Generated by All in One SEO v4.9.10, this is an llms.txt file, used by LLMs to index the site.

# HKS Misinformation Review

A project of the Shorenstein Center

## Sitemaps

- [XML Sitemap](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/sitemap.xml): Contains all public & indexable URLs for this website.

## Posts

- [Explore](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/explore/)
- [Quantifying the “misinformation beat”: 38 years of coverage in major U.S. daily newspapers](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/quantifying-the-misinformation-beat-38-years-of-coverage-in-major-u-s-daily-newspapers/) - Media have made misinformation conversations part of daily life. We looked at nearly four decades’ worth of news stories about misinformation to see exactly what this coverage looked like. We searched five major U.S. daily newspapers for articles containing the misinformation-related terms—disinformation, misinformation, conspiracy theory, fake news, and propaganda—then extracted words in proximity to these
- [Developing an accuracy-prompt toolkit to reduce COVID-19 misinformation online](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/developing-an-accuracy-prompt-toolkit-to-reduce-covid-19-misinformation-online/) - Recent research suggests that shifting users’ attention to accuracy increases the quality of news they subsequently share online. Here we help develop this initial observation into a suite of deployable interventions for practitioners. We ask (i) how prior results generalize to other approaches for prompting users to consider accuracy, and (ii) for whom these prompts
- [The causes and consequences of COVID-19 misperceptions: Understanding the role of news and social media](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/the-causes-and-consequences-of-covid-19-misperceptions-understanding-the-role-of-news-and-social-media/) - We investigate the relationship between media consumption, misinformation, and important attitudes and behaviours during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. We find that comparatively more misinformation circulates on Twitter, while news media tends to reinforce public health recommendations like social distancing. We find that exposure to social media is associated with misperceptions regarding basic facts about COVID-19
- [The relation between media consumption and misinformation at the outset of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic in the US](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/the-relation-between-media-consumption-and-misinformation-at-the-outset-of-the-sars-cov-2-pandemic-in-the-us/) - A US national probability-based survey during the early days of the SARS-CoV-2 spread in the US showed that, above and beyond respondents’ political party, mainstream broadcast media use (e.g., NBC News) correlated with accurate information about the disease's lethality, and mainstream print media use (e.g., the New York Times) correlated with accurate beliefs about protection
- [Pausing to consider why a headline is true or false can help reduce the sharing of false news](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/pausing-reduce-false-news/) - In an online experiment, participants who paused to explain why a headline was true or false indicated that they were less likely to share false information compared to control participants. Their intention to share accurate news stories was unchanged. These results indicate that adding “friction” (i.e., pausing to think) before sharing can improve the quality of information shared on social media.
- [Emphasizing publishers does not effectively reduce susceptibility to misinformation on social media](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/emphasizing-publishers-does-not-reduce-misinformation/) - Survey experiments with nearly 7,000 Americans suggest that increasing the visibility of publishers is an ineffective, and perhaps even counterproductive, way to address misinformation on social media. Our findings underscore the importance of social media platforms and civil society organizations evaluating interventions experimentally rather than implementing them based on intuitive appeal. Research Question Platforms are making
- [The presence of unexpected biases in online fact-checking](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/the-presence-of-unexpected-biases-in-online-fact-checking/) - The increasing amount of information online makes it challenging to judge what to believe or discredit. Fact-checking unverified claims shared on platforms, like social media, can play a critical role in correcting misbeliefs. The current study demonstrates how the effect of fact-checking can vary by several factors. We show that fact-checking helps self-correct one's views
- [Cognitive reflection is associated with greater truth discernment for COVID-19 headlines, less trust but greater use of formal information sources, and greater willingness to pay for masks among social media users in Pakistan](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/cognitive-reflection-is-associated-with-greater-truth-discernment-for-covid-19-headlines-less-trust-but-greater-use-of-formal-information-sources-and-greater-willingness-to-pay-for-masks-among-socia/) - We evaluated the relationship between individual differences in cognitive reflection and the ability to discern between true and false COVID-19 information, trust in information sources for receiving COVID-19 information and willingness to pay (WTP) for masks, using a sample of 621 low- and middle-income users in Pakistan. To capture WTP, participants play an incentive-compatible game
- [Examining accuracy-prompt efficacy in combination with using colored borders to differentiate news and social content online](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/examining-accuracy-prompt-efficacy-in-combination-with-using-colored-borders-to-differentiate-news-and-social-content-online/) - Recent evidence suggests that prompting users to consider the accuracy of online posts increases the quality of news they share on social media. Here we examine how accuracy prompts affect user behavior in a more realistic context, and whether their effect can be enhanced by using colored borders to differentiate news from social content. Our
- [Older Americans are more vulnerable to prior exposure effects in news evaluation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/older-americans-are-more-vulnerable-to-prior-exposure-effects-in-news-evaluation/) - Older news users may be especially vulnerable to prior exposure effects, whereby news comes to be seen as more accurate over multiple viewings. I test this in re-analyses of three two-wave, nationally representative surveys in the United States (N = 8,730) in which respondents rated a series of mainstream, hyperpartisan, and false political headlines (139,082 observations).
- [Contextualizing critical disinformation during the 2023 Voice referendum on WeChat: Manipulating knowledge gaps and whitewashing Indigenous rights](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/contextualizing-critical-disinformation-during-the-2023-voice-referendum-on-wechat-manipulating-knowledge-gaps-and-whitewashing-indigenous-rights/) - Outside China, WeChat is a conduit for translating and circulating English-language information among the Chinese diaspora. Australian domestic political campaigns exploit the gaps between platform governance and national media policy, using Chinese-language digital media outlets that publish through WeChat’s “Official Accounts” feature, to reproduce disinformation from English-language sources. These campaigns are situated within local contexts
- [Emotional resonance and participatory misinformation: Learning from a K-pop controversy](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/emotional-resonance-and-participatory-misinformation-learning-from-a-k-pop-controversy/) - In today’s digital media environment, emotionally resonant narratives often spread faster and stick more firmly than verifiable facts. This paper explores how emotionally charged communication in online controversies fosters not only widespread engagement but also the participatory nature of misinformation. Through a case study of a K-pop controversy, we show how audiences act not just
- [When knowing more means doing less: Algorithmic knowledge and digital (dis)engagement among young adults](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/when-knowing-more-means-doing-less-algorithmic-knowledge-and-digital-disengagement-among-young-adults/) - What if knowing how social media algorithms work doesn’t make you a more responsible digital citizen, but a more cynical one? A new survey of U.S. young adults finds that while higher algorithmic awareness and knowledge are linked to greater concerns about misinformation and filter bubbles, individuals with greater algorithmic awareness and knowledge are less
- [Fact checking what matters: How a harms-based model for selecting claims works](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/fact-checking-what-matters-how-a-harms-based-model-for-selecting-claims-works/) - Not all misinformation consequences are equal. Faced by hundreds of thousands of false claims online and offline every day, fact checkers need a robust way to identify the important ones to check. This scalable model—used by fact checkers in trials in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East since 2024—helps forecast the potential imminent and cumulative
- [Narrative monitoring and argument-checking: Enhancing effectiveness in countering disinformation beyond fact-checking](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/narrative-monitoring-and-argument-checking-enhancing-effectiveness-in-countering-disinformation-beyond-fact-checking/) - In the October 2024 flash floods in Spain, social media posts falsely claimed authorities were concealing the number of casualties. The narrative centered on a flooded parking structure in Valencia, where hundreds of bodies were falsely claimed to be trapped. This narrative gained traction even after videos showing the premises had been evacuated. This illustrates
- [Beyond compliance: How European fact checkers correct their own errors](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/beyond-compliance-how-european-fact-checkers-correct-their-own-errors/) - Fact checkers should maintain high standards of accountability because they hold unique positions in society by verifying content that can influence political practices and society as a whole. To maintain these professional standards, fact-checking network organizations such as the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) and the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN) have established codes of standards,
- [Fact-checking in the multipolar AI order: Between epistemic sovereignty and ambivalence](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/fact-checking-in-the-multipolar-ai-order-between-epistemic-sovereignty-and-ambivalence/) - Fact-checking has become a key response to disinformation during crises and conflicts, but its role is increasingly contested due to concerns about its effectiveness and its co-optation by different political actors. In polarized, high-choice environments, fact-checking is often embedded within partisan and state-aligned infrastructures, shaping validation and rejection of knowledge claims. Authoritarian states are increasingly
- [Accountability in name only: Fact-checking under the EU’s Code of Practice on Disinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/accountability-in-name-only-fact-checking-under-the-eus-code-of-practice-on-disinformation/) - Major platforms constantly claim to fight disinformation and support the fact checking community, but their transparency reports and the empirical evidence from a survey of expert fact checkers across 21 EU countries show a different reality. This study finds that despite commitments made under EU regulations, expert fact checkers remain largely peripheral actors within the
- [Fact-checking at a crossroads: Fact checkers’ perspectives on Community Notes, AI integration, and design recommendations](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/fact-checking-at-a-crossroads-fact-checkers-perspectives-on-community-notes-ai-integration-and-design-recommendations/) - Social media platforms are increasingly using community-based verification systems, such as Community Notes, and AI systems to flag and contextualize potentially misleading content at scale. While these approaches promise speed and broad coverage, concerns about accuracy, bias, and transparency persist. Drawing on interviews with 29 fact checkers, we find that practitioners see community-based verification and AI Note
- [Prebunking misinformation techniques in social media feeds: Results from an Instagram field study](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/prebunking-misinformation-techniques-in-social-media-feeds-results-from-an-instagram-field-study/) - Boosting psychological defences against misleading content online is an active area of research, but transition from the lab to real-world uptake remains a challenge. We developed a 19-second prebunking video about emotionally manipulative content and showed it as a Story Feed ad to N = 375,597 Instagram users in the United Kingdom. Using an innovative
- [On the same page? Experts are mostly, but not always aligned about disinformation in times of generative AI](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/on-the-same-page-experts-are-mostly-but-not-always-aligned-about-disinformation-in-times-of-generative-ai/) - We conducted an expert survey of almost a hundred academics, fact checkers, and journalists who actively work towards mitigating disinformation and providing policy advice in the European context to examine whether they share views on generative artificial intelligence’s (AI) role in disinformation. Findings show that fact checkers feel more confident in tackling AI-generated disinformation than
- [People rely on their existing political beliefs to identify election misinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/people-rely-on-their-existing-political-beliefs-to-identify-election-misinformation/) - Rather than assuming that people are motivated to fact-check, we investigated the process that people go through when and if they encounter political misinformation. Using a digital diary method, we asked 38 participants to collect examples of political misinformation during Australia’s 2025 federal election and explain why they determined it to be misinformation (n =
- [Not so different after all? Antecedents of believing in misinformation and conspiracy theories on COVID-19](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/not-so-different-after-all-antecedents-of-believing-in-misinformation-and-conspiracy-theories-on-covid-19/) - Misinformation and conspiracy theories are often grouped together, but do people believe in them for the same reasons? This study examines how these conceptually distinct forms of deceptive content are processed and believed using the COVID-19 pandemic as context. Surprisingly, despite their theoretical differences, belief in both is predicted by similar psychological factors—particularly conspiracy mentality
- [Reframing misinformation as informational-systemic risk in the age of societal volatility](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/reframing-misinformation-as-informational-systemic-risk-in-the-age-of-societal-volatility/) - When a bank run, a pandemic, or an election spirals out of control, the spark is often informational. In 2023, rumors online helped accelerate the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank. During COVID-19, false claims about vaccines fueled preventable harms by undermining public trust in health guidance, and election lies in the United States fed into
- [Towards the study of world misinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/towards-the-study-of-world-misinformation/) - What if nearly everything we think we know about misinformation came from just a sliver of the world? When research leans heavily on online studies from a few wealthy nations, we risk drawing global conclusions from local noise. A WhatsApp group of fishermen, a displaced community in a refugee camp, or a bustling market in
- [Information control on YouTube during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/information-control-on-youtube-during-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/) - This research note investigates the aftermath of YouTube's global ban on Russian state-affiliated media channels in the wake of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Using over 12 million YouTube comments across 40 Russian-language channels, we analyzed the effectiveness of the ban and the shifts in user activity before and after the platform’s intervention.
- [People are more susceptible to misinformation with realistic AI-synthesized images that provide strong evidence to headlines](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/people-are-more-susceptible-to-misinformation-with-realistic-ai-synthesized-images-that-provide-strong-evidence-to-headlines/) - The development of artificial intelligence (AI) allows rapid creation of AI-synthesized images. In a pre-registered experiment, we examine how properties of AI-synthesized images influence belief in misinformation and memory for corrections. Realistic and probative (i.e., providing strong evidence) images predicted greater belief in false headlines. Additionally, we found preliminary evidence that paying attention to properties
- [LLMs grooming or data voids? LLM-powered chatbot references to Kremlin disinformation reflect information gaps, not manipulation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/llms-grooming-or-data-voids-llm-powered-chatbot-references-to-kremlin-disinformation-reflect-information-gaps-not-manipulation/) - Some of today’s most popular large language model (LLM)-powered chatbots occasionally reference Kremlin-linked disinformation websites, but it might not be for the reasons many fear. While some recent studies have claimed that Russian actors are “grooming” LLMs by flooding the web with disinformation, our small-scale analysis finds little evidence for this. When such references appear,
- [A dual typology of social media interventions and deterrence mechanisms against misinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/a-dual-typology-of-social-media-interventions-and-deterrence-mechanisms-against-misinformation/) - In response to the escalating threat of misinformation, social media platforms have introduced a wide range of interventions aimed at reducing the spread and influence of false information. However, there is a lack of a coherent macro-level perspective that explains how these interventions operate independently and collectively. To address this gap, I offer a dual
- [Vaccine hesitancy in online spaces: A scoping review of the research literature, 2000-2020](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/vaccine-hesitancy-in-online-spaces-a-scoping-review-of-the-research-literature-2000-2020/) - We review 100 articles published from 2000 to early 2020 that research aspects of vaccine hesitancy in online communication spaces and identify several gaps in the literature prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. These gaps relate to five areas: disciplinary focus; specific vaccine, condition, or disease focus; stakeholders and implications; research methodology; and geographical coverage. Our
- [Do language models favor their home countries? Asymmetric propagation of positive misinformation and foreign influence audits](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/do-language-models-favor-their-home-countries-asymmetric-propagation-of-positive-misinformation-and-foreign-influence-audits/) - As language models (LMs) continue to develop, concerns over foreign misinformation through models developed in authoritarian countries have emerged. Do LMs favor their home countries? This study audits four frontier LMs by evaluating their favoritism toward world leaders, then measuring how favoritism propagates into misinformation belief. We found that although DeepSeek favors China, it also
- [New sources of inaccuracy? A conceptual framework for studying AI hallucinations](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/new-sources-of-inaccuracy-a-conceptual-framework-for-studying-ai-hallucinations/) - In February 2025, Google’s AI Overview fooled itself and its users when it cited an April Fool’s satire about “microscopic bees powering computers” as factual in search results (Kidman, 2025). Google did not intend to mislead, yet the system produced a confident falsehood. Such cases mark a shift from misinformation caused by human mistakes to
- [Toxic politics and TikTok engagement in the 2024 U.S. election](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/toxic-politics-and-tiktok-engagement-in-the-2024-u-s-election/) - What kinds of political content thrive on TikTok during an election year? Our analysis of 51,680 political videos from the 2024 U.S. presidential cycle reveals that toxic and partisan content consistently attracts more user engagement—despite ongoing moderation efforts. Posts about immigration and election fraud, in particular, draw high levels of toxicity and attention. While Republican-leaning
- [The unappreciated role of intent in algorithmic moderation of abusive content on social media](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/the-unappreciated-role-of-intent-in-algorithmic-moderation-of-abusive-content-on-social-media/) - A significant body of research is dedicated to developing language models that can detect various types of online abuse, for example, hate speech, cyberbullying. However, there is a disconnect between platform policies, which often consider the author's intention as a criterion for content moderation, and the current capabilities of detection models, which typically lack efforts
- [The small effects of short user corrections on misinformation in Brazil, India, and the United Kingdom](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/the-small-effects-of-short-user-corrections-on-misinformation-in-brazil-india-and-the-united-kingdom/) - How effective are user corrections in combatting misinformation on social media, and does adding a link to a fact check improve their effectiveness? We conducted a pre-registered online experiment on representative samples of the online population in Brazil, India, and the United Kingdom (N participants = 3,000, N observations = 24,000). We found that in
- [Disparities by design: Toward a research agenda that links science misinformation and socioeconomic marginalization in the age of AI](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/disparities-by-design-toward-a-research-agenda-that-links-science-misinformation-and-socioeconomic-marginalization-in-the-age-of-ai/) - Misinformation research often draws optimistic conclusions, with fact-checking, for example, being established as an effective means of reducing false beliefs. However, it rarely considers the details of socioeconomic disparities that often shape who is most vulnerable to science misinformation. Historical and systemic inequalities have fostered mistrust in institutions, limiting access to credible information, for example,
- [Gendered disinformation as violence: A new analytical agenda](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/gendered-disinformation-as-violence-a-new-analytical-agenda/) - The potential for harm entrenched in mis- and disinformation content, regardless of intentionality, opens space for a new analytical agenda to investigate the weaponization of identity-based features like gender, race, and ethnicity through the lens of violence. Therefore, we lay out the triangle of violence to support new studies aiming to investigate multimedia content, victims,
- [Declining information quality under new platform governance](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/declining-information-quality-under-new-platform-governance/) - Following the leadership transition on October 27, 2022, Twitter/X underwent a notable change in platform governance. This study investigates how these changes influenced information quality for registered U.S. voters and the platform more broadly. We address this question by analyzing two complementary datasets—a Twitter panel and a Decahose sample. Our findings reveal a subtle yet
- [Feedback and education improve human detection of image manipulation on social media](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/feedback-and-education-improve-human-detection-of-image-manipulation-on-social-media/) - This study investigates the impact of educational interventions and feedback on users' ability to detect manipulated images on social media, addressing a gap in research that has primarily focused on algorithmic approaches. Through a pre-registered randomized and controlled experiment, we found that feedback and educational content significantly improved participants' ability to detect manipulated images on
- [Our journal statistics for 2024 ](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/our-journal-statistics-for-2024/) - This editorial provides an overview of the key statistics for Volume 5 (2024) of the HKS Misinformation Review, including submission and acceptance rates, accepted article types, publication speed and frequency, citation impact, most-viewed articles, engagement and readership, as well as author and reviewer demographics. Acknowledgements We extend our sincere thanks to everyone who contributed to making Volume 5
- [Our journal statistics for 2021](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/our-journal-statistics-for-2021/) - In this editorial, we share some of the journal’s key statistics for 2021, including acceptance rate, processing and publication times, and other useful data. In 2021, we received 109 submissions in total, which included 85 research articles, 18 commentaries, and 6 research notes. Although somewhat lower than our 2020 submission volume, this number is still impressive
- [Disagreement as a way to study misinformation and its effects](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/disagreement-as-a-way-to-study-misinformation-and-its-effects/) - Experts consider misinformation a significant societal concern due to its associated problems like political polarization, erosion of trust, and public health challenges. However, these broad effects can occur independently of misinformation, illustrating a misalignment with the narrow focus of the prevailing misinformation concept. We propose using disagreement—conflicting attitudes and beliefs—as a more effective framework for
- [Google allows advertisers to target the sensitive informational queries of cancer patients](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/google-allows-advertisers-to-target-the-sensitive-informational-queries-of-cancer-patients/) - Alternative cancer treatments are associated with earlier time to death when used without evidence-based treatments. Our study suggests alternative cancer clinics providing scientifically unsupported cancer treatments spent an estimated $15,839,504 on Google ads from 2012 to 2023 targeting users in the United States. The ads led to an estimated 6,717,663 website visits. Paid traffic constituted
- [State media tagging does not affect perceived tweet accuracy: Evidence from a U.S. Twitter experiment in 2022](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/state-media-tagging-does-not-affect-perceived-tweet-accuracy-evidence-from-a-u-s-twitter-experiment-in-2022/) - State media outlets spread propaganda disguised as news online, prompting social media platforms to attach state-affiliated media tags to their accounts. Do these tags reduce belief in state media misinformation? Previous studies suggest the tags reduce misperceptions but focus on Russia, and current research does not compare these tags with other interventions. Contrary to expectations,
- [Misinformation perceived as a bigger informational threat than negativity: A cross-country survey on challenges of the news environment](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/misinformation-perceived-as-a-bigger-informational-threat-than-negativity-a-cross-country-survey-on-challenges-of-the-news-environment/) - This study integrates research on negativity bias and misinformation, as a comparison of how systematic (negativity) and incidental (misinformation) challenges to the news are perceived differently by audiences. Through a cross-country survey, we found that both challenges are perceived as highly salient and disruptive. Despite negativity bias in the news possibly being a more widespread
- [US-skepticism and transnational conspiracy in the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/us-skepticism-and-transnational-conspiracy-in-the-2024-taiwanese-presidential-election/) - Taiwan has one of the highest freedom of speech indexes while it also encounters the largest amount of foreign interference due to its contentious history with China. Because of the large influx of misinformation, Taiwan has taken a public crowdsourcing approach to combatting misinformation, using both fact-checking ChatBots and public dataset called CoFacts. Combining CoFacts
- [#SaveTheChildren: A pilot study of a social media movement co-opted by conspiracy theorists](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/savethechildren-a-pilot-study-of-a-social-media-movement-co-opted-by-conspiracy-theorists/) - In a preliminary analysis of 121,984 posts from X (formerly known as Twitter) containing the hashtag #SaveTheChildren, we found that conspiratorial posts received more engagement than authentic hashtag activism between January 2022 and March 2023. Conspiratorial posts received twice the number of reposts as non-conspiratorial content. Our initial findings of a forthcoming larger multi-platform study
- [The spread of synthetic media on X](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/the-spread-of-synthetic-media-on-x/) - Generative artificial intelligence (AI) models have introduced new complexities and risks to information environments, as synthetic media may facilitate the spread of misinformation and erode public trust. This study examines the prevalence and characteristics of synthetic media on social media platform X from December 2022 to September 2023. Leveraging crowdsourced annotations identifying synthetic content, our
- [Who reports witnessing and performing corrections on social media in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and France?](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/who-reports-witnessing-and-performing-corrections-on-social-media-in-the-united-states-united-kingdom-canada-and-france/) - Observed corrections of misinformation on social media can encourage more accurate beliefs, but for these benefits to occur, corrections must happen. By exploring people’s perceptions of witnessing and performing corrections on social media, we find that many people say they observe and perform corrections across the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and France. We find higher levels of self-reported correction experiences
- [Taking the power back: How diaspora community organizations are fighting misinformation spread on encrypted messaging apps](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/taking-the-power-back-how-diaspora-community-organizations-are-fighting-misinformation-spread-on-encrypted-messaging-apps/) - We applied a mixed-methods approach with the goal of understanding how Latinx and Asian diaspora communities perceive and experience the spread of misinformation through encrypted messaging apps in the United States. Our study consists of 12 in-depth interviews with leaders of relevant diaspora community organizations and a computer-assisted content analysis of 450,300 messages published on
- [How do social media users and journalists express concerns about social media misinformation? A computational analysis](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/how-do-social-media-users-and-journalists-express-concerns-about-social-media-misinformation-a-computational-analysis/) - This article describes partisan-based, accuracy-based, and action-based discussions through which U.S. social media users and journalists express concerns about social media misinformation. While platform policy stands out as the most highly discussed topic by both social media users and journalists, much of it is cast through a party politics lens. The findings call for shifting
- [Attitudes towards COVID-19 vaccines may have “spilled over” to other, unrelated vaccines along party lines in the United States](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/attitudes-towards-covid-19-vaccines-may-have-spilled-over-to-other-unrelated-vaccines-along-party-lines-in-the-united-states/) - This study used data from pre- and post-COVID surveys to examine vaccine attitudes in the United States. We found evidence consistent with an ideological “spillover” effect: Liberals’ attitudes became more positive towards non-COVID vaccines (flu, MMR, HPV, chickenpox) and conservatives’ attitudes became more negative. These spillover effects are perplexing because the COVID-19 vaccines were developed
- [The consequences of misinformation concern on media consumption](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/the-consequences-of-misinformation-concern-on-media-consumption/) - For the last decade, policymakers, journalists, and scientists have continued to alert us of the threat of misinformation for making sound decisions in the political, health, and environmental domains. In this study, we evaluate whether perceiving misinformation as a threat affects media use, particularly considering selection of media sources that are politically aligned. We show
- [Framing disinformation through legislation: Evidence from policy proposals in Brazil](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/framing-disinformation-through-legislation-evidence-from-policy-proposals-in-brazil/) - This article analyzes 62 bills introduced in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies between 2019–2022 to understand how legislators frame disinformation into different problems and their respective solutions. The timeframe coincides with the administration of right-wing President Jair Bolsonaro. The study shows a tendency from legislators of parties opposed to Bolsonaro to attempt to criminalize the
- [Playing Gali Fakta inoculates Indonesian participants against false information](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/playing-gali-fakta-inoculates-indonesian-participants-against-false-information/) - Although prebunking games have shown promise in Western and English-speaking contexts, there is a notable lack of research on such interventions in countries of the Global South. In response to this gap, we developed Gali Fakta, a new kind of media literacy game specifically tailored for an Indonesian audience. Our findings indicate that participants who
- [Beyond the deepfake hype: AI, democracy, and “the Slovak case”](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/beyond-the-deepfake-hype-ai-democracy-and-the-slovak-case/) - Was the 2023 Slovakia election the first swung by deepfakes? Did the victory of a pro-Russian candidate, following the release of a deepfake allegedly depicting election fraud, herald a new era of disinformation? Our analysis of the so-called “Slovak case” complicates this narrative, highlighting critical factors that made the electorate particularly susceptible to pro-Russian disinformation.
- [Stochastic lies: How LLM-powered chatbots deal with Russian disinformation about the war in Ukraine](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/stochastic-lies-how-llm-powered-chatbots-deal-with-russian-disinformation-about-the-war-in-ukraine/) - Research on digital misinformation has turned its attention to large language models (LLMs) and their handling of sensitive political topics. Through an AI audit, we analyze how three LLM-powered chatbots (Perplexity, Google Bard, and Bing Chat) generate content in response to the prompts linked to common Russian disinformation narratives about the war in Ukraine. We
- [The algorithmic knowledge gap within and between countries: Implications for combatting misinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/the-algorithmic-knowledge-gap-within-and-between-countries-implications-for-combatting-misinformation/) - While understanding how social media algorithms operate is essential to protect oneself from misinformation, such understanding is often unevenly distributed. This study explores the algorithmic knowledge gap both within and between countries, using national surveys in the United States (N = 1,415), the United Kingdom (N = 1,435), South Korea (N = 1,798), and Mexico
- [How spammers and scammers leverage AI-generated images on Facebook for audience growth](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/how-spammers-and-scammers-leverage-ai-generated-images-on-facebook-for-audience-growth/) - Much of the research and discourse on risks from artificial intelligence (AI) image generators, such as DALL-E and Midjourney, has centered around whether they could be used to inject false information into political discourse. We show that spammers and scammers—seemingly motivated by profit or clout, not ideology—are already using AI-generated images to gain significant traction on Facebook. At
- [GPT-fabricated scientific papers on Google Scholar: Key features, spread, and implications for preempting evidence manipulation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/gpt-fabricated-scientific-papers-on-google-scholar-key-features-spread-and-implications-for-preempting-evidence-manipulation/) - Academic journals, archives, and repositories are seeing an increasing number of questionable research papers clearly produced using generative AI. They are often created with widely available, general-purpose AI applications, most likely ChatGPT, and mimic scientific writing. Google Scholar easily locates and lists these questionable papers alongside reputable, quality-controlled research. Our analysis of a selection of
- [Trump, Twitter, and truth judgments: The effects of “disputed” tags and political knowledge on the judged truthfulness of election misinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/trump-twitter-and-truth-judgments-the-effects-of-disputed-tags-and-political-knowledge-on-the-judged-truthfulness-of-election-misinformation/) - Misinformation has sown distrust in the legitimacy of American elections. Nowhere has this been more concerning than in the 2020 U.S. presidential election wherein Donald Trump falsely declared that it was stolen through fraud. Although social media platforms attempted to dispute Trump’s false claims by attaching soft moderation tags to his posts, little is known
- [The role of narrative in misinformation games](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/the-role-of-narrative-in-misinformation-games/) - Several existing media literacy games aim to increase resilience to misinformation. However, they lack variety in their approaches. The vast majority focus on assessing information accuracy, with limited exploration of socio-emotional influences of misinformation adoption. Misinformation correction and educational games have explored how narrative persuasion influences personal beliefs, as identification with certain narratives can frame
- [Misinformed about misinformation: On the polarizing discourse on misinformation and its consequences for the field](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/misinformed-about-misinformation-on-the-polarizing-discourse-on-misinformation-and-its-consequences-for-the-field/) - The field of misinformation is facing several challenges, from attacks on academic freedom to polarizing discourse about the nature and extent of the problem for elections and digital well-being. However, we see this as an inflection point and an opportunity to chart a more informed and contextual research practice. To foster credible research and informed
- [Conservatives are less accurate than liberals at recognizing false climate statements, and disinformation makes conservatives less discerning: Evidence from 12 countries](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/conservatives-are-less-accurate-than-liberals-at-recognizing-false-climate-statements-and-disinformation-makes-conservatives-less-discerning-evidence-from-12-countries/) - Competing hypotheses exist on how conservative political ideology is associated with susceptibility to misinformation. We performed a secondary analysis of responses from 1,721 participants from twelve countries in a study that investigated the effects of climate disinformation and six psychological interventions to protect participants against such disinformation. Participants were randomized to receiving twenty real climate
- [Conspiracy theories and their believers in an era of misinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/conspiracy-theories-and-their-believers-in-an-era-of-misinformation/) - Conspiracy theories have transitioned from fringe phenomena to central forces shaping public opinion and political discourse worldwide. Driven by the digital transformation of information, conspiracy beliefs increasingly pose a challenge across the world. Recent research has sought to unravel the psychological, social, and political dimensions of conspiracy beliefs, recognizing their potential to polarize societies, incite
- [White consciousness helps explain conspiracy thinking](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/white-consciousness-helps-explain-conspiracy-thinking/) - While conspiracy theories have long been tied to race, ethnicity, and religion, understanding this relationship is increasingly important in countries where White identity has become politically charged. This study finds that those high in White consciousness are more likely to 1) engage in generalized conspiracy thinking, 2) endorse the racist “great replacement” conspiracy theory, and
- [Are conspiracy beliefs a sign of flawed cognition? Reexamining the association of cognitive style and skills with conspiracy beliefs](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/are-conspiracy-beliefs-a-sign-of-flawed-cognition-reexamining-the-association-of-cognitive-style-and-skills-with-conspiracy-beliefs/) - Throughout human history, political leaders, oppositional forces, and businesspeople have frequently coordinated in secret for their own benefit and the public’s disadvantage. In these cases, conspiracy theories are capable of accurately describing our environment. However, the vast majority of research today operationalizes conspiracy theories as irrational beliefs that contradict our everyday knowledge. It is not
- [Understanding climate change conspiracy beliefs: A comparative outlook](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/understanding-climate-change-conspiracy-beliefs-a-comparative-outlook/) - Are climate change conspiracy theories widespread across the world, or do we find climate change conspiracy beliefs more so in some countries than in others? This research note explores the prevalence of conspiracy beliefs that identify climate change as a hoax across eight geographically and culturally diverse countries. Using original data, we found that climate
- [The relationship between conspiracy theory beliefs and political violence](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/the-relationship-between-conspiracy-theory-beliefs-and-political-violence/) - Recent instances of political violence have prompted concerns over the relationship between conspiracy theory beliefs and violence. Here, we examine the relationships between beliefs in various conspiracy theories and three operationalizations of violence—support for political violence, self-reported engagement in political violence, and engagement in non-political conflict. While we did observe significant correlations between most conspiracy
- [The impact of conspiracy belief on democratic culture: Evidence from Europe](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/the-impact-of-conspiracy-belief-on-democratic-culture-evidence-from-europe/) - The spread of conspiracy theories is expected to have an increasing impact on the vitality of Western democracies and their political culture. Drawing on a 2022 survey from 10 European countries (with n = 20,449), this study uses narratives about immigration and COVID-19 to examine their relation to individual democratic attitudes and preferred forms of
- [The climate lockdown conspiracy: You can’t fact-check possibility ](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/the-climate-lockdown-conspiracy-you-cant-fact-check-possibility/) - The climate lockdown conspiracies claim that a clandestine group of elites are planning to use climate change as a justification to enact widespread lockdowns and curtail freedoms. This conspiracy draws on a wide range of unconnected real-world events and suggests that their possibility of happening again is all the proof required. The focus on possibility
- [Using an AI-powered “street epistemologist” chatbot and reflection tasks to diminish conspiracy theory beliefs](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/using-an-ai-powered-street-epistemologist-chatbot-and-reflection-tasks-to-diminish-conspiracy-theory-beliefs/) - Social scientists, journalists, and policymakers are increasingly interested in methods to mitigate or reverse the public’s beliefs in conspiracy theories, particularly those associated with negative social consequences, including violence. We contribute to this field of research using an artificial intelligence (AI) intervention that prompts individuals to reflect on the uncertainties in their conspiracy theory beliefs.
- [Structured expert elicitation on disinformation, misinformation, and malign influence: Barriers, strategies, and opportunities](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/structured-expert-elicitation-on-disinformation-misinformation-and-malign-influence-barriers-strategies-and-opportunities/) - We used a modified Delphi method to elicit and synthesize experts’ views on disinformation, misinformation, and malign influence (DMMI). In a three-part process, experts first independently generated a range of effective strategies for combatting DMMI, identified the most impactful barriers to combatting DMMI, and proposed areas for future research. In the second stage, experts deliberated
- [How alt-tech users evaluate search engines: Cause-advancing audits](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/how-alt-tech-users-evaluate-search-engines-cause-advancing-audits/) - Search engine audit studies—where researchers query a set of terms in one or more search engines and analyze the results—have long been instrumental in assessing the relative reliability of search engines. However, on alt-tech platforms, users often conduct a different form of search engine audit. These user audits, driven by evaluation metrics that favor search
- [The origin of public concerns over AI supercharging misinformation in the 2024 U.S. presidential election](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/the-origin-of-public-concerns-over-ai-supercharging-misinformation-in-the-2024-u-s-presidential-election/) - We surveyed 1,000 U.S. adults to understand concerns about the use of artificial intelligence (AI) during the 2024 U.S. presidential election and public perceptions of AI-driven misinformation. Four out of five respondents expressed some level of worry about AI’s role in election misinformation. Our findings suggest that direct interactions with AI tools like ChatGPT and
- [How different incentives reduce scientific misinformation online](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/how-different-incentives-reduce-scientific-misinformation-online/) - Several social media employ or consider user recruitment as defense against misinformation. Yet, it is unclear how to encourage users to make accurate evaluations. Our study shows that presenting the performance of previous participants increases discernment of science-related news. Making participants aware that their evaluations would be used by future participants had no effect on
- [A playbook for mapping adolescent interactions with misinformation to perceptions of online harm](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/a-playbook-for-mapping-adolescent-interactions-with-misinformation-to-perceptions-of-online-harm/) - Digital misinformation is rampant, and understanding how exposure to misinformation affects the perceptions and decision-making processes of adolescents is crucial. In a four-part qualitative study with 25 college students 18–19 years old, we found that participants first assess the severity of harms (e.g., emotion, trust) that misinformation can cause, and then think about the possibilities
- [Propaganda, obviously: How propaganda analysis fixates on the hidden and misses the conspicuous](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/propaganda-obviously-how-propaganda-analysis-fixates-on-the-hidden-and-misses-the-conspicuous/) - Propaganda analysis has long focused on revealing the rhetorical tricks and hidden special interests behind persuasion campaigns. But what are critics to do when propaganda is obvious? In the late 1930s the Institute for Propaganda Analysis faced this question while investigating the public politicking of A&P, then the largest retailer in the United States. While
- [Unseeing propaganda: How communication scholars learned to love commercial media](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/unseeing-propaganda-how-communication-scholars-learned-to-love-commercial-media/) - A new disinformation age is upon us—or so it seems. But much of what appears to be unprecedented isn’t new at all. Concerns about misinformation’s effects on democracy are as old as media. The many systemic failures abetting Trump’s ascendance—as well as more recent election- and pandemic-related conspiracies—were decades in the making. Yet our degraded
- [Prebunking interventions based on “inoculation” theory can reduce susceptibility to misinformation across cultures](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/global-vaccination-badnews/) - This study finds that the online “fake news” game, Bad News, can confer psychological resistance against common online misinformation strategies (e.g., conspiracy theories, manipulating emotions, political polarization) across different cultures (Sweden, German, Poland, and Greece). The intervention draws on the theory of psychological inoculation: analogous to the process of medical immunization, we find that “prebunking” or preemptively warning and exposing people to weakened doses of misinformation can help cultivate “mental antibodies” against fake news. We conclude that social impact games rooted in basic insights from social psychology can boost immunity against misinformation across a variety of cultural, linguistic, and political settings.
- [Ambiguity in authenticity of top-level Coronavirus-related domains](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/ambiguity-in-authenticity-of-top-level-coronavirus-related-domains/) - During the novel coronavirus (Covid-19) crisis, citizens have been attempting to obtain critical information and directives from official government websites. These are usually hosted on top-level domains, such as coronavirus.mx. There is no reliable mechanism to verify these websites’ authenticity, and the space is also shared by commercial entities selling related (or not) products and
- [Research note: This salesperson does not exist: How tactics from political influence operations on social media are deployed for commercial lead generation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/research-note-this-salesperson-does-not-exist-how-tactics-from-political-influence-operations-on-social-media-are-deployed-for-commercial-lead-generation/) - Researchers of foreign and domestic influence operations document tactics that frequently recur in covert propaganda campaigns on social media, including backstopping fake personas with plausible biographies or histories, using GAN-generated images as profile photos, and outsourcing account management to paid organizations. These tactics, however, can be applied outside of the political realm. In this paper,
- [Engaging with others: How the IRA coordinated information operation made friends](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/engaging-ira-coordinated-information-operation/) - We analyzed the Russian Internet Research Agency’s (IRA) 2015–2017 English-language information operation on Twitter to understand the special role that engagement with outsiders (i.e., non-IRA affiliated accounts) played in their campaign. By analyzing the timing and type of engagement of IRA accounts with non-IRA affiliated accounts, and the characteristics of the latter, we identified a
- [Meme factory cultures and content pivoting in Singapore and Malaysia during COVID-19](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/meme-factory-cultures-and-content-pivoting-in-singapore-and-malaysia-during-covid-19/) - This paper is a qualitative ethnographic study of how a group of meme factories in Singapore and Malaysia have adapted their content programming and social media practices in light of COVID-19. It considers how they have fostered, countered, or challenged the rise and spread of misinformation in both countries. More crucially, the paper considers how
- [Signs of a new world order: Italy as the COVID-19 disinformation battlefield](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/signs-of-a-new-world-order-italy-as-the-covid-19-disinformation-battlefield/) - When Italy became the western center of the COVID-19 outbreak, it also became the focus of a series of states-sponsored coordinated disinformation campaigns. From early March through May 2020, disinformation operations in the country have increased noticeably, showing evidence of evolving strategies from multiple state actors geared towards reshaping the narrative of the global COVID-19
- [Repress/redress: What the “war on terror” can teach us about fighting misinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/repress-redress-what-the-war-on-terror-can-teach-us-about-fighting-misinformation/) - Misinformation, like terrorism, thrives where trust in conventional authorities has eroded. An informed policy response must therefore complement efforts to repress misinformation with efforts to redress loss of trust. At present, however, we are repeating the mistakes of the war on terror, prioritizing repressive, technologically deterministic solutions while failing to redress the root sociopolitical grievances
- [Redesigning consent: Big data, bigger risks](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/big-data-bigger-risks/) - Over the last decade, the rapid proliferation of social media platforms coupled with the advancement of computational methods for collecting, processing, and analyzing big datasets created new opportunities for social science. But alongside new insights about the behaviors of individuals and groups, these practices raise new questions regarding what constitutes ethical research. Most critically, current
- [Blame is in the eye of the beholder: Beyond an ethics of hubris and shame in the time of COVID-19](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/blame-is-in-the-eye-of-the-beholder-beyond-an-ethics-of-hubris-and-shame-in-the-time-of-covid-19/) - As misinformation and disinformation spread more rapidly and widely than ever before, individuals have been encouraged to be critical consumers of all received information. At the heart of this point of contention is the question of where responsibility and fault should lie. This framing and dynamic have taken a new form during the COVID-19 pandemic:
- [The anatomy of credulity and incredulity: A hermeneutics of misinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/the-anatomy-of-credulity-and-incredulity-or-a-hermeneutics-of-misinformation/) - This essay explores the historical process by which the birth and expansion of information systems transformed the relationship between “faith” and “fact.” The existence of recurring forms of credulity and conversely denial—from holocaust denial to climate change denial—suggests that patterns of belief and disbelief will not be easily resolved either with fact-checking or with the
- [Conspiracy and debunking narratives about COVID-19 origins on Chinese social media: How it started and who is to blame](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/conspiracy-and-debunking-narratives-about-covid-19-origins-on-chinese-social-media-how-it-started-and-who-is-to-blame/) - This paper studies conspiracy and debunking narratives about the origins of COVID-19 on a major Chinese social media platform, Weibo, from January to April 2020. Popular conspiracies about COVID-19 on Weibo, including that the virus is human-synthesized or a bioweapon, differ substantially from those in the United States. They attribute more responsibility to the United States
- [Chinese state media Facebook ads are linked to changes in news coverage of China worldwide](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/chinese-state-media-facebook-ads-are-linked-to-changes-in-news-coverage-of-china-worldwide/) - We studied the relationship between Facebook advertisements from Chinese state media on the global media environment by examining the link between advertisements and online news coverage of China by other countries. We found that countries that see a large increase in views of Facebook advertisement from Chinese state media also see news coverage of China
- [Volume 1, Issue 1](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/editorial-volume-1-issue-1/) - Volume 1, Issue 1 Editorial For the scope of this publication, we use the term "misinformation" to refer to all kinds of false or inaccurate information, independently from the fact that such information was deliberately created and spread to deceive. Then, misinformation can take many forms. It can be a coordinated, online campaign that targets
- [Russian Twitter disinformation campaigns reach across the American political spectrum](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/russian-disinformation-campaigns-on-twitter/) - Evidence from an analysis of Twitter data reveals that Russian social media trolls exploited racial and political identities to infiltrate distinct groups of authentic users, playing on their group identities. The groups affected spanned the ideological spectrum, suggesting the importance of coordinated counter-responses from diverse coalitions of users. Research Questions What authentic audiences did the
- [Search engine manipulation to spread pro-Kremlin propaganda](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/search-engine-manipulation-to-spread-pro-kremlin-propaganda/) - The Kremlin’s use of bots and trolls to manipulate the recommendation algorithms of social media platforms is well-documented by many journalists and researchers. However pro-Kremlin manipulation of search engine algorithms has rarely been explored. We examine pro-Kremlin attempts to manipulate search engine results by comparing backlink and keyphrase networks of US, European, and Russian think
- [Exposure to social engagement metrics increases vulnerability to misinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/exposure-to-social-engagement-metrics-increases-vulnerability-to-misinformation/) - News feeds in virtually all social media platforms include engagement metrics, such as the number of times each post is liked and shared. We find that exposure to these signals increases the vulnerability of users to low-credibility information in a simulated social media feed. This finding has important implications for the design of social media
- [Propaganda Analysis revisited](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/propaganda-analysis-revisited/) - This special issue is designed to place our contemporary post-truth impasse in historical perspective. Drawing comparisons to the Propaganda Analysis research paradigm of the Interwar years, this essay and issue call attention to historical similarities between patterns in mass communication research then and now. The hope is that contemporary misinformation studies scholars can learn from
- [A dangerous misinfodemic spreads alongside the SARS-COV-2 pandemic](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/a-misinfodemic-as-dangerous-as-sars-cov-2-pandemic-itself/) - Special Issue on COVID-19 & Misinfodemics, Guest-Editors' Editorial. On January 7th, 2020, Chinese authorities identified a new type of coronavirus, which was subsequently named severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2).https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200121-sitrep-1-2019-ncov.pdf?sfvrsn=20a99c10_4 Within two months, the world bore witness to the first pandemic caused by a coronavirus.https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020 As of this writing, there have been 4,013,728 confirmed
- [Brazilian Capitol attack: The interaction between Bolsonaro’s supporters’ content, WhatsApp, Twitter, and news media](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/brazilian-capitol-attack-the-interaction-between-bolsonaros-supporters-content-whatsapp-twitter-and-news-media/) - Bolsonaro’s supporters used social media to spread content during key events related to the Brasília attack. An unprecedented analysis of more than 15,000 public WhatsApp groups showed that these political actors tried to manufacture consensus in preparation for and after the attack. A cross-platform time series analysis showed that the spread of content on Twitter predicted the
- [Journalistic interventions matter: Understanding how Americans perceive fact-checking labels](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/journalistic-interventions-matter-understanding-how-americans-perceive-fact-checking-labels/) - While algorithms and crowdsourcing have been increasingly used to debunk or label misinformation on social media, such tasks might be most effective when performed by professional fact checkers or journalists. Drawing on a national survey (N = 1,003), we found that U.S. adults evaluated fact-checking labels created by professional fact checkers as more effective than labels by algorithms and
- [Gamified inoculation reduces susceptibility to misinformation from political ingroups](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/gamified-inoculation-reduces-susceptibility-to-misinformation-from-political-ingroups/) - Psychological inoculation interventions, which seek to pre-emptively build resistance against unwanted persuasion attempts, have shown promise in reducing susceptibility to misinformation. However, as many people receive news from popular, mainstream ingroup sources (e.g., a left-wing person consuming left-wing media) which may host misleading or false content, and as ingroup sources may be more persuasive, the
- [Fact-opinion differentiation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/fact-opinion-differentiation/) - Statements of fact can be proved or disproved with objective evidence, whereas statements of opinion depend on personal values and preferences. Distinguishing between these types of statements contributes to information competence. Conversely, failure at fact-opinion differentiation potentially brings resistance to corrections of misinformation and susceptibility to manipulation. Our analyses show that on fact-opinion differentiation tasks, unsystematic
- [Debunking and exposing misinformation among fringe communities: Testing source exposure and debunking anti-Ukrainian misinformation among German fringe communities](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/debunking-and-exposing-misinformation-among-fringe-communities-testing-source-exposure-and-debunking-anti-ukrainian-misinformation-among-german-fringe-communities/) - Through an online field experiment, we test traditional and novel counter-misinformation strategies among fringe communities. Though generally effective, traditional strategies have not been tested in fringe communities, and do not address the online infrastructure of misinformation sources supporting such consumption. Instead, we propose to activate source criticism by exposing sources’ unreliability. Based on a snowball
- [Seeing lies and laying blame: Partisanship and U.S. public perceptions about disinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/seeing-lies-and-laying-blame-partisanship-and-u-s-public-perceptions-about-disinformation/) - Using data from a nationally representative survey of 2,036 U.S. adults, we analyze partisan perceptions of the risk disinformation poses to the U.S. government and society, as well as the actors viewed as responsible for and harmed by disinformation. Our findings indicate relatively high concern about disinformation across a variety of societal issues, with broad bipartisan agreement that disinformation poses
- [Measuring what matters: Investigating what new types of assessments reveal about students’ online source evaluations](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/measuring-what-matters-investigating-what-new-types-of-assessments-reveal-about-students-online-source-evaluations/) - A growing number of educational interventions have shown that students can learn the strategies fact checkers use to efficiently evaluate online information. Measuring the effectiveness of these interventions has required new approaches to assessment because extant measures reveal too little about the processes students use to evaluate live internet sources. In this paper, we analyze
- [Correcting campaign misinformation: Experimental evidence from a two-wave panel study ](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/correcting-campaign-misinformation-experimental-evidence-from-a-two-wave-panel-study/) - In this study, we used a two-wave panel and a real-world intervention during the 2017 UK general election to investigate whether fact-checking can reduce beliefs in an incorrect campaign claim, source effects, the duration of source effects, and how predispositions including political orientations and prior exposure condition them. We find correction effects in the short
- [Misinformation reloaded? Fears about the impact of generative AI on misinformation are overblown](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/misinformation-reloaded-fears-about-the-impact-of-generative-ai-on-misinformation-are-overblown/) - Many observers of the current explosion of generative AI worry about its impact on our information environment, with concerns being raised about the increased quantity, quality, and personalization of misinformation. We assess these arguments with evidence from communication studies, cognitive science, and political science. We argue that current concerns about the effects of generative AI
- [What do we study when we study misinformation? A scoping review of experimental research (2016-2022)](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/what-do-we-study-when-we-study-misinformation-a-scoping-review-of-experimental-research-2016-2022/) - We reviewed 555 papers published from 2016–2022 that presented misinformation to participants. We identified several trends in the literature—increasing frequency of misinformation studies over time, a wide variety of topics covered, and a significant focus on COVID-19 misinformation since 2020. We also identified several important shortcomings, including overrepresentation of samples from the United States and
- [User experiences and needs when responding to misinformation on social media](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/user-experiences-and-needs-when-responding-to-misinformation-on-social-media/) - This study examines the experiences of those who participate in bottom-up user-led responses to misinformation on social media and outlines how they can be better supported via software tools. Findings show that users desire support tools designed to minimize time and effort in identifying misinformation and provide tailored suggestions for crafting responses to misinformation that
- [Increasing accuracy motivations using moral reframing does not reduce Republicans’ belief in false news](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/increasing-accuracy-motivations-using-moral-reframing-does-not-reduce-republicans-belief-in-false-news/) - In a pre-registered survey experiment with 2,009 conservative Republicans, we evaluated an intervention that framed accurate perceptions of information as consistent with a conservative political identity and conservative values (e.g., patriotism, respect for tradition, and religious purity). The intervention caused participants to report placing greater value on accuracy, and placing greater value on accuracy was correlated
- [“Fact-checking” fact checkers: A data-driven approach](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/fact-checking-fact-checkers-a-data-driven-approach/) - This study examined four fact checkers (Snopes, PolitiFact, Logically, and the Australian Associated Press FactCheck) using a data-driven approach. First, we scraped 22,349 fact-checking articles from Snopes and PolitiFact and compared their results and agreement on verdicts. Generally, the two fact checkers agreed with each other, with only one conflicting verdict among 749 matching claims after adjusting
- [Exploring partisans’ biased and unreliable media consumption and their misinformed health-related beliefs](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/exploring-partisans-biased-and-unreliable-media-consumption-and-their-misinformed-health-related-beliefs/) - This study explores U.S. adults’ media consumption—in terms of the average bias and reliability of the media outlets participants report referencing—and the extent to which those participants hold inaccurate beliefs about COVID-19 and vaccination. Notably, we used a novel means of capturing the (left-right) bias and reliability of audiences’ media consumption, leveraging the Ad Fontes
- [A focus shift in the evaluation of misinformation interventions](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/a-focus-shift-in-the-evaluation-of-misinformation-interventions/) - The proliferation of misinformation has prompted significant research efforts, leading to the development of a wide range of interventions. There is, however, insufficient guidance on how to evaluate these interventions. Here, we argue that researchers should consider not just the interventions’ primary effectiveness but also ancillary outcomes and implementation challenges. Introduction A range of recent
- [Assessing misinformation recall and accuracy perceptions: Evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/assessing-misinformation-recall-and-accuracy-perceptions-evidence-from-the-covid-19-pandemic/) - Misinformation is ubiquitous; however, the extent and heterogeneity in public uptake of it remains a matter of debate. We address these questions by exploring Americans’ ability to recall prominent misinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic and the factors associated with accuracy perceptions of these claims. Comparing reported recall rates of real and “placebo” headlines, we estimate
- [Did the Musk takeover boost contentious actors on Twitter?](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/did-the-musk-takeover-boost-contentious-actors-on-twitter/) - After his acquisition of Twitter, Elon Musk pledged to overhaul verification and moderation policies. These events sparked fears of a rise in influence of contentious actors—notably from the political right. I investigated whether these actors did receive increased engagement over this period by gathering tweet data for accounts that purchased blue-tick verification before and after
- [Who knowingly shares false political information online?](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/who-knowingly-shares-false-political-information-online/) - Some people share misinformation accidentally, but others do so knowingly. To fully understand the spread of misinformation online, it is important to analyze those who purposely share it. Using a 2022 U.S. survey, we found that 14 percent of respondents reported knowingly sharing misinformation, and that these respondents were more likely to also report support
- [Does incentivization promote sharing “true” content online?](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/does-incentivization-promote-sharing-true-content-online/) - In an online experiment in India, incentives for sharing factual posts increased sharing compared to no incentivization. However, the type of incentive (monetary or social) did not influence sharing behavior in a custom social media simulation. Curbing misinformation may not require substantial monetary resources; in fact, social media platforms can devise ways to socially incentivize their
- [A survey of expert views on misinformation: Definitions, determinants, solutions, and future of the field](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/a-survey-of-expert-views-on-misinformation-definitions-determinants-solutions-and-future-of-the-field/) - We surveyed 150 academic experts on misinformation and identified areas of expert consensus. Experts defined misinformation as false and misleading information, though views diverged on the importance of intentionality and what exactly constitutes misinformation. The most popular reason why people believe and share misinformation was partisanship, while lack of education was one of the least
- [Fact-checking Trump’s election lies can improve confidence in U.S. elections: Experimental evidence](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/fact-checking-trumps-election-lies-can-improve-confidence-in-u-s-elections-experimental-evidence/) - As the 2020 campaign unfolded, with a mix of extraordinary embellishments and outright falsehoods, President Trump’s attacks on the integrity of the U.S. electoral system grew louder and more frequent. Trump-aligned Republican candidates have since advanced similar false claims in their own campaigns in the lead-up to the 2022 midterm elections. Scholars, election officials, and
- [Mapping the website and mobile app audiences of Russia’s foreign communication outlets, RT and Sputnik, across 21 countries](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/mapping-the-website-and-mobile-app-audiences-of-russias-foreign-communication-outlets-rt-and-sputnik-across-21-countries/) - Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, policymakers worldwide have taken measures to curb the reach of Russia’s foreign communication outlets, RT and Sputnik. Mapping the audiences of these outlets in 21 countries, we show that in the quarter before the invasion, at least via their official websites and mobile apps, neither outlet reached more than 5% of the
- [A pro-government disinformation campaign on Indonesian Papua](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/a-pro-government-disinformation-campaign-on-indonesian-papua/) - This research identifies an Indonesian-language Twitter disinformation campaign posting pro-government materials on Indonesian governance in Papua, site of a protracted ethno-nationalist, pro-independence insurgency. Curiously, the campaign does not employ common disinformation tactics such as hashtag flooding or the posting of clickbait with high engagement potential, nor does it seek to build user profiles that would
- [Mis- and disinformation studies are too big to fail: Six suggestions for the field’s future](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/mis-and-disinformation-studies-are-too-big-to-fail-six-suggestions-for-the-fields-future/) - Who are mis-/disinformation studies for? What agenda does the field serve? How can it be improved? While the increase in the attention towards the topic in the last years is healthy, it has also led to an explosion of papers in all directions, and the field has been subject to various criticisms and attacks. In
- [Where conspiracy theories flourish: A study of YouTube comments and Bill Gates conspiracy theories](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/where-conspiracy-theories-flourish-a-study-of-youtube-comments-and-bill-gates-conspiracy-theories/) - We studied YouTube comments posted to Covid-19 news videos featuring Bill Gates and found they were dominated by conspiracy theories. Our results suggest the platform’s comments feature operates as a relatively unmoderated social media space where conspiracy theories circulate unchecked. We outline steps that YouTube can take now to improve its approach to moderating misinformation.
- [Community-based strategies for combating misinformation: Learning from a popular culture fandom](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/community-based-strategies-for-combating-misinformation-learning-from-a-popular-culture-fandom/) - Through the lens of one of the fastest-growing international fandoms, this study explores everyday misinformation in the context of networked online environments. Findings show that fans experience a range of misinformation, similar to what we see in other political, health, or crisis contexts. However, the strong sense of community and shared purpose of the group
- [Audio misinformation on WhatsApp: A case study from Lebanon](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/audio-misinformation-on-whatsapp-a-case-study-from-lebanon/) - Since 2019, Lebanon has witnessed sequential crises that have routinely spurred media attention. A great deal of misinformation has proliferated during these events, much of it spreading on WhatsApp. One format is particularly understudied: audio instant messages, otherwise known as voice notes. Utilizing a grounded theory approach to examine 35 misleading WhatsApp voice notes collected
- [Legislator criticism of a candidate’s conspiracy beliefs reduces support for the conspiracy but not the candidate: Evidence from Marjorie Taylor Greene and QAnon](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/legislator-criticism-of-a-candidates-conspiracy-beliefs-reduces-support-for-the-conspiracy-but-not-the-candidate-evidence-from-marjorie-taylor-greene-and-qanon/) - In November 2020, Georgia Republican Marjorie Taylor Greene became the first open supporter of QAnon to be elected to the United States Congress. Despite criticism from Democrats, Republicans, and the media for her belief in this dangerous conspiracy theory, Greene remains a prominent national figure and a member of Congress. In a large survey experiment
- [Research note: Explicit voter fraud conspiracy cues increase belief among co-partisans but have broader spillover effects on confidence in elections](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/research-note-explicit-voter-fraud-conspiracy-cues-increase-belief-among-co-partisans-but-have-broader-spillover-effects-on-confidence-in-elections/) - In this pre-registered experiment, we test the effects of conspiracy cue content in the context of the 2020 U.S. elections. Specifically, we varied whether respondents saw an explicitly stated conspiracy theory, one that was merely implied, or none at all. We found that explicit cues about rigged voting machines increase belief in such theories, especially
- [Measuring the effect of Facebook’s downranking interventions against groups and websites that repeatedly share misinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/measuring-the-effect-of-facebooks-downranking-interventions-against-groups-and-websites-that-repeatedly-share-misinformation/) - Facebook has claimed to fight misinformation notably by reducing the virality of posts shared by “repeat offender” websites. The platform recently extended this policy to groups. We identified websites and groups that repeatedly publish false information according to fact checkers and investigated the implementation and impact of Facebook’s measures against them. Our analysis reveals a significant reduction
- [Who is afraid of fake news? Modeling risk perceptions of misinformation in 142 countries](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/who-is-afraid-of-fake-news-modeling-risk-perceptions-of-misinformation-in-142-countries/) - Using survey data from 154,195 respondents in 142 countries, we investigate internet user perceptions of the risks associated with being exposed to misinformation. We find that: 1) The majority of regular internet users globally (58.5%) worry about misinformation, and young and low-income groups are most likely to be concerned. 2) Risk perception among internet users varies starkly across regions whereby concern is highest in Latin America and the Caribbean (74.2%), and lowest in South Asia (31.2%). 3)
- [Clarity for friends, confusion for foes: Russian vaccine propaganda in Ukraine and Serbia](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/clarity-for-friends-confusion-for-foes-russian-vaccine-propaganda-in-ukraine-and-serbia/) - This paper examines how Russia tailors its vaccine propaganda to hostile and friendly audiences, like Ukraine and Serbia. Web scraping of all articles about vaccines on Russian state-owned websites from December 2020 to November 2021 provided data for quantitative topic modeling and qualitative analysis. This revealed that the Kremlin muddles issues and sows confusion for
- [Partisan reasoning in a high stakes environment: Assessing partisan informational gaps on COVID-19](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/partisan-reasoning-in-a-high-stakes-environment-assessing-partisan-informational-gaps-on-covid-19/) - Using a survey conducted in July 2020, we establish a divide in the news sources partisans prefer for information about the COVID-19 pandemic and observe partisan disagreements in beliefs about the virus. These divides persist when respondents face financial costs for incorrectly answering questions. This supports a view in which the informational divisions revealed in
- [Studying mis- and disinformation in Asian diasporic communities: The need for critical transnational research beyond Anglocentrism](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/studying-mis-and-disinformation-in-asian-diasporic-communities-the-need-for-critical-transnational-research-beyond-anglocentrism/) - Drawing on preliminary research about the spread of mis- and disinformation across Asian diasporic communities, we advocate for qualitative research methodologies that can better examine historical, transnational, multilingual, and intergenerational information networks. Using examples of case studies from Vietnam, Taiwan, China, and India, we discuss research themes and challenges including legacies of multiple imperialisms, nationalisms, and
- [Hide and seek: The connection between false beliefs and perceptions of government transparency](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/hide-and-seek-the-connection-between-false-beliefs-and-perceptions-of-government-transparency/) - This research examines how false beliefs shape perceptions of government transparency in times of crisis. Measuring transparency perceptions using both closed- and open-ended questions drawn from a Canadian panel survey, we show that individuals holding false beliefs about COVID-19 are more likely to have negative perceptions of government transparency. They also tend to rely on
- [A story of (non)compliance, bias, and conspiracies: How Google and Yandex represented Smart Voting during the 2021 parliamentary elections in Russia](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/a-story-of-noncompliance-bias-and-conspiracies-how-google-and-yandex-represented-smart-voting-during-the-2021-parliamentary-elections-in-russia/) - On 3 September 2021, the Russian court forbade Google and Yandex to display search results for “Smart Voting,” the query referring to a tactical voting project by the jailed Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny. To examine whether the two search engines complied with the court order, we collected top search outputs for the query from
- [Leveraging infodemiologists to counteract online misinformation: Experience with COVID-19 vaccines](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/leveraging-infodemiologists-to-counteract-online-misinformation-experience-with-covid-19-vaccines/) - In the new information environment represented by the internet and social media platforms, information of public health importance is transmitted rapidly by decentralized, interpersonal networks rather than through traditional sources like public health officials or professional journalists, thus requiring a new approach to counteracting misinformation. We have previously advanced the idea that infodemiology, when combined
- [Ridiculing the “tinfoil hats:” Citizen responses to COVID-19 misinformation in the Danish facemask debate on Twitter](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/ridiculing-the-tinfoil-hats-citizen-responses-to-covid-19-misinformation-in-the-danish-facemask-debate-on-twitter/) - We study how citizens engage with misinformation on Twitter in Denmark during the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that misinformation regarding facemasks is not corrected through counter-arguments or fact-checking. Instead, many tweets rejecting misinformation use humor to mock misinformation spreaders, whom they pejoratively label wearers of “tinfoil hats.” Tweets rejecting misinformation project a superior social position
- [Addendum to: Research note: Examining potential bias in large-scale censored data](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/addendum-to-research-note-examining-potential-bias-in-large-scale-censored-data/) - Addendum to HKS Misinformation Review “Research note: Examining potential bias in large-scale censored data” (https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-74), published on July 26, 2021. In Allen (2021), we examined bias in Facebook’s 10-trillion cell URLs dataset hosted with research consortium Social Science One caused by censoring any URL with less than 100 public shares from the data. The data
- [Research note: Tiplines to uncover misinformation on encrypted platforms: A case study of the 2019 Indian general election on WhatsApp](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/research-note-tiplines-to-uncover-misinformation-on-encrypted-platforms-a-case-study-of-the-2019-indian-general-election-on-whatsapp/) - There is currently no easy way to discover potentially problematic content on WhatsApp and other end-to-end encrypted platforms at scale. In this paper, we analyze the usefulness of a crowd-sourced tipline through which users can submit content (“tips”) that they want fact-checked. We compared the tips sent to a WhatsApp tipline run during the 2019
- [Research note: Fighting misinformation or fighting for information?](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/research-note-fighting-misinformation-or-fighting-for-information/) - A wealth of interventions have been devised to reduce belief in fake news or the tendency to share such news. By contrast, interventions aimed at increasing trust in reliable news sources have received less attention. In this article, we show that, given the very limited prevalence of misinformation (including fake news), interventions aimed at reducing
- [Research note: Examining how various social media platforms have responded to COVID-19 misinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/research-note-examining-how-various-social-media-platforms-have-responded-to-covid-19-misinformation/) - We analyzed community guidelines and official news releases and blog posts from 12 leading social media and messaging platforms (SMPs) to examine their responses to COVID-19 misinformation. While the majority of platforms stated that they prohibited COVID-19 misinformation, the responses of many platforms lacked clarity and transparency. Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and Twitter had largely consistent
- [Retraction note to: Disinformation creep: ADOS and the strategic weaponization of breaking news](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/retraction-note-to-disinformation-creep-ados-and-the-strategic-weaponization-of-breaking-news/) - The HKS Misinformation Review retracts the article “Disinformation creep: ADOS and the strategic weaponization of breaking news”(https://doi.org/10.37016/mr-2020-52), which was published in the journal on January 18, 2021. After concerns were brought to our attention by the organization that is the object of the study, challenging the validity of the findings reported by Nkonde et al.,
- [Digital literacy is associated with more discerning accuracy judgments but not sharing intentions](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/digital-literacy-is-associated-with-more-discerning-accuracy-judgments-but-not-sharing-intentions/) - It has been widely argued that social media users with low digital literacy—who lack fluency with basic technological concepts related to the internet—are more likely to fall for online misinformation, but surprisingly little research has examined this association empirically. In a large survey experiment involving true and false news posts about politics and COVID-19, we
- [Research note: Lies and presidential debates: How political misinformation spread across media streams during the 2020 election](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/research-note-lies-and-presidential-debates-how-political-misinformation-spread-across-media-streams-during-the-2020-election/) - When U.S. presidential candidates misrepresent the facts, their claims get discussed across media streams, creating a lasting public impression. We show this through a public performance: the 2020 presidential debates. For every five newspaper articles related to the presidential candidates, President Donald J. Trump and Joseph R. Biden Jr., there was one mention of a
- [Misinformation interventions are common, divisive, and poorly understood](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/misinformation-interventions-are-common-divisive-and-poorly-understood/) - Social media platforms label, remove, or otherwise intervene on thousands of posts containing misleading or inaccurate information every day. Who encounters these interventions, and how do they react? A demographically representative survey of 1,207 Americans reveals that 49% have been exposed to some form of online misinformation intervention. However, most are not well-informed about what
- [Research note: Understanding offline Covid-19 conspiracy theories: A content analysis of The Light “truthpaper”](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/research-note-understanding-offline-covid-19-conspiracy-theories-a-content-analysis-of-the-light-truthpaper/) - This article explores the ways in which offline conspiracist material concerned with Covid-19 is presented and structured through a content analysis of The Light, a newspaper produced and distributed by activists in the U.K. Our analysis shows that conspiracy theories related to Covid-19 are included alongside a range of other, non-conspiracist content and that readers
- [The battleground of COVID-19 vaccine misinformation on Facebook: Fact checkers vs. misinformation spreaders](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/the-battleground-of-covid-19-vaccine-misinformation-on-facebook-fact-checkers-vs-misinformation-spreaders/) - Our study examines Facebook posts containing nine prominent COVID-19 vaccine misinformation topics that circulated on the platform between March 1st, 2020 and March 1st, 2021. We first identify misinformation spreaders and fact checkers,fact checker in our study is defined as any public account (including both individual and organizational accounts) that posts factual information about COVID-19
- [Review of social science research on the impact of countermeasures against influence operations](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/review-of-social-science-research-on-the-impact-of-countermeasures-against-influence-operations/) - Despite ongoing discussion of the need for increased regulation and oversight of social media, as well as debate over the extent to which the platforms themselves should be responsible for containing misinformation, there is little consensus on which interventions work to address the problem of influence operations and disinformation campaigns. To provide policymakers and scholars
- [Twitter flagged Donald Trump’s tweets with election misinformation: They continued to spread both on and off the platform](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/twitter-flagged-donald-trumps-tweets-with-election-misinformation-they-continued-to-spread-both-on-and-off-the-platform/) - We analyze the spread of Donald Trump’s tweets that were flagged by Twitter using two intervention strategies—attaching a warning label and blocking engagement with the tweet entirely. We find that while blocking engagement on certain tweets limited their diffusion, messages we examined with warning labels spread further on Twitter than those without labels. Additionally, the
- [Critical disinformation studies: History, power, and politics](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/critical-disinformation-studies-history-power-and-politics/) - This essay advocates a critical approach to disinformation research that is grounded in history, culture, and politics, and centers questions of power and inequality. In the United States, identity, particularly race, plays a key role in the messages and strategies of disinformation producers and who disinformation and misinformation resonates with. Expanding what “counts” as disinformation
- [Happiness and surprise are associated with worse truth discernment of COVID-19 headlines among social media users in Nigeria](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/happiness-and-surprise-are-associated-with-worse-truth-discernment-of-covid-19-headlines-among-social-media-users-in-nigeria/) - Do emotions we experience after reading headlines help us discern true from false information or cloud our judgement? Understanding whether emotions are associated with distinguishing truth from fiction and sharing information has implications for interventions designed to curb the spread of misinformation. Among 1,341 Facebook users in Nigeria, we find that emotions—specifically happiness and surprise—are
- [Self-regulation 2:0? A critical reflection of the European fight against disinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/self-regulation-20-a-critical-reflection-of-the-european-fight-against-disinformation/) - In presenting the European Democracy Action Plan (EDAP) in 2020, the European Commission pledged to build more resilient democracies across the EU. As part of this plan, the Commission announced intensified measures to combat disinformation, both through the incoming Digital Services Act (DSA) and specific measures to address sponsored content online. Ostensibly, these reforms would end
- [Research note: Examining potential bias in large-scale censored data](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/research-note-examining-potential-bias-in-large-scale-censored-data/) - We examine potential bias in Facebook’s 10-trillion cell URLs dataset, consisting of URLs shared on its platform and their engagement metrics. Despite the unprecedented size of the dataset, it was altered to protect user privacy in two ways: 1) by adding differentially private noise to engagement counts, and 2) by censoring the data with a
- [Research note: This photograph has been altered: Testing the effectiveness of image forensic labeling on news image credibility](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/research-note-this-photograph-has-been-altered-testing-the-effectiveness-of-image-forensic-labeling-on-news-image-credibility/) - Despite the ubiquity of images and videos in online news environments, much of the existing research on misinformation and its correction is solely focused on textual misinformation, and little is known about how ordinary users evaluate fake or manipulated images and the most effective ways to label and correct such falsities. We designed a visual
- [Where’s the fake news at? European news consumers’ perceptions of misinformation across information sources and topics](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/wheres-the-fake-news-at-european-news-consumers-perceptions-of-misinformation-across-information-sources-and-topics/) - This study indicates that news users across ten different European countries are quite concerned about misinformation in their information environment. Respondents are most likely to associate politicians, corporations, and foreign actors with misinformation. They perceive misinformation to be most common for topics like immigration, the economy, and the environment. This offers support for the increasingly
- [How COVID drove the evolution of fact-checking](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/how-covid-drove-the-evolution-of-fact-checking/) - With the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic came a flood of novel misinformation. Ranging from harmless false cures to dangerous rhetoric targeting minorities, coronavirus-related misinformation spread quickly wherever the virus itself did. Fact-checking organizations around the world took up the charge against misinformation, essentially crowdsourcing the task of debunking false narratives. In many places, engagement
- [Source alerts can reduce the harms of foreign disinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/source-alerts-can-reduce-the-harms-of-foreign-disinformation/) - Social media companies have begun to use content-based alerts in their efforts to combat mis- and disinformation, including fact-check corrections and warnings of possible falsity, such as “This claim about election fraud is disputed.” Another harm reduction tool, source alerts, can be effective when a hidden foreign hand is known or suspected. This paper demonstrates
- [“A most mischievous word”: Neil Postman’s approach to propaganda education](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/a-most-mischievous-word-neil-postmans-approach-to-propaganda-education/) - Before there was a term called media literacy education, there was an interdisciplinary group of writers and thinkers who taught people to guard themselves against the manipulative power of language. One of the leaders of this group was Neil Postman, known for his best-selling book published in 1985, Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in
- [Research note: Likes, sarcasm and politics: Youth responses to a platform-initiated media literacy campaign on social media](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/research-note-likes-sarcasm-and-politics-youth-responses-to-a-platform-initiated-media-literacy-campaign-on-social-media/) - To better understand youth attitudes towards media literacy education on social media, and the opportunities and challenges inherent in such initiatives, we conducted a large-scale analysis of user responses to a recent media literacy campaign on TikTok. We found that reactions to the campaign were mixed, and highly political in nature. While young people appreciated
- [Propaganda, misinformation, and histories of media techniques](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/propaganda-misinformation-and-histories-of-media-techniques/) - This essay argues that the recent scholarship on misinformation and fake news suffers from a lack of historical contextualization. The fact that misinformation scholarship has, by and large, failed to engage with the history of propaganda and with how propaganda has been studied by media and communication researchers is an empirical detriment to it, and
- [Data dependencies and funding prospects: A 1930s cautionary tale](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/data-dependencies-and-funding-prospects-a-1930s-cautionary-tale/) - Misinformation studies relies, to some extent, on access to data from large technology firms, which also seed grants, sponsor events, and support think tanks working in the field. These companies, facing scrutiny from regulators and critics, have a stake in their portrayal. This essay recounts a pair of episodes in early radio research, as a
- [Overlooking the political economy in the research on propaganda](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/overlooking-the-political-economy-in-the-research-on-propaganda/) - Historically, scholars studying propaganda have focused on its psychological and behavioral impacts on audiences. This tradition has roots in the unique historical trajectory of the United States through the 20th century. This article argues that this tradition is quite inadequate to tackle propaganda-related issues in the Global South, where a deep understanding of the political economy of
- [Constructing a suitable platform for public health: Radio propaganda, instruction, and “The case of Elisa Cedillo”](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/constructing-a-suitable-platform-for-public-health-radio-propaganda-instruction-and-the-case-of-elisa-cedillo/) - The Mexican government communicated public health information in the early 20th century during radio programs dedicated to women. Turning to a platform committed to instruction and cultural programming, it publicized health education bulletins, which were sandwiched between weather reports and on-air cooking classes. These daily reports offered practical advice and information on proper hygiene and diseases,
- [COVID-19 disinformation and political engagement among communities of color: The role of media literacy](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/covid-19-disinformation-and-political-engagement-among-communities-of-color-the-role-of-media-literacy/) - Communities of color, suffering equity gaps and disproportionate COVID-19 effects, also must resist ongoing disinformation campaigns designed to impede their political influence. A representative, national survey (N=1264) of adults conducted June-July 2020 found that nonwhite respondents tended to report less COVID-19 knowledge, media literacy, and voting intent than white respondents, but more acceptance of COVID-19
- [The presumed influence of election misinformation on others reduces our own satisfaction with democracy](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/the-presumed-influence-of-election-misinformation-on-others-reduces-our-own-satisfaction-with-democracy/) - Pervasive political misinformation threatens the integrity of American electoral democracy but not in the manner most commonly examined. We argue the presumed influence of misinformation (PIM) may be just as pernicious, and widespread, as any direct influence that political misinformation may have on voters. Our online survey of 2,474 respondents in the United States shows
- [COVID-19 misinformation and the 2020 U.S. presidential election](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/covid-19-misinformation-and-the-2020-u-s-presidential-election/) - Voting is the defining act for a democracy. However, voting is only meaningful if public deliberation is grounded in veritable and equitable information. This essay investigates the politicization of public health practices during the Democratic primaries in the context of the 2020 U.S. presidential election, using a dataset of more than 67 million tweets. We
- [Lateral reading: College students learn to critically evaluate internet sources in an online course](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/lateral-reading-college-students-learn-to-critically-evaluate-internet-sources-in-an-online-course/) - The COVID-19 pandemic has forced college students to spend more time online. Yet many studies show that college students struggle to discern fact from fiction on the Internet. A small body of research suggests that students in face-to-face settings can improve at judging the credibility of online sources. But what about asynchronous remote instruction? In an
- [Right and left, partisanship predicts (asymmetric) vulnerability to misinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/right-and-left-partisanship-predicts-asymmetric-vulnerability-to-misinformation/) - We analyze the relationship between partisanship, echo chambers, and vulnerability to online misinformation by studying news sharing behavior on Twitter. While our results confirm prior findings that online misinformation sharing is strongly correlated with right-leaning partisanship, we also uncover a similar, though weaker, trend among left-leaning users. Because of the correlation between a user’s partisanship
- [Research note: Bolsonaro’s firehose: How Covid-19 disinformation on WhatsApp was used to fight a government political crisis in Brazil](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/research-note-bolsonaros-firehose-how-covid-19-disinformation-on-whatsapp-was-used-to-fight-a-government-political-crisis-in-brazil/) - Brazil has one of the highest rates of cases and deaths attributed to Covid-19 in the world. Two factors contributed to the high rates: the Brazilian government underestimated the pandemic and a large amount of disinformation was spread through social media. We found that disinformation about Covid-19 on WhatsApp was associated with political disinformation, mostly
- [Research note: Examining false beliefs about voter fraud in the wake of the 2020 Presidential Election](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/research-note-examining-false-beliefs-about-voter-fraud-in-the-wake-of-the-2020-presidential-election/) - The 2020 U.S. Presidential Election saw an unprecedented number of false claims alleging election fraud and arguing that Donald Trump was the actual winner of the election. Here we report a survey exploring belief in these false claims that was conducted three days after Biden was declared the winner. We find that a majority of
- [A year in review](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/editorial-a-year-in-review/) - Volume 1, Issue 8 Editorial As we enter 2021, the HKS Misinformation Review completes its first year as a journal dedicated to publishing work of the highest quality from across the misinformation field on a compressed publication schedule. In our first year, we received more submissions than we possibly could have anticipated, and we send
- [Retracted: Disinformation creep: ADOS and the strategic weaponization of breaking news](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/disinformation-creep-ados-and-the-strategic-weaponization-of-breaking-news/) - In this essay, we conduct a descriptive content analysis from a sample of a dataset made up of 534 thousand scraped tweets, supplemented with access to 1.36 million tweets from the Twitter firehose, from accounts that used the #ADOS hashtag between November 2019 and September 2020. ADOS is an acronym for American Descendants of Slavery,
- [Tackling misinformation: What researchers could do with social media data](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/tackling-misinformation-what-researchers-could-do-with-social-media-data/) - Written by Irene V. Pasquetto, Briony Swire-Thompson, Michelle A. Amazeen, Fabrício Benevenuto, Nadia M. Brashier, Robert M. Bond, Lia C. Bozarth, Ceren Budak, Ullrich K. H. Ecker, Lisa K. Fazio, Emilio Ferrara, Andrew J. Flanagin, Alessandro Flammini, Deen Freelon, Nir Grinberg, Ralph Hertwig, Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Kenneth Joseph, Jason J. Jones, R. Kelly Garrett, Daniel
- [Breaking Harmony Square: A game that “inoculates” against political misinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/breaking-harmony-square-a-game-that-inoculates-against-political-misinformation/) - We present Harmony Square, a short, free-to-play online game in which players learn how political misinformation is produced and spread. We find that the game confers psychological resistance against manipulation techniques commonly used in political misinformation: players from around the world find social media content making use of these techniques significantly less reliable after playing, are more
- [The different forms of COVID-19 misinformation and their consequences](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/the-different-forms-of-covid-19-misinformation-and-their-consequences/) - As the COVID-19 pandemic progresses, an understanding of the structure and organization of beliefs in pandemic conspiracy theories and misinformation becomes increasingly critical for addressing the threat posed by these dubious ideas. In polling Americans about beliefs in 11 such ideas, we observed clear groupings of beliefs that correspond with different individual-level characteristics (e.g., support
- [All disinformation is local: A reflection on the need and possibility of  measuring impact](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/do-we-really-need-to-measure-the-impact-of-online-disinformation/) - Volume 1, Issue 6 Editorial The title "All disinformation is local" was inspired by a tweet of Joan Donovan, on September 29th 2020 On September 1st, the leadership of the HKS Misinformation Review officially passed to Dr. Natascha Chtena, a former journalist and magazine editor, whose research is in the areas of scholarly publishing, open
- [Research note: Does the public support fact-checking social media? It depends whom and how you ask](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/research-note-does-the-public-support-fact-checking-social-media-it-depends-who-and-how-you-ask/) - We analyze original survey data on support for social media companies’ fact-checking of politicians in general and President Trump in particular. We find overwhelming majorities of Democrats support fact-checking in both instances, while a majority of Republicans support fact-checking of politicians in general but not of President Trump. Moreover, we find those concerned about contracting
- [Overcoming resistance to COVID-19 vaccine adoption: How affective dispositions shape views of science and medicine](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/overcoming-resistance-to-covid-19-vaccine-adoption-how-affective-dispositions-shape-views-of-science-and-medicine/) - Health experts worry that a COVID-19 vaccine boycott could inhibit reaching “herd immunity,” and their concerns have only grown as the pandemic has spread. Concern has largely focused on anti-vaccine protestors, who captured headlines as they stood side by side with Tea Party activists and armed militia groups demonstrating against the quarantine in April and
- [State media warning labels can counteract the effects of foreign misinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/state-media-warning-labels-can-counteract-the-effects-of-foreign-misinformation/) - Platforms are increasingly using transparency, whether it be in the form of political advertising disclosures or a record of page name changes, to combat disinformation campaigns. In the case of state-controlled media outlets on YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter this has taken the form of labeling their connection to a state. We show that these labels
- [The Twitter origins and evolution of the COVID-19 “plandemic” conspiracy theory](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/the-twitter-origins-and-evolution-of-the-covid-19-plandemic-conspiracy-theory/) - Tweets about “plandemic” (e.g., #plandemic)—the notion that the COVID-19 pandemic was planned or fraudulent—helped to spread several distinct conspiracy theories related to COVID-19. But the term’s catchy nature attracted attention from anti-vaccine activist filmmakers who ultimately created Plandemic the 26-minute documentary. Plandemic falsely attacks NIAID Director Dr. Anthony Fauci, among others, and an eventual coronavirus
- [The weaponization of web archives: Data craft and COVID-19 publics](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/the-weaponization-of-web-archives-data-craft-and-covid-19-publics/) - An unprecedented volume of harmful health misinformation linked to the coronavirus pandemic has led to the appearance of misinformation tactics that leverage web archives in order to evade content moderation on social media platforms. Here we present newly identified manipulation techniques designed to maximize the value, longevity, and spread of harmful and non-factual content across
- [Research note: The scale of Facebook’s problem depends upon how ‘fake news’ is classified](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/research-note-the-scale-of-facebooks-problem-depends-upon-how-fake-news-is-classified/) - Ushering in the contemporary ‘fake news’ crisis, Craig Silverman of Buzzfeed News reported that it outperformed mainstream news on Facebook in the three months prior to the 2016 US presidential elections. Here the report’s methods and findings are revisited for 2020. Examining Facebook user engagement of election-related stories, and applying Silverman’s classification of fake news,
- [Research note: The spread of political misinformation on online subcultural platforms](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/research-note-the-spread-of-political-misinformation-on-online-subcultural-platforms/) - This research note explores the extent to which misinformation and other types of “junk” content are spread on political boards and forums on 4chan and Reddit. Our findings suggest that these userbases are impervious to the appeal of low-quality “pink slime” news sites with algorithmically generated conservative talking points masquerading as journalism. However, these political
- [Anger contributes to the spread of COVID-19 misinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/anger-contributes-to-the-spread-of-covid-19-misinformation/) - A survey conducted over South Korean adults (N=513) reveals that emotions, specifically anger, contribute to the broader spread of misinformation on COVID-19 by leading angry individuals to consider false claims to be “scientifically credible.” This pattern is more evident among conservatives than liberals. Our finding sheds light on new measures and journalistic interventions that could
- [Not just conspiracy theories: Vaccine opponents and proponents add to the COVID-19 ‘infodemic’ on Twitter](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/not-just-conspiracy-theories-vaccine-opponents-and-pro-ponents-add-to-the-covid-19-infodemic-on-twitter/) - In February 2020, the World Health Organization announced an ‘infodemic’—a deluge of both accurate and inaccurate health information—that accompanied the global pandemic of COVID-19 as a major challenge to effective health communication. We assessed content from the most active vaccine accounts on Twitter to understand how existing online communities contributed to the ‘infodemic’ during the
- [Misinformation more likely to use non-specific authority references: Twitter analysis of two COVID-19 myths](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/misinformation-more-likely-to-use-non-specific-authority-references-twitter-analysis-of-two-covid-19-myths/) - This research examines the content, timing, and spread of COVID-19 misinformation and subsequent debunking efforts for two COVID-19 myths. COVID-19 misinformation tweets included more non-specific authority references (e.g., “Taiwanese experts”, “a doctor friend”), while debunking tweets included more specific and verifiable authority references (e.g., the CDC, the World Health Organization, Snopes). Findings illustrate a delayed
- [The spread of COVID-19 conspiracy theories on social media and the effect of content moderation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/the-spread-of-covid-19-conspiracy-theories-on-social-media-and-the-effect-of-content-moderation/) - We investigate the diffusion of conspiracy theories related to the origin of COVID-19 on social media. By analyzing third-party content on four social media platforms, we show that: (a) In contrast to conventional wisdom, mainstream sources contribute overall more to conspiracy theories diffusion than alternative and other sources; and (b) platforms’ content moderation practices are
- [Can WhatsApp benefit from debunked fact-checked stories to reduce misinformation?](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/can-whatsapp-benefit-from-debunked-fact-checked-stories-to-reduce-misinformation/) - WhatsApp was alleged to have been widely used to spread misinformation and propaganda during the 2018 elections in Brazil and the 2019 elections in India. Due to the private encrypted nature of the messages on WhatsApp, it is hard to track the dissemination of misinformation at scale. In this work, using public WhatsApp data from
- [Images and misinformation in political groups: Evidence from WhatsApp in India](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/images-and-misinformation-in-political-groups-evidence-from-whatsapp-in-india/) - WhatsApp is a key medium for the spread of news and rumors, often shared as images. We study a large collection of politically-oriented WhatsApp groups in India, focusing on the period leading up to the 2019 Indian national elections. By labeling samples of random and popular images, we find that around 10% of shared images
- [Ibuprofen narratives in five European countries during the COVID-19 pandemic](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/ibuprofen-narratives-in-five-european-countries-during-the-covid-19-pandemic/) - We follow the trajectory of the unverified story about the adverse effects of using Ibuprofen for treating the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) on Twitter, across five European countries. Our findings suggest that the impact of misinformationWe use the term misinformation to refer to false or inaccurate information that is shared accidentally. In contrast, we use
- [Do the right thing: Tone may not affect correction of misinformation on social media](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/do-the-right-thing-tone-may-not-affect-correction-of-misinformation-on-social-media/) - An experiment conducted with 610 participants suggests that corrections to misinformation—pointing out information that is wrong or misleading and offering credible information in its place—on social media reduce misperceptions regardless of the correction’s tone (uncivil, affirmational, or neutral). There is also an opportunity to correct secondary but related misperceptions (dealing with the same topic but
- [Promoting health literacy during the COVID-19 pandemic: A call to action for healthcare professionals](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/promoting-health-literacy-during-the-covid-19-pandemic-a-call-to-action-for-healthcare-professionals/) - The extraordinary spread of misinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic is impressive. And, to public health professionals like us, it’s worrying: We know that good information and good health go hand in hand. Knowing what we do about the practice of public health and what the science tells us about how people fall for misinformation, we
- [Misinformation in action: Fake news exposure is linked to lower trust in media, higher trust in government when your side is in power](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/misinformation-in-action-fake-news-exposure-is-linked-to-lower-trust-in-media-higher-trust-in-government-when-your-side-is-in-power/) - One major concern about fake news is that it could damage the public trust in democratic institutions. We examined this possibility using longitudinal survey data combined with records of online behavior. Our study found that online misinformation was linked to lower trust in mainstream media across party lines. However, for moderates and conservatives, exposure to
- [Pandemics & propaganda: How Chinese state media creates and propagates CCP coronavirus narratives](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/pandemics-propaganda-how-chinese-state-media-creates-and-propagates-ccp-coronavirus-narratives/) - To gain insight into how Chinese state media is communicating about the coronavirus pandemic to the outside world, we analyzed a collection of posts from their English-language presence on Facebook. We observed three recurring behaviors: sharing positive stories and promoting the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) pandemic response, rewriting recent history in a manner favorable to
- [Feeling “disinformed” lowers compliance with COVID-19 guidelines: Evidence from the US, UK, Netherlands, and Germany](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/feeling-disinformed-lowers-compliance-with-covid-19-guidelines-evidence-from-the-us-uk-netherlands-and-germany/) - This study indicates that, during the first phase of the coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic in 2020, citizens from the US, UK, Netherlands, and Germany experienced relatively high levels of mis- and disinformation in their general information environment. We asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they experienced that information on coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2 and the disease
- [Leveraging volunteer fact checking to identify misinformation about COVID-19 in social media](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/leveraging-volunteer-fact-checking-to-identify-misinformation-about-covid-19-in-social-media/) - Identifying emerging health misinformation is a challenge because its manner and type are often unknown. However, many social media users correct misinformation when they encounter it. From this intuition, we implemented a strategy that detects emerging health misinformation by tracking replies that seem to provide accurate information. This strategy is more efficient than keyword-based search
- [News literacy education in a polarized political climate: How games can teach youth to spot misinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/news-literacy-education-in-a-polarized-political-climate-how-games-can-teach-youth-to-spot-misinformation/) - We designed, implemented and evaluated a game about fake news to test its potential to enhance news literacy skills in educational settings. The game was largely effective at facilitating complex news literacy skills. When these skills were integrated into the design and fictional narrative of the game, diverse groups of students engaged with the learning
- [How search engines disseminate information about COVID-19 and why they should do better](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/how-search-engines-disseminate-information-about-covid-19-and-why-they-should-do-better/) - Access to accurate and up-to-date information is essential for individual and collective decision making, especially at times of emergency. On February 26, 2020, two weeks before the World Health Organization (WHO) officially declared the COVID-19’s emergency a “pandemic,” we systematically collected and analyzed search results for the term “coronavirus” in three languages from six search
- [Why do people believe COVID-19 conspiracy theories?](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/why-do-people-believe-covid-19-conspiracy-theories/) - As conspiracy theories about COVID-19 take root in the United States, understanding the psychological foundations of conspiracy beliefs is increasingly critical. Our research shows that beliefs in two popular variants of COVID-19 conspiracy theory are the joint product of the psychological predispositions 1) to reject information coming from experts and other authority figures and 2)
- [Identifying patterns to prevent the spread of misinformation during epidemics](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/identifying-patterns-to-prevent-the-spread-of-misinformation-during-epidemics/) - This paper discusses patterns of public health misinformation observed during infectious disease epidemics. Specifically, we group epidemic-related misinformation into four categories: transmission, prevention, treatment, and vaccination. By developing tools, algorithms, and other resources around these categories, institutions, companies, and individuals can proactively limit and counter the spread of misinformation and its potential negative health effects.
- [Using misinformation as a political weapon: COVID-19 and Bolsonaro in Brazil](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/using-misinformation-as-a-political-weapon-covid-19-and-bolsonaro-in-brazil/) - With over 30,000 confirmed cases, Brazil is currently the country most affected by COVID-19 in Latin America, and ranked 12th worldwide (John Hopkins University & Medicine, 2020). Despite all evidence, a strong rhetoric undermining risks associated to COVID-19 has been endorsed at the highest levels of the Brazilian government, making President Jair Bolsonaro the leader
- [Misleading tobacco content is on the rise on YouTube](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/misleading-tobacco-content-is-on-the-rise-on-youtube/) - A content analysis of popular videos on YouTube containing tobacco-relevant material revealed five categories of misleading content about tobacco use in 2013. A re-examination in 2019 of the most heavily viewed exemplars of these categories identified in 2013 revealed a striking increase in viewership in all categories but especially in the portrayal and promotion of
- [Cross-platform disinformation campaigns: Lessons learned and next steps](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/cross-platform-disinformation-campaigns/) - We conducted a mixed-method, interpretative analysis of an online, cross-platform disinformation campaign targeting the White Helmets, a rescue group operating in rebel-held areas of Syria that have become the subject of a persistent effort of delegitimization. This research helps to conceptualize what a disinformation campaign is and how it works. Based on what we learned
- [How trust in experts and media use affect acceptance of common anti-vaccination claims](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/users-of-social-media-more-likely-to-be-misinformed-about-vaccines/) - Surveys of nearly 2,500 Americans, conducted during a measles outbreak, suggest that users of traditional media are less likely to be misinformed about vaccines than social media users. Results also suggest that an individual’s level of trust in medical experts affects the likelihood that a person’s beliefs about vaccination will change. Research Questions How does
- [Answering impossible questions: Content governance in an age of disinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/content-governance-in-an-age-of-disinformation/) - The governance of online platforms has unfolded across three eras – the era of Rights (which stretched from the early 1990s to about 2010), the era of Public Health (from 2010 through the present), and the era of Process (of which we are now seeing the first stirrings). Rights-era conversations and initiatives amongst regulators and
- [“Fake news” may have limited effects beyond increasing beliefs in false claims](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/fake-news-limited-effects-on-political-participation/) - Since 2016, there has been an explosion of interest in misinformation and its role in elections. Research by news outlets, government agencies, and academics alike has shown that millions of Americans have been exposed to dubious political news online. However, relatively little research has focused on documenting the effects of consuming this content. Our results
- [Support for “doing your own research” is associated with COVID-19 misperceptions and scientific mistrust](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/support-for-doing-your-own-research-is-associated-with-covid-19-misperceptions-and-scientific-mistrust/) - Amid concerns about misinformation online and bias in news, there are increasing calls on social media to “do your own research.” In an abundant information environment, critical media consumption and information validation are desirable. However, using panel survey data, we find that positive perceptions toward “doing your own research” are associated with holding more misperceptions about COVID-19 and
- [Less reliable media drive interest in anti-vaccine information](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/less-reliable-media-drive-interest-in-anti-vaccine-information/) - As progress on vaccine rollout in the United States slowed down in Spring 2021, it became clear that anti-vaccine information posed a public health threat. Using text data from 5,613 distinct COVID misinformation stories and 70 anti-vaccination Facebook groups, we tracked highly salient keywords regarding anti-vaccine discourse across Twitter, thousands of news websites, and the
- [Explaining beliefs in electoral misinformation in the 2022 Brazilian election: The role of ideology, political trust, social media, and messaging apps](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/explaining-beliefs-in-electoral-misinformation-in-the-2022-brazilian-election-the-role-of-ideology-political-trust-social-media-and-messaging-apps/) - The 2022 elections in Brazil have demonstrated that disinformation can have violent consequences, particularly when it comes from the top, raising concerns around democratic backsliding. This study leverages a two-wave survey to investigate individual-level predictors of holding electoral misinformation beliefs and the role of trust and information habits during the 2022 Brazilian elections. Our findings
- [How effective are TikTok misinformation debunking videos?](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/how-effective-are-tiktok-misinformation-debunking-videos/) - TikTok provides opportunity for citizen-led debunking where users correct other users’ misinformation. In the present study (N=1,169), participants either watched and rated the credibility of (1) a misinformation video, (2) a correction video, or (3) a misinformation video followed by a correction video (“debunking”). Afterwards, participants rated both a factual and a misinformation video about
- [Designing misinformation interventions for all: <br>Perspectives from AAPI, Black, Latino, and Native American community leaders on misinformation educational efforts](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/designing-misinformation-interventions-for-all-perspectives-from-aapi-black-latino-and-native-american-community-leaders-on-misinformation-educational-efforts/) - This paper examines strategies for making misinformation interventions responsive to four communities of color. Using qualitative focus groups with members of four non-profit organizations, we worked with community leaders to identify misinformation narratives, sources of exposure, and effective intervention strategies in the Asian American Pacific Islander (AAPI), Black, Latino, and Native American communities. Analyzing the findings from

## Pages

- [Front Page](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/) - Publishing high quality interdisciplinary research that examines misinformation from different perspectives, from its prevalence and impact to the effectiveness of possible interventions.
- [Editorial Board](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/editorial-board-2/)
- [Metrics](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/our-metrics/) - This page provides information about our article metrics, citation impact, annual usage, and publication speed. Article Metrics Each article page contains information about article views and downloads, Crossref citations, and online attention. Citation Impact 2024 CiteScore (Scopus): 7.6 (95th percentile) SCImago Journal Rank (SJR): 1.858 Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP): 1.585 Usage 2024 Active users: 330K Speed 2024 Submission
- [About Us](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/about-us/) - Mission The widespread adoption of digital media and information technologies has made it exponentially easier and faster to produce, disseminate, and be exposed to false, manipulated, and sometimes hateful content. Still, misinformation is a complex, largely misunderstood phenomenon. The public, the media, and policymakers are in need of reliable, unbiased research on the prevalence, diffusion,
- [Author Guidelines](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/submit/) - Please ensure that you follow the guidelines on this page when preparing your manuscript and that you consult our Editorial Policies and Publication Ethics before submitting it. Manuscript Submission Please email your submission to the Editorial Desk at misinforeview@hks.harvard.edu. In your email, please attach the completed Submission Details Form. We will confirm receipt of your submission within 48 hours
- [View Test](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/view-test/)
- [Reviewer List](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/reviewer-list-2/) - The continuing excellence of the HKS Misinformation Review is a result of the outstanding devotion of our worldwide group of reviewers. Below, we have listed the reviewers who have helped make Volume 5 possible through their expert advice. If our cut-off dates exclude anyone, we apologize and are deeply indebted to and thank every one of our
- [Most Cited](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/most-cited/)
- [Become a Reviewer](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/review/) - Become part of a large network of scientists who are helping to combat misinformation worldwide! As a token of appreciation, the HKS Misinformation Review offers a stipend ($100) for peer reviews. To become a reviewer, you are required to be (at least) a Ph.D. candidate at an academic institution or a research organization. Interested in being a
- [Editorial Policies](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/editorial-policies/) - Peer Review Research Articles and Research Notes are peer-reviewed before publication. Commentaries are usually not peer-reviewed. Nevertheless, even Commentaries, particularly if they present technical information, may be peer-reviewed at the discretion of the editors. We use a double-blind review, in which the authors’ and reviewers’ identities and affiliations are concealed from each other. To facilitate
- [Publication Ethics](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/our-publication-ethics/) - The HKS Misinformation Review is a member of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE), a non-profit organization dedicated to promoting the integrity of the scientific record. Any cases of ethical misconduct are treated very seriously and dealt with in accordance with the COPE guidelines. Responsibilities of the Authors Authorship Authorship is limited to those who have made a
- [Misinformation Review Digest](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/digest/)
- [Contact](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/contact/)
- [Open Access and Licensing ](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/open-access-and-licensing/) - The HKS Misinformation Review is committed to real and immediate open access for academic work. All of our articles are free to access immediately from the date of publication. We do not charge our authors any fees for publication or processing, nor do we charge readers to download articles. The journal is free to all at any time
- [Guidelines for Citations & References](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/guidelines-for-citations-references/) - The HKS Misinformation Review uses the APA7 reference style (Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association, Seventh Edition). Please review our guidelines and examples below to ensure that your manuscript conforms to the specified reference style. A list of examples for formatting different kinds of publications in APA 7 can also be found in the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association and at
- [Ensuring Blind Peer Review](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/ensuring-blind-peer-review/) - To ensure the integrity of the double-blind peer review process for submissions to the HKS Misinformation Review, every effort should be made to prevent the identities of the authors and reviewers from becoming known to each other. This contribution to the fairness of peer review involves authors making sure they have taken the following steps to anonymize
- [Structure for Research Notes (Qualitative)](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/structure-for-research-notes-qualitative/) - Maximum length: 2,500 words. Descriptive title The title should include a core finding or argument of the article. Article’s lead [50 to 100 words] The article’s lead attracts the curiosity of the readers. It presents one or two highlights from the article. For example, the lead could focus on one of the most important findings
- [Structure for Research Notes (Quantitative and Mixed Methods)](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/structure-for-research-notes-quantitative-and-mixed-methods/) - Maximum length: 2,500 words. Descriptive title The title should include a core finding or argument of the article. Article’s lead [50 to 100 words] The article’s lead attracts the curiosity of the readers. It presents one or two highlights from the article. For example, the lead could focus on one of the most important findings
- [Structure for Research Articles (Qualitative)](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/structure-for-research-articles-qualitative/) - Maximum length: 3,000 words. Descriptive title The title should include a core finding or argument of the article. Article’s lead [50 to 100 words] The article’s lead attracts the curiosity of the readers. It presents one or two highlights from the article. For example, the lead could focus on one of the most important findings or
- [Structure for Research Articles (Quantitative and Mixed Methods)](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/structure-for-research-articles-quant-mixed/) - Maximum length: 3,000 words. Descriptive title The title should include a core finding or argument of the article. Article’s lead [50 to 100 words] The article’s lead attracts the curiosity of the readers. It presents one or two highlights from the article. For example, the lead could focus on one of the most important findings or
- [Structure for Commentaries](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/structure-for-commentaries/) - Maximum length: 2,000 words. Descriptive title The title should include a core finding or argument of the article. Article’s lead [50 to 100 words] The article’s lead attracts the curiosity of the readers. It presents one or two highlights from the article. For example, the lead could focus on one of the most important findings or
- [Contact Us](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/get-in-touch/) - For all editorial inquiries as well as press and collaboration inquiries, please contact: misinforeview@hks.harvard.edu. If you are interested in becoming a peer reviewer, please visit this page.
- [Essays](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/essays/)

## Categories

- [Social Media](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/social-media/)
- [Education](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/education/)
- [Politics](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/politics/)
- [Information Bias](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/information-bias/)
- [Fake News](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/fake-news/)
- [Disinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/disinformation/)
- [Healthcare](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/healthcare/)
- [Law & Government](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/law-government/)
- [Big Data](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/big-data/)
- [Twitter/X](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/twitter/)
- [Youtube](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/youtube/)
- [Prebunking](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/prebunking/)
- [Mainstream Media](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/mainstream-media/)
- [COVID-19](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/covid-19/)
- [Conspiracy Theories](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/conspiracy-theories/)
- [Russia](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/russia/)
- [Youth](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/youth/)
- [Philosophy](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/philosophy/)
- [Search engines](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/search-engines/)
- [Fact-checking](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/fact-checking/)
- [Whatsapp](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/whatsapp/)
- [Debunking](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/debunking/)
- [Vaccines](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/vaccines/)
- [Gaming](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/gaming/)
- [Psychology](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/psychology/)
- [Emotion](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/emotion/)
- [Platform Regulation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/platform-regulation/)
- [Platforms](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/platforms/)
- [Public Opinion](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/public-opinion/)
- [Partisan Issues](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/partisan-issues/)
- [Facebook](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/facebook/)
- [Sources](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/sources/)
- [Elections](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/elections/)
- [Propaganda](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/propaganda/)
- [Public Health](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/public-health/)
- [Media Literacy](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/media-literacy/)
- [Impact](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/impact/)
- [Editorial](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/editorial/)
- [Europe](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/europe/)
- [Content Moderation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/content-moderation/)
- [Asia](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/asia/)
- [Research](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/research/)
- [Artificial Intelligence](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/category/artificial-intelligence/)

## Tags

- [Misinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/tag/misinformation/)
- [Disinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/tag/disinformation/)
- [Infrastructure](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/tag/infrastructure/)
- [COVID](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/tag/covid/)
- [COVID-19](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/tag/covid-19/)
- [Coronavirus](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/tag/coronavirus/)
- [Media Consumption](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/tag/media-consumption/)
- [Pandemic](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/tag/pandemic/)
- [brazil](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/tag/brazil/)
- [Politics](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/tag/politics/)
- [South America](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/tag/south-america/)
- [fake news](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/tag/fake-news/)

## Article Types

- [Research Article](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/explore/research-article/)
- [Commentary](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/explore/commentary/)
- [Editorial](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/explore/editorial/)
- [Research Note](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/explore/research-note/)
- [Retraction Note](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/explore/retraction-note/)
- [Addendum](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/explore/addendum/)

## Issue

- [1](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/issue/1/)
- [2](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/issue/2/)
- [COVID-19 and Misinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/issue/covid-19-and-misinformation/)
- [3](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/issue/3/) - COVID-19 and Misinformation
- [4](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/issue/4/)
- [5](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/issue/5/)
- [6](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/issue/6/)
- [US Elections and Disinformation](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/issue/us-elections-and-disinformation/)
- [7](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/issue/7/) - ELECTIONS
- [8](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/issue/8/)
- [Propaganda Analysis](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/issue/propaganda-analysis/)
- [Conspiracy Theories](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/issue/conspiracy-theories/)
- [Fact-Checking](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/issue/fact-checking/)

## Volume

- [1](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume/1/)
- [2](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume/2/)
- [3](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume/3/)
- [4](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume/4/)
- [5](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume/5/)
- [6](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume/6/)
- [Volume 7](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume/volume-7/)

## Volume, Issue

- [Issue 1](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-1-issue-1/)
- [Issue 2](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-1-issue-2/)
- [Issue 3](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-1-issue-3/) - COVID-19
- [Issue 4](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-1-issue-4/)
- [Issue 1](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-2-issue-1/)
- [Issue 2](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-2-issue-2/) - Propaganda
- [Issue 3](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-2-issue-3/)
- [Issue 4](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-2-issue-4/)
- [Issue 1](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-3-issue-1/)
- [Issue 2](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-3-issue-2/)
- [Issue 3](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-3-issue-3/)
- [Issue 4](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-3-issue-4/)
- [Issue 1](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-4-issue-1/)
- [Issue 2](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-4-issue-2/)
- [Issue 3](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-4-issue-3/)
- [Issue 4](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-4-issue-4/)
- [Issue 1](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-5-issue-1/)
- [Issue 2](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-5-issue-2/)
- [Issue 3](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-5-issue-3/)
- [Issue 4](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-5-issue-4/)
- [Issue 5](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-1-issue-5/)
- [Issue 6](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-1-issue-6/)
- [Issue 7](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-1-issue-7/) - Elections
- [Issue 8](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-1-issue-8/)
- [Issue 5](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-2-issue-5/)
- [Issue 6](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-2-issue-6/)
- [Issue 5](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-3-issue-5/)
- [Issue 6](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-3-issue-6/)
- [Issue 5](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-4-issue-5/)
- [Issue 6](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-4-issue-6/)
- [Issue 5](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-5-issue-5/)
- [Issue 6](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-5-issue-6/) - Conspiracy Theories
- [Volume 1](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-1/)
- [Volume 2](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-2/)
- [Volume 3](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-3/)
- [Volume 4](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-4/)
- [Volume 5](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-5/)
- [Issue 7](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-5-issue-7/)
- [Volume 6](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-6/)
- [Issue 1](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-6-issue-1/)
- [Issue 2](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/issue-2/)
- [Issue 3](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/issue-3/)
- [Issue 4](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/issue-4/)
- [Issue 5](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/issue-5/)
- [Issue 6](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/issue-6/)
- [Volume 7](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/volume-7/)
- [Issue 1](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/issue-1/)
- [Issue 2](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/issue-2-volume-7/)
- [Issue 3](https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/volume-issue/issue-3-volume-7/) - Fact-Checking