

Appendix B: Supplementary confirmatory results

As specified in our pre-analysis plan, our study aimed to confirm specific hypotheses pertaining to misinformation intervention attitudes and partisanship (RQ1), institutional trust (RQ2), media preference (RQ3), and platform experience (RQ4). Due to space constraints and rhetorical clarity, we excluded from the main text a subset of analyses confirming our hypotheses for RQ1 and all analyses pertaining to RQ3 altogether.

Presented graphically below, the excluded analyses confirm that Republicans support interventions less than all other groups and perceive interventions as more biased (RQ1); and that conservative media preferences would decrease intervention support while overall news engagement would increase ambivalent responding (RQ3).

See the Methods section in the main paper for more details on the calculation of confidence intervals and usage of models.




Figure 1. Association between partisanship and perception of ideological bias. This plot reinforces a finding in the main text that Republicans are explicitly more likely to think interventions are biased against conservatives than Democrats (and even “everyone else”). Just as most groups perceive more biased judgment in credibility labeling, most groups also agree that interventions are not ideologically targeting liberal content (right panel).




Figure 2. Association between conservative news preference and intervention support (overall index). This plot shows that, with and without covariate adjustment, a standardized increase in conservative news slant in news diet (measured as an average of left/right codings of open-text sources of news as well as preference for 9 “anchoring” news sources: Fox News, CNN, Breitbart, Newsmax, Infowars, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, The Washington Post, MSNBC) predicts 0.25-0.75 standard deviations of lower support for misinformation interventions.




Figure 3. Association between news following and ambivalence towards interventions. This plot shows that, with and without covariate adjustment, frequency of following news (measured with a direct question a 6-point discrete scale) and average frequency across news modes (measured with a 6-point discrete scale for different news modes including tablet, desktop, mobile, radio, print news, local TV news, national TV news) predicts 0.2-0.4 standard deviations of lower ambivalence about misinformation interventions (aggregated across all questions in support index).