 35.27, *SD* = 12.72) and the median education level was a four-year degree (44.6% had less than a four-year degree). 79.4% of respondents claimed white racial/ethnic background. For a comparison to American Community Survey (ACS) demographic estimates, see Table A1 in Appendix A. Respondents were paid $1.30 (mean completion time was 8.9 minutes; median time was 7.4 minutes). The data collection period was from November 3–4, 2021 (one to two days after the off-year 2021 election).

Respondents first completed demographic information and potential moderators, as well as two pre-treatment attention checks. No respondents failed both attention checks. Respondents were then asked to carefully read a brief local news article and were assigned to read one of five articles containing one of the following: 1) an explicit conspiracy cue targeting Democrats, 2) an implicit conspiracy cue targeting Democrats, 3) an explicit conspiracy cue targeting Republicans, 4) an implicit conspiracy cue targeting Republicans, or 5) a placebo article about cooking. An elected official in each of the treatment articles noted a decrease in down-ballot roll-off in their state from 71,498 in 2004 (3.98%) to 550 in 2020 (0.03%). Each also briefly defined roll-off voting. In the explicit conditions, the elected official additionally alleges that voting machines had been programmed to switch votes in favor of the opposing party.

Following treatment, all respondents viewed a brief definition of “roll-off” voting, leading into the open-ended measure of conspiracy belief about its decrease in 2020: "‘Roll-off’ is a political science term

for when people cast a ballot in some races but don't bother voting in others. Some have pointed out decreased roll-off in the 2020 election." Respondents were then asked: "In your view, what likely caused the decrease in down-ballot roll-off in the 2020 election? It's ok to say you don't know." Responses that mentioned intentional (fraudulent) actions by Republicans [Democrats], intentional (fraudulent) actions by prominent elected officials, or manipulation of voting machines were coded as a conspiracy response. All open-ended responses were coded by a set of two independent coders (99.6% agreement on 2,111 responses). Disagreements (0.4% of cases) were resolved through discussion.

Next, all respondents answered closed-ended questions about the role of the Republican and Democratic Parties in the vote disparities. Respondents then answered questions about confidence in elections, satisfaction with democracy, and willingness to donate toward enhanced election security. Finally, all respondents were debriefed.

For full detail on stimuli and measurements, see Appendix A.

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Competing Interests
The authors declare no competing interests.

Ethics
This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of Utah (#00143620).

Data availability
All materials needed to replicate this study are available via the Harvard Dataverse at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HA0KKQ and via the Open Science Framework at https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/WP4AZ

Appendix A: Sample and materials

Sample

The sample (*N* = 2,111) was recruited via Prolific in November 2021, balanced for sex and partisanship (Republican, Democrat, and Independent). Respondents had a mean age of 35.27 (*SD* = 12.72), were 79.39% White and had a median education of a 4-year degree (44.62% had less thana 4-year degree). 51.44% supported Joe Biden in the 2020 election.

Table A1*. Demographic comparison of Prolific sample and ACS estimates.*

Variable (ACS pop.)	Subgroup	Sample	
		Prolific (2022)	ACS 2020 (5-year est.)
Gender (age 18+)	Male	50	48.7
	Female	50	51.3
Race (total population – all ages)	White	79.4	70.4
	Black or African-American	4.3	12.6
	American Indian and Alaska Native	0.3	0.8
	Asian	4.9	5.6
	Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander	N/A	0.2
	Two or more races/other	11.1	5.2
Age (age 18+)	18-24	23.3	12
	25 to 34 years	33	17.9
	35 to 44 years	21.1	16.4
	45 to 54 years	12.9	16.4
	55 to 59 years	4.1	8.6
	60+	5.5	28.7
Education (age 25+)	Less than bachelor's degree	44.6	67.1
	Bachelor's degree or higher	55.4	32.9

Note: Population for ACS estimates varies by age across some variables and is noted in parentheses for each variable. Prolific values come from the full sample. All values are percentages.

Survey question wording

Demographics and background characteristics

Age

In what year were you born?

Racial background

What racial or ethnic group best describes you?

- White
- Black or African-American
- Hispanic or Latino

- Asian or Asian-American
- Native American
- Middle Eastern
- Mixed Race
- Other (open)

Education

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- Did not graduate from high school
- High school graduate
- Some college, but no degree (yet)
- Two-year college degree
- Four-year college degree
- Postgraduate

Moderators

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...?

- Democrat
- Republican
- Independent
- Other
- Not sure [Follow-up] If Democrat:
- Strong Democrat
- Not very strong DemocratIf Republican:
- Strong Republican
- Not very strong Republican

If Independent/Other/Not sure:

- The Democratic Party
- The Republican Party
- Neither
- Not sure

2020 Presidential support

Who did you support in the 2020 election?

- Donald Trump
- Joe Biden
- Someone else
- No one
- Don't know

Political interest

Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you followwhat's going on in government and public affairs ...

- Most of the time (5)
- Some of the time (4)
- Only now and then (3)
- Hardly at all (2)

- Don't know (1)

Political knowledge

The next set of questions helps us learn what types of information are commonly known to the public. Please answer these questions on your own without asking anyone or looking up the answers.Many people don't know the answers to these questions, but we'd be grateful if you would pleaseanswer every question even if you're not sure what the right answer is.

It is important to us that you do NOT use outside sources like the Internet to search for the correct answer. Will you answer the following questions without help from outside sources?

- Yes
- No

For how many years is a United States Senator elected - that is, how many years are there in onefull term of office for a U.S. Senator?

- Two years
- Four years
- Six years (1)
- Eight years
- None of these
- Don't know

How many times can an individual be elected President of the United States under current laws?

- Once
- Twice (1)
- Four times
- Unlimited number of terms
- Don't know

How many U.S. Senators are there from each state?

- One
- Two (1)
- Four
- Depends on which state
- Don't know

Who is currently the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom?

- Boris Johnson (1)
- Nick Clegg
- David Cameron
- Theresa May
- Margaret Thatcher
- Don't know

For how many years is a member of the United States House of Representatives elected – that is,how many years are there in one full term of office for a U.S. House member?

- Two years (1)
- Four years

- Six years
- Eight years
- For life
- Don't know

Conspiracy predisposition
Mean of four items:
Much of our lives are being controlled by plots hatched in secret places.
Even though we live in a democracy, a few people will always run things anyway. (The people who really 'run' the country are not known to the voter.)
Big events like wars, recessions, and the outcomes of elections are controlled by small groups of people who are working in secret against the rest of us.

- Strongly agree (5)
- Somewhat agree (4)
- Neither disagree nor disagree (3)
- Somewhat disagree (2)
- Strongly disagree (1)

Feeling thermometers
We would like to get your feelings toward some of our political leaders and institutions who are in the news these days using something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the person. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the person or institution and that you don't care too much for that person or institution. You would rate them at the 50-degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward them. If we come to a person or institution whose name you don't recognize, you don't need to rate them.

Respondents click on thermometer to give ratings for: White people, Hispanic or Latino people, Black people, the Media, Republicans, Democrats, Trump, Biden)

Affective polarization
Affective polarization is computed by subtracting the respondent's out-party feeling thermometer score from the in-party score.

Dependent variables

Open-ended conspiracy belief
"Roll-off" is a political science term for when people cast a ballot in some races but don't bother voting in others. Some have pointed out decreased roll-off in the 2020 election.

In your view, what likely caused the decrease in down-ballot roll-off in the 2020 election? It's ok to say you don't know. (Open text box)

Responses that mentioned intentional (fraudulent) actions by Republicans [Democrats], or intentional (fraudulent) actions by prominent elected officials, or manipulation of voting machines, were coded as a conspiracy response. All open-ended responses were coded by a set of two independent coders (99.6% agreement on 2,111 responses). Disagreements (0.4% of cases) were resolved through discussion.

Closed-ended conspiracy beliefs

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

(1) The Republican Party is probably responsible for the decrease in down-ballot roll-off in the 2020 election noted the article
(2) The Republican Party probably manipulated the vote totals through paperless voting machines
(3) The Democratic Party is probably responsible for the decrease in down-ballot roll-off in the 2020 election noted the article
(4) The Democratic Party probably manipulated the vote totals through paperless voting machines

- Strongly agree (5)
- Somewhat agree (4)
- Neither disagree nor disagree (3)
- Somewhat disagree (2)
- Strongly disagree (1)

For the closed-ended outcome questions, we analyzed the items individually, as the two pro-Democrat (α = .50) and two pro-Republican items (α = .59) did not scale at the threshold set in the preregistration (.65).

Confidence in elections scale

How confident are you that everyone who was legally entitled to vote and sought to do so was able to successfully cast a ballot in the last election?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident

How confident are you that election officials managed the counting of ballots fairly in the election?

- Very confident
- Somewhat confident
- Not too confident
- Not at all confident

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? At the end of the day, in spite of all of the problems casting and counting the votes, the system worked.

- Strongly agree (5)
- Somewhat agree (4)
- Neither disagree nor disagree (3)
- Somewhat disagree (2)
- Strongly disagree (1)

To what extent do you trust elections in this country? Please respond on the scale below where 1 means "not at all" and 7 means "a lot." -1 (Not at all) ... 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ... 7 (A lot)

How secure are ballots from tampering in this country's elections?

- Extremely secure
- Very secure
- Moderately secure
- Not too secure

- Not at all secure

How often are voting machines accurate in counting the votes?

- Extremely often
- Very often
- Moderately often
- Not too often
- Not at all often

For the outcome measure of confidence in elections, we analyzed a standardized composite measure as the items scale together (α = .92).

Satisfaction with democracy (CSES)

-On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the United States?

- Not at all satisfied
- Not very satisfied
- Fairly satisfied
- Very satisfied

Behavioral intent

Public funds are needed to maintain and improve election security. In support of these initiatives, what is the maximum amount your household would be willing to pay each year? (Options: Sliding scale [$ to $00])

Stimuli

Johnson calls attention to drop in down-ballot "roll-off"

BY RONALD BRIXTON | APRIL 26, 2021 9:07 PM



An examination of the numbers shows that fraud was likely widespread in the 2020 election, according to some elected officials. "2,134,996 Kentuckians voted for the President and 2,134,446 voted for the Senate. A difference of exactly 550? How did we get to such a tiny number?" Kentucky Democratic State Rep. Marsha Johnson said in a press conference Thursday. "The expanded use of paperless voting machines – at the explicit demand of the Republican party in our state – has directly led to their electoral benefit. This is fraud, plain and simple."

"In past elections, at least 20,000 folks voted for President but left down-ballot races blank. That all changed in 2020's election. These machines have been programmed to switch these down-ballot blanks to Republican votes," she added.

The change in the numbers since Kentucky shifted to electronic voting machines? 71,498 left down-ballot races blank in 2004 (3.98%). Only 550 left down-ballot races blank in 2020 (0.03%). The tendency for some voters to skip down-ballot races is commonly referred to as "roll-off" by experts.

Others have suggested similar foul play in other states. A common element across many of these claims is paperless voting machine manufacturing.

Johnson and others have lamented that they cannot formally dispute the election results since the paperless machines can't be audited.

Figure A1. Explicit Republican fraud cue.

Johnson calls attention to drop in down-ballot "roll-off"

BY RONALD BRIXTON | APRIL 26, 2021 9:07 PM



An examination of the numbers behind 2020 and other elections has led to some curious results, some say. "2,134,996 Kentuckians voted for the President and 2,134,446 voted for the Senate. A difference of exactly 550? How did we get to such a tiny number?" Kentucky Democratic State Rep. Marsha Johnson said in a press conference Thursday.

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Others have noted similar interesting patterns in other states.

Figure A2. Implicit Republican fraud cue.

Johnson calls attention to drop in down-ballot "roll-off"

BY RONALD BRIXTON | APRIL 26, 2021 9:07 PM



An examination of the numbers shows that fraud was likely widespread in the 2020 election, according to some elected officials. "4,549,353 people in New Jersey voted for the President and 4,548,803 voted for the Senate. A difference of exactly 550? How did we get to such a tiny number?" New Jersey Republican State Rep. Marsha Johnson said in a press conference Thursday. "The expanded use of paperless voting machines – at the explicit request of the Democrat party in our state – has directly led to their electoral benefit. This is fraud, plain and simple."

"In past elections, at least 20,000 folks voted for President but left down-ballot races blank. That all changed in 2020's election. These machines have been programmed to switch these down-ballot blanks to Democrat votes," she added.

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Others have suggested similar foul play in other states. A common element across many of these claims is paperless voting machine manufacturing.

Johnson and others have lamented that they cannot formally dispute the election results since the paperless machines can't be audited.

Figure A3. Explicit Democrat fraud cue.

Johnson calls attention to drop in down-ballot "roll-off"

BY RONALD BRIXTON | APRIL 26, 2021 9:07 PM



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Others have noted similar interesting patterns in other states.

Figure A4. Implicit Democrat fraud cue.

Five sauces for the modern cook

BY RONALD BRIXTON | APRIL 26, 2021 9:07 PM

Travis Lett often steals. Of course, the only person this pensive chef ever steals from is himself. At his Los Angeles, USA restaurant, "We're constantly appropriating elements from dishes we've done in the past to create new combinations," he said.

There's a lesson here: To improve your cooking, learn how to make and use sauce like a professional.

Five basic types of sauces appear over and over again on menus and in cookbooks that feature the kind of vegetable-heavy, flavor-dense food that cooks and eaters favor today: yogurt sauce, pepper sauce, herb sauce, tahini sauce and pesto. Master each one, and you'll immediately have access to the dozens of variations that descend from them, too.

Think of them as the new mother sauces, an updated version of the five mother sauces of French cuisine. Armed with one of these five sauces, the home cook can go on and cook what he or she is most comfortable cooking. The right sauce will transform the distinct elements of a dish into a unified statement of taste.

Figure A5. Placebo.

Appendix B: Results

***Table B1**. Cue effects on targeted conspiracy beliefs.*

	Reps responsible	Reps used voting machines	Dems responsible	Dems used voting machines
Democrat	0.1044	-0.0829	-0.0847	-0.5487***
	(0.0699)	(0.0750)	(0.0703)	(0.0702)
Republican	-0.5714***	-0.5662***	0.3974***	1.1522***
	(0.0697)	(0.0674)	(0.0738)	(0.0905)
Republicans committed fraud explicit cue	-0.2878***	0.3958***		
	(0.0694)	(0.0694)		
Republicans committed fraud implicit cue	-0.0800	-0.0754		
	(0.0708)	(0.0674)		
Democrats committed fraud explicit cue			-0.1970**	0.1349
			(0.0750)	(0.0821)
Democrats committed fraud implicit cue			-0.0394	-0.0141
			(0.0716)	(0.0796)
Constant	3.1785***	2.0509***	3.0614***	2.1618***
	(0.0606)	(0.0668)	(0.0635)	(0.0743)
Republican fraud explicit cue - implicit cue	-0.2078***	0.4712***		
	(0.0708)	(0.0702)		
Democrat fraud explicit cue - implicit cue			-0.1576*	0.1489
			(0.0735)	(0.0788)
N	1252	1252	1274	1274

** p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). Cell entries are OLS coefficients. Models drop treatment conditionsirrelevant to the outcome of interest.*

Table B2. *Cue effects on targeted conspiracy beliefs, by congeniality.*

	Reps responsible	Reps used voting machines	Dems responsible	Dems used voting machines
Democrat	0.1530	-0.1816	-0.0903	-0.5471***
	(0.1103)	(0.1105)	(0.0701)	(0.0701)
Republican	-0.5712***	-0.5626***	0.1010	1.0995***
	(0.0698)	(0.0672)	(0.1156)	(0.1487)
Republicans committed fraud explicit cue	-0.2768***	0.2538***		
	(0.0831)	(0.0807)		
Republicans committed fraud explicit cue × Democrat	-0.0307	0.4340***.	(0.1526)	
	(0.1506)			
Republicans committed fraud implicit cue	-0.0390	-0.0241		
	(0.0872)	(0.0810)		
Republicans committed fraud implicit cue × Democrat	-0.1146	-0.1331		
	(0.1497)	(0.1437)		
Democrats committed fraud explicit cue			-0.3997***	0.1321
			(0.0863)	(0.0873)
Democrats committed fraud explicit cue × Republican			0.6433***	0.0021
			(0.1673)	(0.1982)
Democrats committed fraud implicit cue			-0.1251	-0.0651
			(0.0864)	(0.0829)
Democrats committed fraud implicit cue × Republican			0.2540	0.1521
			(0.1531)	(0.1902)
Constant	3.1617***	2.0837***	3.1633***	2.1790***
	(0.0652)	(0.0714)	(0.0685)	(0.0754)
Republican fraud explicit cue - implicit cue	0.0840	0.5671***		
	(0.1496)	(0.1528)		
Democrat fraud explicit cue - implicit cue			0.6027**	-0.3702
			(0.2261)	(0.2468)
N	1252	1252	1274	1274

** p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). Cell entries are OLS coefficients. Models drop treatment conditionsirrelevant to the outcome of interest.*

Table B3. *Cue effects on secondary outcomes (spillover effects).*

	Confidence in elections	Satisfaction with democracy	Funding support
Democrat	0.3668***	0.1234***	8.0642***
	(0.0380)	(0.0435)	(1.6040)
Republican	-0.5298***	0.0482	0.0818
	(0.0444)	(0.0450)	(1.5563)
Republicans committed fraud explicit cue	-0.1292*	-0.0528	-4.4450*
	(0.0525)	(0.0547)	(1.9710)
Republicans committed fraud implicit cue	-0.0529	-0.0716	-1.4220
	(0.0528)	(0.0576)	(2.1352)
Democrats committed fraud explicit cue	-0.1074*	-0.0995	-3.4171
	(0.0534)	(0.0579)	(2.0488)
Democrats committed fraud implicit cue	-0.0569	-0.0430	-0.4390
	(0.0504)	(0.0573)	(2.0554)
Constant	0.1188**	2.4376***	25.8828***
	(0.0450)	(0.0491)	(1.7881)
Republican fraud explicit cue - implicit cue	-0.0763	0.0187	-3.0230
	(0.0530)	(0.0541)	(2.0252)
Democrat fraud explicit cue - implicit cue	-0.0506	-0.0565	-2.9782
	(0.0514)	(0.0570)	(2.0183)
N	2111	2111	2111

** p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). Cell entries are OLS coefficients.*

Table B4. *Cue effects on confidence in elections, by congeniality.*

	1	2
Democrat	0.3703***	0.3668***
	(0.0745)	(0.0380)
Republican	-0.5318***	-0.5035***
	(0.0445)	(0.0866)
Republicans committed fraud explicit cue	-0.0983	-0.1549*
	(0.0696)	(0.0607)
Republicans committed fraud implicit cue	-0.0566	-0.0730
	(0.0715)	(0.0612)
Democrats committed fraud explicit cue	-0.1317	-0.0807
	(0.0720)	(0.0600)
Democrats committed fraud implicit cue	-0.0538	0.0020
	(0.0678)	(0.0567)
Republicans committed fraud explicit cue × Democrat	-0.0957 (0.1016)	
Republicans committed fraud implicit cue × Democrat	0.0098 (0.1022)	
Democrats committed fraud explicit cue × Democrat	0.0711 (0.1019)	
Democrats committed fraud implicit cue × Democrat	-0.0088 (0.0975)	
Republicans committed fraud explicit cue × Republican		0.0682 (0.1162)
Republicans committed fraud implicit cue × Republican		0.0626 (0.1178)
Democrats committed fraud explicit cue × Republican		-0.0867 (0.1239)
Democrats committed fraud implicit cue × Republican		-0.1757 (0.1143)
Constant	0.1183*	0.1100*
	(0.0539)	(0.0485)
N	2111	2111

** p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). Cell entries are OLS coefficients.*

Table B5. *Main effects of background characteristics on conspiracy beliefs and secondary outcomes.*

	Reps responsible	Reps machines	Dems responsible	Dems machines	Confidence	Democracy	Fund
Democrat	0.2472**	0.2418***	-0.3522***	-0.6612***	0.3373***	0.0692	4.2168
	(0.0734)	(0.0680)	(0.0733)	(0.0723)	(0.0457)	(0.0556)	(2.1520)
Republican	-0.3560***	-0.3470***	0.1082	0.6740***	-0.2947***	0.2068***	-0.3611
	(0.0648)	(0.0622)	(0.0631)	(0.0681)	(0.0416)	(0.0465)	(1.8007)
Reps committed fraud explicit	-0.2744***	0.3707***	-0.4022***	0.0098	-0.0607	0.0053	-3.4933
	(0.0696)	(0.0669)	(0.0719)	(0.0723)	(0.0429)	(0.0510)	(1.9720)
Reps committed fraud implicit	-0.0787	-0.0860	0.0467	-0.1534*	-0.0323	-0.0624	-1.0303
	(0.0710)	(0.0636)	(0.0717)	(0.0709)	(0.0444)	(0.0531)	(2.0996)
Dems committed fraud explicit	-0.5683***	0.0247	-0.2132***	0.0943	-0.0796	-0.0709	-2.5898
	(0.0706)	(0.0658)	(0.0734)	(0.0719)	(0.0432)	(0.0537)	(2.0383)
Dems committed fraud implicit	-0.2316***	-0.0594	-0.0670	-0.0787	-0.0166	-0.0062	0.0509
	(0.0706)	(0.0630)	(0.0715)	(0.0694)	(0.0404)	(0.0531)	(2.0487)
Conspiracy predisposition	0.0729**	0.2131***	0.2023***	0.3988***	-0.2836***	-0.2265***	-0.8454
	(0.0266)	(0.0229)	(0.0271)	(0.0263)	(0.0161)	(0.0189)	(0.7141)
Media FT	0.0052**	0.0011	0.0005	-0.0072***	0.0096***	0.0078***	0.0782*
	(0.0011)	(0.0011)	(0.0012)	(0.0012)	(0.0007)	(0.0008)	(0.0330)
Blacks FT	-0.0011	0.0025	-0.0039	0.0004	-0.0011	-0.0006	0.1694***
	(0.0020)	(0.0021)	(0.0021)	(0.0021)	(0.0014)	(0.0015)	(0.0451)
Hispanics FT	0.0031	-0.0022	0.0047*	-0.0018	0.0006	0.0004	-0.0327
	(0.0021)	(0.0022)	(0.0022)	(0.0022)	(0.0015)	(0.0016)	(0.0503)
Political knowledge	0.0251	-0.1278***	0.0201	-0.1414***	0.0825***	0.0379*	0.6886
	(0.0258)	(0.0241)	(0.0260)	(0.0255)	(0.0158)	(0.0181)	(0.7152)
Political interest	0.0103	-0.1260***	-0.0304	0.0197	0.0390*	-0.0245	3.2266***
	(0.0286)	(0.0282)	(0.0285)	(0.0297)	(0.0188)	(0.0223)	(0.8290)
Affective polarization	-0.0049***	-0.0041***	0.0058***	0.0074***	-0.0042***	-0.0027***	0.0279
	(0.0010)	(0.0009)	(0.0010)	(0.0010)	(0.0006)	(0.0007)	(0.0282)
Constant	2.5488**	2.0952***	2.4791***	1.7653***	0.2908**	2.8050***	3.9748
	(0.1755)	(0.1649)	(0.1803)	(0.1773)	(0.1076)	(0.1267)	(4.9325)
N	2082	2082	2082	2082	2082	2082	2082

** p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). Cell entries are OLS coefficients.*

***Table B6**. Effect of conspiracy cues, by conspiracy predisposition.*

	Reps responsible	Reps machines	Dems responsible	Dems machines	Confidence	Democracy	Fund
Conspiracy predisp.	-0.0247	0.2153***	0.1572**	0.5321***	-0.3877***	-0.2700***	-2.8491
	(0.0565)	(0.0494)	(0.0578)	(0.0615)	(0.0366)	(0.0438)	(1.4615)
Republicans explicit cue	-0.5360*	0.5428**	-0.9493***	0.0313	0.0143	-0.0039	-9.0373
	(0.2390)	(0.2072)	(0.2399)	(0.2384)	(0.1474)	(0.1686)	(6.1272)
Republicans implicit cue	0.0050	-0.2270	0.0694	0.0597	-0.1652	-0.0422	-1.1181
	(0.2283)	(0.1799)	(0.2302)	(0.2196)	(0.1405)	(0.1663)	(6.4413)
Democrats explicit cue	-0.7835***	0.0032	-0.6290*	0.1175	-0.0106	0.1352	-3.0240
	(0.2326)	(0.1904)	(0.2455)	(0.2346)	(0.1451)	(0.1668)	(6.2849)
Democrats implicit cue	-0.4290	-0.2593	0.0691	0.1451	-0.1772	0.0389	-8.7490
	(0.2337)	(0.1832)	(0.2321)	(0.2233)	(0.1411)	(0.1720)	(6.1791)
Conspiracy× explicit Rep. cue	0.0868	-0.0596	0.1928*	-0.0010	-0.0343	-0.0063	1.7075
	(0.0798)	(0.0715)	(0.0799)	(0.0814)	(0.0496)	(0.0574)	(1.9973)
Conspiracy× implicit Rep. cue	-0.0304	0.0533	-0.0104	-0.0756	0.0427	-0.0090	-0.0959
	(0.0781)	(0.0646)	(0.0778)	(0.0783)	(0.0484)	(0.0571)	(2.1065)
Conspiracy× explicit Dem. cue	0.0818	0.0091	0.1486	-0.0071	-0.0260	-0.0774	-0.0787
	(0.0788)	(0.0686)	(0.0816)	(0.0830)	(0.0505)	(0.0578)	(2.0273)
Conspiracy× implicit Dem. cue	0.0673	0.0687	-0.0435	-0.0750	0.0562	-0.0187	3.0064
	(0.0782)	(0.0649)	(0.0767)	(0.0774)	(0.0481)	(0.0587)	(2.0631)
Republican	-0.5634***	-0.5119***	0.3267***	1.0141***	-0.5216***	0.0550	0.1023
	(0.0551)	(0.0509)	(0.0551)	(0.0625)	(0.0379)	(0.0412)	(1.5513)
Democrat	0.0806	0.0488	-0.0739	-0.3963***	0.2410***	0.0269	7.3703***
	(0.0545)	(0.0543)	(0.0543)	(0.0508)	(0.0336)	(0.0418)	(1.6252)
Constant	3.2522***	1.3925***	2.6474***	0.6863***	1.2304***	3.2143***	33.9845***
	(0.1673)	(0.1407)	(0.1726)	(0.1782)	(0.1093)	(0.1297)	(4.6458)
N	2111	2111	2111	2111	2111	2111	2111

** p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). Cell entries are OLS coefficients.*

Table B7. *Effect of conspiracy cues, by feeling toward the media.*

	Reps responsible	Reps machines	Dems responsible	Dems machines	Confidence	Democracy	Fund
Media FT	0.0037	-0.0012	0.0003	-0.0177***	0.0136***	0.0118***	0.1051
	(0.0023)	(0.0021)	(0.0025)	(0.0024)	(0.0014)	(0.0017)	(0.0650)
Republicans explicit cue	-0.2699*	0.2491*	-0.2323	-0.3759*	-0.0602	0.0949	-2.3316
	(0.1288)	(0.1155)	(0.1417)	(0.1500)	(0.0857)	(0.0966)	(3.4280)
Republicans implicit cue	-0.1633	0.1263	0.0464	-0.2355	-0.0059	-0.0935	-4.9927
	(0.1334)	(0.1184)	(0.1411)	(0.1526)	(0.0900)	(0.0993)	(3.6889)
Democrats explicit cue	-0.6739***	-0.0108	0.1126	0.0365	-0.1468	-0.0663	-2.8067
	(0.1295)	(0.1156)	(0.1452)	(0.1519)	(0.0903)	(0.1026)	(3.6416)
Democrats implicit cue	-0.3017*	0.0091	0.0601	-0.1344	-0.1022	-0.0159	-0.9438
	(0.1335)	(0.1096)	(0.1377)	(0.1488)	(0.0850)	(0.1028)	(3.6840)
Media FT × explicit Rep. cue	-0.0003	0.0043	-0.0043	0.0128***	-0.0009	-0.0034	-0.0549
	(0.0032)	(0.0031)	(0.0035)	(0.0034)	(0.0020)	(0.0023)	(0.0868)
Media FT × implicit Rep. cue	0.0026	-0.0062*	-0.0001	0.0020	-0.0007	0.0010	0.1083
	(0.0031)	(0.0029)	(0.0033)	(0.0034)	(0.0021)	(0.0023)	(0.0944)
Media FT × explicit Dem. cue	0.0036	0.0013	-0.0094**	0.0015	0.0019	-0.0002	-0.0110
	(0.0031)	(0.0029)	(0.0034)	(0.0033)	(0.0020)	(0.0023)	(0.0903)
Media FT × implicit Dem. cue	0.0018	-0.0017	-0.0030	0.0026	0.0020	-0.0004	0.0193
	(0.0032)	(0.0028)	(0.0034)	(0.0032)	(0.0018)	(0.0024)	(0.0908)
Republican	-0.5370***	-0.5148***	0.3169***	0.9418***	-0.4445***	0.1183**	0.7852
	(0.0549)	(0.0525)	(0.0569)	(0.0670)	(0.0405)	(0.0424)	(1.5460)
Democrat	0.0081	-0.0043	-0.0973	-0.3696***	0.1737***	-0.0247	6.4559***
	(0.0560)	(0.0588)	(0.0563)	(0.0549)	(0.0369)	(0.0439)	(1.6622)
Constant	3.0690**	2.0523***	3.0825***	2.8041***	-0.3271***	2.0439***	22.4139***
	(0.1002)	(0.0881)	(0.1099)	(0.1134)	(0.0681)	(0.0785)	(2.6927)
N	2099	2099	2099	2099	2099	2099	2099

** p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). Cell entries are OLS coefficients.*

Table B8. *Effect of conspiracy cues, by political interest.*

	Reps responsible	Reps machines	Dems responsible	Dems machines	Confidence	Democracy	Fund
Pol. interest	0.0590	-0.1192*	0.0031	-0.0173	0.0518	-0.0051	5.3264***
	(0.0595)	(0.0542)	(0.0581)	(0.0751)	(0.0465)	(0.0516)	(1.7300)
Republicans explicit cue	0.1543	0.8224***	-0.2130	0.4672	-0.3393	-0.0584	9.4982
	(0.2455)	(0.2477)	(0.2441)	(0.3016)	(0.1990)	(0.2103)	(7.1202)
Republicans implicit cue	-0.0959	0.2925	-0.0979	-0.1469	-0.3485	-0.1712	-4.7454
	(0.2483)	(0.2503)	(0.2444)	(0.3128)	(0.2001)	(0.2176)	(6.8356)
Democrats explicit cue	-0.2674	0.3439	-0.0818	0.2667	-0.2679	-0.2420	-3.0173
	(0.2749)	(0.2539)	(0.2711)	(0.3296)	(0.2117)	(0.2280)	(7.2615)
Democrats implicit cue	-0.0343	0.3820	0.1111	0.3017	-0.2449	-0.2469	9.2446
	(0.2571)	(0.2593)	(0.2490)	(0.3059)	(0.1922)	(0.2254)	(7.5235)
Pol. interest × explicit Rep. cue	-0.1452	-0.1423	-0.0535	-0.1246	0.0699	0.0018	-4.5285
	(0.0814)	(0.0788)	(0.0821)	(0.0986)	(0.0639)	(0.0678)	(2.3780)
Pol. interest × implicit Rep. cue	0.0064	-0.1235	0.0467	0.0015	0.0984	0.0328	1.1796
	(0.0810)	(0.0784)	(0.0804)	(0.1007)	(0.0635)	(0.0704)	(2.3395)
Pol. interest × explicit Dem. cue	-0.0933	-0.0973	-0.0384	-0.0444	0.0517	0.0462	-0.1530
	(0.0887)	(0.0804)	(0.0882)	(0.1051)	(0.0671)	(0.0737)	(2.4518)
Pol. interest × implicit Dem. cue	-0.0666	-0.1377	-0.0488	-0.1030	0.0613	0.0664	-3.1479
	(0.0841)	(0.0806)	(0.0830)	(0.0996)	(0.0618)	(0.0726)	(2.4948)
Republican	-0.5653***	-0.4817***	0.3306***	1.0321***	-0.5417***	0.0472	-0.3297
	(0.0551)	(0.0504)	(0.0572)	(0.0696)	(0.0443)	(0.0451)	(1.5529)
Democrat	0.0751	-0.0102	-0.1423**	-0.5578***	0.3577***	0.1226**	7.5660***
	(0.0543)	(0.0558)	(0.0546)	(0.0549)	(0.0375)	(0.0437)	(1.5944)
Constant	3.0054**	2.3635***	3.0944***	2.2587***	-0.0332	2.4540***	9.8289
	(0.1824)	(0.1736)	(0.1760)	(0.2330)	(0.1471)	(0.1606)	(5.1923)
N	2111	2111	2111	2111	2111	2111	2111

** p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). Cell entries are OLS coefficients.*

***Table B9**. Effect of conspiracy cues, by political knowledge.*

	Reps responsible	Reps machines	Dems responsible	Dems machines	Confidence	Democracy Fund	
Pol. know.	0.0745	-0.1946***	0.0143	-0.2588***	0.1995***	0.0572	0.8561
	(0.0521)	(0.0505)	(0.0530)	(0.0619)	(0.0383)	(0.0428)	(1.5046)
Republicans explicit cue	-0.0389	0.3589	0.1711	0.1941	-0.0060	-0.1147	-3.5599
	(0.2246)	(0.2279)	(0.2236)	(0.2467)	(0.1638)	(0.1724)	(6.2429)
Republicans implicit cue	0.1278	0.1604	0.0479	-0.4644	0.0978	-0.0100	-11.8489
	(0.2231)	(0.2225)	(0.2236)	(0.2565)	(0.1608)	(0.1802)	(6.1683)
Democrats explicit cue	-0.3616	0.0089	0.0890	-0.0275	-0.0562	-0.2557	-10.6962
	(0.2378)	(0.2377)	(0.2532)	(0.2693)	(0.1673)	(0.1840)	(6.4448)
Democrats implicit cue	-0.0069	0.0923	-0.1965	-0.0325	0.0026	-0.3648*	2.4597
	(0.2222)	(0.2244)	(0.2311)	(0.2545)	(0.1615)	(0.1808)	(6.5021)
Pol. know. × explicit Rep. cue	-0.0844	0.0097	-0.1870*	-0.0396	-0.0393	0.0220	-0.2928
	(0.0745)	(0.0725)	(0.0737)	(0.0819)	(0.0539)	(0.0569)	(2.0808)
Pol. know. × implicit Rep. cue	-0.0698	-0.0788	-0.0016	0.1092	-0.0512	-0.0208	3.5003
	(0.0721)	(0.0688)	(0.0719)	(0.0829)	(0.0520)	(0.0584)	(2.0860)
Pol. know. × explicit Dem. cue	-0.0649	0.0108	-0.0974	0.0526	-0.0170	0.0528	2.4562
	(0.0777)	(0.0746)	(0.0814)	(0.0872)	(0.0545)	(0.0602)	(2.1461)
Pol. know. × implicit Dem. cue	-0.0782	-0.0435	0.0528	0.0074	-0.0209	0.1077	-0.9758
	(0.0727)	(0.0693)	(0.0741)	(0.0822)	(0.0514)	(0.0580)	(2.1007)
Republican	-0.5615***	-0.5351***	0.3306***	0.9948***	-0.5062***	0.0617	0.3265
	(0.0550)	(0.0508)	(0.0571)	(0.0687)	(0.0436)	(0.0445)	(1.5630)
Democrat	0.0769	-0.0159	-0.1395*	-0.5483***	0.3559***	0.1186**	7.9272***
	(0.0541)	(0.0547)	(0.0543)	(0.0536)	(0.0371)	(0.0433)	(1.6000)
Constant	2.9638**	2.5947***	3.0605***	2.9825***	-0.4772***	2.2650***	23.3082***
	(0.1625)	(0.1674)	(0.1689)	(0.1941)	(0.1219)	(0.1356)	(4.6609)
N	2111	2111	2111	2111	2111	2111	2111

** p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). Cell entries are OLS coefficients.*

***Table B10**. Effect of conspiracy cues, by affective polarization.*

	Reps responsible	Reps machines	Dems responsible	Dems machines	Confidence	Democracy	Fund
Affective pol.	-0.0044*	-0.0060***	0.0059**	0.0116***	-0.0069***	-0.0044***	0.0242
	(0.0019)	(0.0015)	(0.0021)	(0.0019)	(0.0013)	(0.0015)	(0.0526)
Republicans explicit cue	-0.2919***	0.3407***	-0.3434***	0.1781	-0.1209	-0.0165	-5.2448*
	(0.0880)	(0.0963)	(0.0923)	(0.1102)	(0.0753)	(0.0746)	(2.5867)
Republicans implicit cue	-0.0742	-0.1394	0.0893	-0.0271	-0.1333	-0.0820	-1.9573
	(0.0926)	(0.0975)	(0.0944)	(0.1141)	(0.0775)	(0.0803)	(2.8654)
Democrats explicit cue	-0.5664***	-0.0479	-0.3148***	0.1851	-0.1236	-0.0905	-3.3960
	(0.0932)	(0.0964)	(0.0964)	(0.1141)	(0.0761)	(0.0794)	(2.8117)
Democrats implicit cue	-0.1609	-0.1574	-0.1018	-0.0571	-0.0373	-0.0315	0.1717
	(0.0933)	(0.0941)	(0.0926)	(0.1080)	(0.0731)	(0.0801)	(2.9572)
Affective pol.× explicit Rep. cue	0.0003	0.0019	-0.0011	-0.0034	0.0000	-0.0008	0.0279
	(0.0024)	(0.0022)	(0.0026)	(0.0025)	(0.0016)	(0.0018)	(0.0652)
Affective pol.× implicit Rep. cue	-0.0005	0.0015	-0.0012	-0.0038	0.0028	0.0002	0.0130
	(0.0024)	(0.0022)	(0.0025)	(0.0025)	(0.0017)	(0.0019)	(0.0717)
Affective pol.× explicit Dem. cue	0.0001	0.0026	0.0046	-0.0015	0.0002	-0.0006	0.0006
	(0.0025)	(0.0021)	(0.0027)	(0.0026)	(0.0017)	(0.0019)	(0.0706)
Affective pol.× implicit Dem. cue	-0.0023	0.0037	0.0018	0.0007	-0.0004	-0.0003	-0.0223
	(0.0025)	(0.0021)	(0.0026)	(0.0025)	(0.0016)	(0.0019)	(0.0699)
Republican	-0.3790***	-0.3480***	0.0778	0.6511***	-0.2853***	0.2244***	-1.0981
	(0.0654)	(0.0643)	(0.0642)	(0.0782)	(0.0528)	(0.0520)	(1.8083)
Democrat	0.3132**	0.1720*	-0.4520***	-1.0299***	0.6679***	0.3473***	6.8208***
	(0.0711)	(0.0673)	(0.0706)	(0.0783)	(0.0532)	(0.0556)	(2.0230)
Constant	3.1697**	2.0696***	3.1212***	2.1567***	0.1336*	2.4284***	26.0101***
	(0.0654)	(0.0741)	(0.0696)	(0.0837)	(0.0566)	(0.0603)	(2.2321)
N	2094	2094	2094	2094	2094	2094	2094

** p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). Cell entries are OLS coefficients.*

Table B11. *Effect of conspiracy cues, by feeling toward Blacks.*

	Reps responsible	Reps machines	Dems responsible	Dems machines	Confidence	Democracy	Fund
Blacks FT	0.0021	-0.0022	-0.0024	-0.0085***	-0.0007	-0.0022	0.1495*
	(0.0026)	(0.0022)	(0.0028)	(0.0029)	(0.0020)	(0.0022)	(0.0709)
Republicans explicit cue	-0.1635	0.0741	-0.6448*	-0.7811*	-0.1921	-0.1602	-2.2696
	(0.2676)	(0.2407)	(0.2886)	(0.3119)	(0.2063)	(0.2097)	(6.5107)
Republicans implicit cue	-0.0346	-0.1947	-0.1070	-0.5187	-0.1169	-0.4253	-8.9078
	(0.2797)	(0.2642)	(0.2854)	(0.3295)	(0.2252)	(0.2254)	(7.1598)
Democrats explicit cue	-0.7658***	-0.5206*	-0.2051	-0.4121	-0.4213*	-0.5901**	-0.9340
	(0.2700)	(0.2322)	(0.2953)	(0.3182)	(0.2057)	(0.2161)	(6.9712)
Democrats implicit cue	-0.1396	-0.1549	-0.1640	-0.3285	-0.2860	-0.3157	-0.0078
	(0.2721)	(0.2376)	(0.2778)	(0.3001)	(0.1905)	(0.2139)	(6.7815)
Blacks FT× explicit Rep. cue	-0.0015	0.0045	0.0037	0.0118***	0.0009	0.0015	-0.0239
	(0.0035)	(0.0032)	(0.0038)	(0.0040)	(0.0027)	(0.0028)	(0.0888)
Blacks FT× implicit Rep. cue	-0.0006	0.0015	0.0020	0.0049	0.0009	0.0048	0.1034
	(0.0036)	(0.0034)	(0.0037)	(0.0042)	(0.0029)	(0.0030)	(0.0974)
Blacks FT× explicit Dem. cue	0.0031	0.0078*	-0.0000	0.0071	0.0045	0.0068*	-0.0273
	(0.0035)	(0.0031)	(0.0039)	(0.0041)	(0.0026)	(0.0028)	(0.0947)
Blacks FT× implicit Dem. cue	-0.0012	0.0015	0.0016	0.0040	0.0032	0.0037	-0.0046
	(0.0035)	(0.0031)	(0.0036)	(0.0038)	(0.0025)	(0.0028)	(0.0905)
Republican	-0.5634***	-0.5072***	0.3365***	1.0279***	-0.5254***	0.0499	0.5213
	(0.0553)	(0.0514)	(0.0573)	(0.0697)	(0.0448)	(0.0452)	(1.5517)
Democrat	0.0697	-0.0323	-0.1314*	-0.5442***	0.3591***	0.1196**	7.2633***
	(0.0544)	(0.0570)	(0.0547)	(0.0552)	(0.0383)	(0.0439)	(1.6070)
Constant	3.0308**	2.1799***	3.2732***	2.8435***	0.1719	2.5990***	14.9219**
	(0.2058)	(0.1785)	(0.2139)	(0.2262)	(0.1553)	(0.1686)	(5.4085)
N	2102	2102	2102	2102	2102	2102	2102

** p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). Cell entries are OLS coefficients.*

***Table B12**. Effect of conspiracy cues, by feeling toward Hispanics.*

	Reps responsible	Reps machines	Dems responsible	Dems machines	Confidence	Democracy	Fund
Hispanics FT	0.0029	-0.0042	-0.0004	-0.0107***	0.0014	-0.0003	0.1589*
	(0.0027)	(0.0024)	(0.0031)	(0.0032)	(0.0021)	(0.0022)	(0.0781)
Republicans explicit cue	-0.3084	-0.1938	-0.5247	-0.9560**	-0.0705	-0.0066	-0.8339
	(0.2761)	(0.2531)	(0.3184)	(0.3408)	(0.2099)	(0.2159)	(7.3310)
Republicans implicit cue	0.0998	-0.3075	-0.1012	-0.6545	0.1140	-0.2856	-6.0391
	(0.2939)	(0.2701)	(0.3157)	(0.3434)	(0.2350)	(0.2368)	(8.3267)
Democrats explicit cue	-0.7761**	-0.6434*	-0.2991	-0.8418*	-0.1549	-0.3610	2.7612
	(0.2767)	(0.2549)	(0.3231)	(0.3421)	(0.2209)	(0.2341)	(7.8468)
Democrats implicit cue	-0.0275	-0.0517	-0.0639	-0.3891	-0.1302	-0.1767	2.7338
	(0.2806)	(0.2566)	(0.3037)	(0.3272)	(0.2077)	(0.2219)	(7.4315)
Hispanics FT × explicit Rep. cue	0.0004	0.0080*	0.0020	0.0140***	-0.0007	-0.0006	-0.0456
	(0.0037)	(0.0034)	(0.0042)	(0.0044)	(0.0027)	(0.0028)	(0.0999)
Hispanics FT × implicit Rep. cue	-0.0024	0.0030	0.0020	0.0068	-0.0022	0.0029	0.0598
	(0.0038)	(0.0035)	(0.0041)	(0.0044)	(0.0031)	(0.0031)	(0.1121)
Hispanics FT × explicit Dem. cue	0.0030	0.0092**	0.0014	0.0131***	0.0008	0.0036	-0.0821
	(0.0036)	(0.0034)	(0.0042)	(0.0044)	(0.0028)	(0.0030)	(0.1055)
Hispanics FT × implicit Dem. cue	-0.0028	-0.0000	0.0003	0.0047	0.0011	0.0019	-0.0414
	(0.0036)	(0.0033)	(0.0039)	(0.0042)	(0.0027)	(0.0029)	(0.0992)
Republican	-0.5669***	-0.5053***	0.3392***	1.0382***	-0.5257***	0.0415	0.0417
	(0.0553)	(0.0514)	(0.0575)	(0.0698)	(0.0448)	(0.0452)	(1.5590)
Democrat	0.0662	-0.0209	-0.1402*	-0.5368***	0.3597***	0.1126*	7.2228***
	(0.0545)	(0.0568)	(0.0549)	(0.0554)	(0.0385)	(0.0441)	(1.6169)
Constant	2.9680***	2.3225***	3.1291***	3.0022***	0.0122	2.4597***	14.4216*
	(0.2081)	(0.1883)	(0.2392)	(0.2499)	(0.1652)	(0.1729)	(5.8805)
N	2098	2098	2098	2098	2098	2098	2098

** p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). Cell entries are OLS coefficients.*

Appendix C: Additional analyses

***Table C1**. Cue effects on conspiracy beliefs (including all treatment conditions).*

	Reps responsible	Reps used voting machines	Dems responsible	Dems used voting machines
Democrat	0.0783	-0.0287	-0.1424**	-0.5624***
	(0.0541)	(0.0567)	(0.0543)	(0.0547)
Republican	-0.5635***	-0.5051***	0.3305***	1.0248***
	(0.0550)	(0.0514)	(0.0571)	(0.0697)
Republicans committed fraud explicit cue	-0.2886***	0.3953***	-0.3757***	0.0897
	(0.0694)	(0.0694)	(0.0727)	(0.0813)
Republicans committed fraud implicit cue	-0.0793	-0.0759	0.0433	-0.1416
	(0.0708)	(0.0673)	(0.0720)	(0.0808)
Democrats committed fraud explicit cue	-0.5542***	0.0419	-0.2001**	0.1295
	(0.0709)	(0.0679)	(0.0750)	(0.0822)
Democrats committed fraud implicit cue	-0.2389***	-0.0400	-0.0388	-0.0142
	(0.0706)	(0.0666)	(0.0716)	(0.0797)
Constant	3.1848***	2.0116***	3.1039***	2.2095***
	(0.0564)	(0.0593)	(0.0591)	(0.0686)
Explicit Rep cue - implicit Rep cue	-0.2093***	0.4713***	0.1310*	-0.4190***
	(0.0708)	(0.0701)	(0.0570)	(0.0714)
Explicit Dem cue - implicit Dem cue	-0.3153***	0.0820	-0.1166*	-0.1612*
	(0.0721)	(0.0677)	(0.0582)	(0.0735)
N	2111	2111	2111	2111

** p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). Cell entries are OLS coefficients.*

***Table C2**. Effects of conspiracy cues on open-ended measure of conspiracy ideation.*

Democrat	-0.0178
	(0.0139)
Republican	0.0158
	(0.0153)
Republicans explicit cue	-0.0327
	(0.0188)
Republicans implicit cue	-0.0146
	(0.0198)
Democrats explicit cue	-0.0022
	(0.0202)
Democrats implicit cue	-0.0271
	(0.0190)
Constant	0.0974***
	(0.0167)
Republicans explicit cue - Republicans implicit cue	-0.0181
	(0.0180)
Democrats explicit cue - Democrats implicit cue	0.0249
	(0.0186)
N	2110

** p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). Cell entries are OLS coefficients.*

Table C3. *Cue effects on secondary outcomes (pooled by explicitness).*

	Confidence in elections	Satisfaction with democracy	Funding support
Democrat	0.3666***	0.1238***	8.0500***
	(0.0380)	(0.0434)	(1.6067)
Republican	-0.5306***	0.0500	0.0455
	(0.0443)	(0.0449)	(1.5579)
Explicit	-0.1184**	-0.0760	-3.9351*
	(0.0456)	(0.0493)	(1.7635)
Implicit	-0.0550	-0.0568	-0.9140
	(0.0448)	(0.0500)	(1.8103)
Constant	0.1192**	2.4369***	25.9000***
	(0.0449)	(0.0491)	(1.7888)
N	2111	2111	2111

** p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005 (two-sided). Cell entries are OLS coefficients.*

Appendix D: Preregistration

In this Appendix, we present a "populated pre-analysis plan" that details the location of our pre-registered results in the manuscript as well as departures from the plan. Our full pre-analysis planswere filed in the OSF registry, where all data and analysis script will be shared.

Preregistered hypotheses and research questions

H1a. Both implicit and explicit cues increase conspiracy belief, and H1b) the effects of explicit cues are larger.

- See Table B1, C1, and Figure 1.

H2. The effects of both implicit and explicit cues increase with partisan congeniality.

- See Table B2 and Figure 1.

RQ1. Do conspiracy cues have spillover effects on confidence in elections, satisfaction with democracy, or willingness to donate to election security efforts?

- See Table B3, B4, and C3, as well as Figure 2.

RQ2. Will the effects of either implicit or explicit cues increase with conspiracy predisposition,dislike of the media, political interest, political knowledge, affective polarization, dislike of blacks,or dislike of Hispanics?

- See Table B5-B12.