## Appendix C: Supplementary analyses (COVID-19 items)

The table below displays the share of information choice selection by Democrats and Republicans (see also Figure 1 in the main text).

		,
Share Selected (Dem)	Share Selected (Rep)	Partisan Divide
0.09	0.43	0.34
0.43	0.21	0.23
0.37	0.27	0.09
0.10	0.09	0.02
	Share Selected (Dem)   0.09   0.43   0.37   0.10	Share Selected (Dem) Share Selected (Rep)   0.09 0.43   0.43 0.21   0.37 0.27   0.10 0.09

Table C1. News choices in unincentivized condition (COVID-19 items).

Here we separately analyze the effects of incentives on each of the COVID-19 items, rather than pooling them as in the main analysis. We see statistically significant increases in correct answers for the high incentive condition on the source of COVID-19 and for the low incentive condition on the ineffectiveness of Hydroxychloroquine, but otherwise do not observe statistically significant increases in correct answers across the various conditions and treatments.

	Mortality	International	Risk by Age	Source	Treatment
(Intercept)	$0.63^{*}$	$0.73^{*}$	$0.81^{*}$	$0.70^{*}$	$0.76^{*}$
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Low Incentive	0.04	-0.03	-0.00	0.00	$0.06^{*}$
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
High Incentive	0.03	0.00	0.02	$0.07^{*}$	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
N	1447	1447	1447	1447	1447
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## Table C2. Effect of incentives on pr(correct answer).

Robust standard errors in parentheses

Our primary outcome variable is a binary indicator of whether a respondent was correct or not. We also collected a measure of response certainty, asking respondents on a 5-point scale from 1 ("Not sure") to 5 ("Very sure") about how certain they were of their answers to each information question. Table C3 shows the percentage of those responding correctly or incorrectly to an information question broken out by their reported level of certainty in their answer.

	Not sure	Slightly	Moderately	Very	Extremely
Correct	43 (3%)	52(3%)	391~(23%)	528 (31%)	694 (40%)
Incorrect	49 (8%)	31~(5%)	185~(29%)	215~(33%)	167~(26%)

Table C3. Response certainty on COVID-19 items.

Respondents had a relatively high degree of confidence in the answers they provided. Of those who answered the knowledge questions correctly, 71% percent were "Very Sure" or "Extremely Sure" about their answer, the top two levels of the certainty scale. While slightly lower, 59% of those answering the

knowledge questions incorrectly were "Very Sure" or "Extremely Sure" about their answer. Relatively small shares of respondents fell into the lower certainty response categories.

Using the certainty measure, we created an alternative outcome combining accuracy/certainty into a 10-pt scale from 1 ("wrong and extremely certain about their answer") to 10 ("correct and extremely certain"). The middle of the scale contains respondents who were uncertain about their answers. Those who were wrong and not sure about their answer were placed at 5 and those who were correct and not sure about their answer were placed at 5 and those who were correct and not sure about their answer were placed at 6. There was an average partisan difference of 2.4 points on the accuracy/certainty scale across the different items.

Topic	Accuracy/Certainty Scale	Accuracy/Certainty Scale	Partisan Divide
	(Dem)	$(\operatorname{Rep})$	
CDC Mortality Count	8.22	4.09	4.12
COVID-19 Treatments	8.90	5.75	3.15
COVID-19 Source	8.19	5.18	3.01
International Comparison	6.51	8.17	1.66
Risk by Age	7.64	7.81	0.17

Table C4. Partisan information divides in unincentivized conditions (with response certainty).TopicAccuracy/Certainty ScaleAccuracy/Certainty ScalePartisan Divide

When we examined the effects of incentives on this outcome, we observed similar results. The low incentive treatment did not produce a detectable increase on the accuracy/certainty scale, while the high incentive treatment produced a small increase in accuracy/certainty that was statistically significant.

	COVID-19 Information	
(Intercept)		$7.20^{*}$
		(0.08)
Low Incentive		0.15
		(0.11)
High Incentive		$0.31^{*}$
		(0.11)
N	,	7235

Table C5. Effect of incentives on accuracy/certainty scale.

Robust standard errors, clustered by Respondent, in parentheses Model includes Topic Fixed Effects

In the main text, we considered the probability that respondents provided the correct answer to the information question as an outcome. Here we focus on the effects of incentives for the partisan divide present across the informational items. Our additional analysis using this alternative outcome conforms with the results in the main text, as it shows no detectable decline in the partisan divide on these COVID-19 information items when incentives for correctly answering the questions were made available.

To consider how the availability of incentives affected these divides, we conducted a pooled analysis across the different items. We followed a previous study (Bullock et al. 2015) and standardized the direction of these outcomes. Specifically, we coded responses so that the information items were similarly oriented, with the answer that was party-congenial for Democrats always receiving the higher value. So, for the items where the misinformed answer is party-congenial for Democrats, incorrect answers were coded as 1 and correct answers are coded as 0. This was reversed on items where the misinformed answer is party-congenial for Correct answers as 1. This facilitated interpretation of the various individual information items as the indicator variable for whether a respondent is a Democrat would be positive to the degree that there was a partisan divide.

In Table C6, the coefficient for "Democrat" indicates the partisan divide on these items in the unincentivized control condition. The interactions between this variable and the various incentive

treatments show how much this partisan divide was impacted by the introduction of incentives. If partisan informational divides were simply a manifestation of cheerleading, these interactions would be large and negative, indicating smaller partisan divides in the presence of incentives.

	COVID-19 Information
(Intercept)	0.06*
	(0.02)
Democrat	$0.21^{*}$
	(0.02)
Low Incentive	0.02
	(0.02)
High Incentive	$0.04^{*}$
	(0.02)
Democrat $\times$ Low Incentive	-0.02
	(0.02)
Democrat $\times$ High Incentive	-0.03
	(0.02)
N	7235

Table C6.	Effect of incentives on	partisan	information divide.
		COVID	-19 Information

Robust standard errors, clustered by Respondent, in parentheses Model includes Topic Fixed Effects

However, the table reveals only limited evidence that partisan cheerleading underlies the divisions over factual beliefs. There is a sizeable partisan divide on COVID-19 factual items in the control condition (0.21, 95% CI [0.18, 0.25]). The divide is not substantially reduced by the availability of incentives. For both the low and high incentive conditions, the interaction coefficient is negative, but small, amounting to only a 10% reduction in the size of the partisan divide in the control condition (e.g., a divide of 0.18 on the binary information outcome, 95% CI [0.15, 0.21] in the high incentive condition). The effect of incentives on the partisan divide does not reach statistical significance for either treatment.